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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Statement of the Problem 
The theory of value is one of the most important 
aspects of philosophical thought and endeavor. It stands 
at the center of life for the academician and the man in 
the street alike. No other problem of philosophy "is 
closer to the heart of life than this; indeed it is the 
very problem of the heart of life."1 The problem of ulti-
mate reality is also a problem of ultimate worth. 
A conflict of ideals is raging in the world. It is 
not merely a conflict between East and West, or be-
tween science and tradition, or between political and 
economic democracy, or even between totalitarianism 
and freedom. It is a ~truggle nin the minds of menn 
about ultimate values. 
No matter what basic issue of contention one might 
choose, he discovers upon examination that the conflict, 
essentially, is a conflict of ideals. It is not a matter 
of one side with ideals versus the other side without 
ideals. Each side not only claims to have ideals, but to 
have the better ideals. In the conflicts just mentioned 
istic 
(rev. 
1E. s. Brightman, "The Tasks Confronting a Personal-
Philosophy," Personalist, II (1921), 260. 
2E. s. Brightman, An Introduction to Philosophy 
ed.; New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951), p. viii. 
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in the quotation from Brightman--conflicts between East 
and West, science and tradition, communisn1 and capitalism, 
and the others which he listed--each side attempts to de-
fend its position by pointing to ideals, and sometimes, 
interestingly enough, to the same ideals. Even the Nazis, 
in their program of systematic extermination of the Jews, 
had a rational apologetic based on ideals. Man's conflicts 
are truly conflicts in the realm of values. 
Surely philosophers have something to say that is 
relevant to this problem. In each case the experiences 
involved need to be carefully examined and critically in-
terpreted, tern~s need to be analyzed, basic issues need to 
be delineated and clarified, assumptions need to be brought 
out into the open, adequate criteria and methods need to be 
developed, and goals need to be understood and evaluated. 
Philosophers should be able to speak to these issues. 
To be sure, the philosophers have spoken. The 
history of the problem of value is as old as the history 
of philosophy, indeed, as old as human life itself. Good-
ness, truth, and beauty have been vital concepts in phi-
losophy since the "golden days0 of Greece, and values, 
whether or not designated by that word itself, have had a 
prominent part to play throughout the entire history of 
thought. 
But it was with Kant that modern value theory found 
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its inception and its inspiration. Plato and Aristotle had 
taught the objective validity of values, and their teaching 
served as the basis for the dondnant point of view in this 
regard until the probings of sense empiricism cast doubt 
upon such a theory. According to this new teaching, values 
were "tertiary qualities," two steps removed from the real, 
and dependent only upon hmnan feeling and desire. Kant 
recognized the contribution that had been made by the em-
piricists in their task of analysis, but he also realized 
that they had not told the whole story. Even if values do 
not exist in the same sense as physical things they have, 
nevertheless, a validity for life and action. 
From these views there developed a special interest 
in values, and the term value was first popularized in the 
writings of such divergent thinkers as Lotze (1817-1881) 
and Nietzsche (1844-1900), and later by Ritschl (1822-1889), 
Rickert (1863-1936), and Windelband (1848-1915). As a re-
sult of this increasing interest in the subject of values, 
the theory of value was beginning to be seen as a separate 
science, a special field of endeavor, within the larger 
field of philosophy. It attracted widespread interest 
among philosophers, and soon there appeared a steadily in-
creasing supply of books and articles on the subject of 
values and value experience. During the last seventy years 
there has been developed a tremendous body of literature 
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related to this problem. 
Thus the philosophers have spoken. But they have 
not spoken with anything like a single voice. The theory 
of value has been thought of by some as a normative sci-
ence which would specify a set of ideals which men ought 
to work toward and by which they ought to guide their 
actions. Others have seen it as a descriptive science 
which simply reports what men do desire, approve, or cher-
ish, or what they do use as guiding principles of their 
lives. Not only is one confronted by a tremendous body of 
literature in the field of value, but by such widely vary-
ing points of view within that literature. 
However, since so much work has been done in this 
field, it might conceivably be expected that, even though 
conclusions about the theory of value as a whole might 
vary, there has been developed, within the field, a basic 
system of terminology and definitions on which there is 
general agreement. Unfortunately, this is far from the 
actual case. The one term, "value," has been used for 
what men do value and for what they ought to value, it has 
been used both as a noun and as a verb, and it has been 
used to refer both to unexamined desire and to critical ap-
proval. One of the basic problems in value theory is this 
problem of tenninology, the problem of the definition of 
terms. This problem will constitute a recurring theme 
throughout the dissertation. As each system of thought 
is examined, the analysis will include an examination of 
the manner in which terms are defined within that system. 
As one confronts this literature in value theory, 
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he soon discovers that more attention has been given to 
ethical values than has been given to intellectual, aesthet-
ic, or religious values. Nor is this particularly sur-
prising. Man's experience is largely an experience of 
facing alternatives and of having to make choices from 
among those alternatives, and every act of choice, is, 
potentially, a moral decision. 
But when is a decision a moral decision and when 
not? And when confronted with alternatives, are there any 
basic principles universally valid for all men that one 
can use to guide him as he makes his choices? And if 
there are such universal principles, how is knowledge of 
them attained? Or are choices to be made simply on the 
basis of the demands of the society within which one hap-
pens to live, or on the basis of personal interest and de-
sire? 
The problem which this dissertation confronts is 
not so much the problem of value in general, but of moral 
value and moral experience in particular. And the basic 
problem to which it seeks to address itself, \tfithin the 
larger problem of the theory of value, is this: Is there, 
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among contemporary ethical systems, a sound, positive state-
ment of moral objectivism, which is able, without internal 
contradictions, and without basic inadequacies in handling 
human experience, to defend the view that rnan, as man, is 
subject to a set of moral laws as real and operative as 
physical laws and which determine the direction in which he 
must move if he is to realize the potentialities resident 
within a human being? 
2. Definition of Terms 
Since the problem of terminology ·will be a recur-
ring theme throughout the dissertation, the only terms to 
be defined here are those which appear in the title of this 
study, 11 Moral Objectivism in W. R. Sorley, \1. D. Ross, 
A. c. Ewing, and A. C. Garnett." 
The term "moral" implies, first of all, a realm in 
which there is voluntary control of conduct. That which 
one must, of necessity, do, is beyond the realm of the 
moral. One is not to be praised or blamed, either by 
himself or others, for that over which he has no control. 
To ascribe praise or blame is to assume that there is 
voluntary control. To praise is to judge that this control 
has been used well; to blame is to judge that it has been 
used poorly. 
Thus the term "moral" will be used only in reference 
to that realm in which there is voluntary control. 
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Illore than this, the term nmoral, u as used here, 
implies a standard of voluntary control of conduct. It 
does not imply a particular standard, but simply the 
existence of a standard, whatever it might be, by means of 
which it is possible to make distinctions of worth among 
alternative forms of conduct. For example, a person may 
choose between parting his hair on the side or parting it 
in the middle, and the voluntary aspect of the situation 
makes this, potentially at least, a form of moral behavior. 
But unless it is possible to show a basis for preference 
that suggests that one method of arranging the hair is 
better than the other, for whatever reasons that might be 
advanced, it would not ordinarily be thought of as a moral 
choice. Hair arrangement is usually simply a matter of 
taste. But if a moral distinction could be made ar.1ong 
alternative methods of arranging the hair, it would have 
to be in reference to some sort of standard by which one 
arrangement would then be seen as preferable to other ar-
rangements, and thus obligatory. 
The term "objectivism" is used in contrast to 
"relativism." It does not imply, necessarily, some sort 
of absolute standard of voluntary control of conduct, 
whatever that r:1ight mean. Rather, it refers to the posi-
tion which holds simply that moral experience, in general, 
has a more ultimate point of reference than just human 
desires, interests, and institutions, and that the moral 
standard is somehow valid for all men because they are 
men. Certainly human desires and interests must be taken 
into account, for these are to be found as a normal part 
of human experience. But the subjectivist wishes to re-
duce all judgments of obligation and worth to descriptive 
statements about subjective desires and interests, or 
even suggests that such judgments have no meaning. 
The objectivist, on the other hand, while agreeing 
that moral experience often includes the experience of 
desires and interests, insists that the basic meaning of 
judgments of obligation and worth is to be found not in 
terms of desires and interests themselves, but in the 
evaluation of desires and interests on the basis of some 
moral standard. 
"Moral objectivism," then, refers to any point of 
view or system of thought which holds, as a minimum, that 
there is a moral standard, or a set of ;·aoral standards, 
universally valid for all men. 
The men whose systems of thought are to ana-
lyzed in this dissertation, William Ritchie Sorley, 
William David Ross, Alfred Cyril Ewing, and Arthur 
Campbell Garnett, are all able to be classified as moral 
objectivists. The nature of the moral objectivism in each 
of these systems, and the degree to which each system is 
8 
9 
defensible as an adequate ethical theory, is the subject 
matter of this dissertation. 
3. Aim of the Dissertation 
It is the aim of this dissertation to examine the 
systems of thought of four recent and contemporary objec-
tivists in moral theory, Sorley, Ross, Ewing, and Garnett, 
with a view to evaluating the case vfhich they make for moral 
objectivism. 
4. Previous Work in the Field 
So far as is known by the present writer, this is 
the first study of its kind. It see,ns quite certain that 
these particular four systems of thought have never re-
ceived this kind of comparative analysis in one study; 
and when, from time to tiw.e, the thoughts of SOlile of these 
men have been examined individually, it has not been for 
the purpose of evaluating their contribution to moral 
objectivism. 
Sorley' s thought has received sorne attention from 
personalists and other idealists, the most notable being 
the careful and critical work done by Peter A. Bertocci in 
his doctoral dissertation, The Empirical Argu.11ent for God 
in Late British Thought •1 Indeed, this seeras to be the 
1P. A. Bertocci, The Empirical Argument for God in 
Late British Thought (Cambridge, Il"i:assachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1938). 
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only noteworthy analysis of Sorley's system. 
Ross's thought has had more references made to it 
than has that of any of the other three lilen of this study. 
As the one who developed the fullest state;nent of the 
deontologist position, Ross has attracted widespread at-
tent ion. l\1any recent books on ethical theory have made 
at least some reference to the theory which Ross developed. 
Some of these books have included expository and critical 
statements concerning Ross's system, such as, in particu-
lar, Ethical Theory by Richard B. Brandt; 1 The Moral Life 
2 
and the Ethical Life by Eliseo Vivas; and the two books 
by Thomas E. Hill, Contemporary Ethical Theories and 
Ethics in Theory and Practice.3 
Ewing has received less attention than Ross, and 
Garnett has received least of all. No thorough study has 
been r.1ade of their systems of thought, and references to 
them have been primarily expository in nature. 
There have been three unpublished dissertations 
which included studies of Ross's thought, and one of these 
1R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 
N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959). 
2E. Vivas, The Ivioral Life and the Ethical Life 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1950). 
3T. E. Hill, Contem ora Ethical Theories (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1 50 ; T. E. Hill, Et ics in 
Theory and Practice (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 
1956). 
included a study of Ewing's thought also. In 1952, Ftel-
vin Lubin, Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University, sub-
mitted the dissertation, Deontology and the Moral Life: 
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The Ethical Writings of H. A. Prichard, W. D. Ross, E. F. 
Carritt, and C. D. Broad. In 1955, Clifford T. Hanson, 
Ph.D. candidate at the University of Nebraska, submitted 
the dissertation, The Concepts of Right and Ought in the 
Philosophies of G. E. Moore, Sir William David Ross, and 
A. c. Ewing. And in 1958, Grayson D. Browning, Ph.D. can-
didate at the University of Texas, submitted the disser-
tation, Judgment and Motivation in Contemporary Intuition-
ist Ethics, a study of the thought of Prichard and Ross 
with points of emphasis indicated by the title. None of 
these dissertations are directly related to the present 
undertaking. 
5. Method of Procedure 
The method of procedure, following this introduc-
tory chapter, will be to examine the systems of thought 
of Sorley, Ross, Ewing, and Garnett, individually, and in 
that order. One chapter will be devoted to each of these 
four men. Each chapter will begin with a brief statement 
of the thinker's life and work, and this will be followed 
by an exposition of his system of thought. The final sec-
tion of each of these four chapters will consist of a 
critical evaluation of the system under discussion, pre-
senting what seem to be the strengths and weaknesses of 
that system. 
12 
Following these four chapters, Chapters II through 
V, there will be a chapter consisting of a comparative 
summary of the entire study of these four systerns of 
thought, and a statement of conclusions covering the work 
as a whole. 
Then will follow a bibliography of all of the 
sources cited in the dissertation or used in its prepara-
tion, an abstract of the dissertation, and a brief auto-
biography, including a photograph, of the write!'. 
CHAPTER II 
WILLIAM RITCHIE SORLEY 
The naturalistic ethics of the late nineteenth 
century found a vigorous critic in the person of William 
Ritchie Sorley (1855-1935). Sorley, schooled at Edinburgh 
and Cambridge, and actively at work in the field of moral 
philosophy when the new field of value theory came into 
its own, was a part of this new movement which developed 
a great wealth of literature in the first half of the 
twentieth century. Sorley•s contribution to this movement 
was not inconsiderable, and of the scores of articles, 
books, and book reviews which he wrote, a great majority 
were centered around the problems of value theory, 
particularly as they are related to ethical theory. Never-
theless he maintained a broad interest in all areas of 
human concern. 
Early in his career Sorley demonstrated his inter-
est in the relationship between naturalism and ethics, 
between evolution and purpose, and between historical 
description and ethical validity. In an essay published 
in 1883 he insisted that the origin and development of 
ethical ideals may indeed be aspects of historical fact 
which are important to know, but such facts do not determine 
13 
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the validity of the ethical ideals. 1 The historical method 
has its function to perform, but the establishment of valid 
moral ideals is not a part of that function. 
He formulated these notions more fully in two 
books, The Ethics of Naturalism and Recent Tendencies in 
Ethics, emphasizing the impossibility of deriving the idea 
of that which ought to be from that which is; the recog-
nition of moral ideas and moral ideals as valid data of 
experience that must be included in a coherent system of 
philosophy; and the notion that the universe and all that 
it contains cannot be understood apart from the postulates 
of purpose and intelligence. And in a later book, The 
Moral Life and Moral Worth, he insisted that morality is 
given in experience, and that moral ideas and ideals are 
and always have been a valid part of total experience.2 
Sorley's magnum opus, Moral Values and the Idea of 
God, first published in 1918, was originally presented as 
the Gifford Lectures for 1914 and 1915. The main emphases 
of Sorley•s thought found in this book include his insis-
tence that the best clue to what is, is found in what 
ought to be; that moral judgments claim objective validity; 
lw. R. Sorley, "The Historical Method," Essays in 
Philosophical Criticism, ed. A. s. Pringle-Pattison and 
R.B. Haldane (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1883), 
pp. 102-125. 
2w. R. Sorley, The Moral Life and Moral Worth 
(Cambridge: The University Press, 1911), p. 4. 
15 
that this objectivity is qualified by the fact that value 
is non-existent apart from personality; that moral values 
form a coherent system within a larger coherent system of 
the whole; that the universe is understandable only through 
the postulates of purpose and freedom; and that theism can 
best be argued on the basis of values, particularly moral 
values. 
Honors which Sorley received during his lifetime 
included fellowships and prizes as a student, the honorary 
degree of LL.D. from Edinburgh, election as a Fellow in the 
British Academy, the invitation to deliver the Gifford 
Lectures in Aberdeen, as well as an honored teaching post 
at Cambridge from 1900 until his retirement in 1933. After 
resigning his professorship he continued his pursuit of 
truth, and was at work on a book on political theory at 
the time of his death in 1935. 
1. Sorley•s Use of the Term "Value" 
Sorley defined value as a unique, sui generis 
predicate with an existential reference and claim. 1 That 
is to say, to predicate value of something is to say that 
that something ought to be. For Sorley, the significant 
distinction between predications of qualities and predica-
tions of value resides in the fact that predications of 
lw. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd. ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), pp. 76-79. 
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value have a claim to existence that predications of qual-
ities do not have. To say of a flower, It is yellow, is 
not to say that that particular flower ought to be yellow. 
It might just as well be red or pink or purple. But to 
say of the flower, It is beautiful, is to predicate a 
normative state of affairs that ought to exist even if it 
does not. And, on the other hand, to say of the flower, 
It is ugly, is to say, by implication, that it ought not 
to be so. To claim that anything is of value, be it truth 
or beauty or goodness, is to "pass from the mere concept 
or essence of the thing, with its qualities, to a bearing 
which this essence has upon existence: it is worth existing 
or ought to be."1 
Sorley approached this definition of value by 
discussing the meanings of value which he rejected. These 
include the conception that value arises out of a subjective 
experience of feeling or desire, in which the value is 
described as a functional relation between the subject 
valuing and the object valued; 2 the notion that value is a 
relation between objects;3 and the view that value is a 
quality of an object as shape and color are qualities of 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 77. 
2Ibid., pp. 54-73. 
3Ibid., pp. 73-74. 
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material things.l 
Of these rejected definitions of value, it was the 
first that received the greatest attention from Sorley. He 
described it as a psychological explanation of value which 
defines value in terms of feelings of pleasure and pain or 
in terms of experiences of desire. Such an explanation 
either does not make qualitative distinctions between types 
of pleasures and types of desires, hence all judgments are 
just existential judgments and not value judgments; or it 
does make qualitative distinctions and by those very dis-
tinctions demonstrates that it has introduced a differen-
tiating factor which cannot be identified with pleasure in 
the one case nor desire in the other.2 
Sorley had no quarrel with anyone who wished to 
describe the psychical history of moral judgments. He 
recognized, as did they, that "the moral consciousness is 
a comparatively late expression, if not of human life, yet 
of life generally,"3 and that as consciousness had preceded 
specific consciousness of pleasure, so consciousness of 
pleasure had preceded the moral consciousness. 4 But, he 
(3rd 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), pp. 74-75. 
2Ibid., pp. 56-57. 
3Ibid., p. 57. 
4Just what this "moral consciousness" is, for Sorley, 
and how it operates, will be examined in Section 2, "The 
Data of Ethical Theory, and their Claim to Validity." 
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argued, history and validity are two different things. If 
all one has to go by are the facts of history, and attempts 
to discover the meaning of the moral consciousness in feel-
ings of pleasure, then pleasures can be compared only as 
pleasures, in which case the only reasonable course of 
action would be to give preference to the stronger pleasure, 
for any other standard is denied. But with the arrival of 
the moral consciousness has come approval of certain 
pleasures and disapproval of others, and with it a new 
standard has been introduced, a standard of value. 
If the standard is that of desire rather than 
pleasure, the problem is much the same. As soon as there 
is approval of one desire and disapproval of another an 
additional criterion has been introduced and desire is no 
longer the ultimate criterion. Here again a standard of 
value has been introduced which is not based on desire but 
which attempts to judge desires. Value judgments have 
their psychical history just as do scientific judgments, 
but the validity of the former is no more determined by 
that history than is the validity of the latter. 1 
Thus, for Sorley, the notion of value is a notion 
that is not contained within the experience of pleasure nor 
within the experience of desire, but is a new factor which 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 64. 
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must come from some other source. 1 And until this new fac-
tor is added, until a standard of value has been determined, 
there can be no differentiation of worth between pleasures 
or between desires, and choice is devoid of value content. 
It is the standard of value that a person holds which makes 
it possible for him to choose intelligently between pleas-
ures and between desires, and which makes the act of choos-
ing a value experience. 2 Desire and an appraisal of desire 
are two different things, according to Sorley, and only in 
the latter is the element of value present.3 
The other definitions of value which Sorley rejected 
are given far less attention by him than this first defini-
tion by which value is seen as arising out of a subjective 
experience of feeling of pleasure or a subjective experience 
of desire. He rejected next the definition of value which 
describes value as a relation between objects, for this, 
said Sorley, is identifying value with the object valued. 4 
To describe value as a relation between objects is to point 
out a certain relation of harmony, or justice, or fairness 
in a situation, and to say that value consists just in that 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 57. 
2Ibid., p. 63. 
3Ibid • 
............... 
harmony~ or justice~ or fairness. To be sure~ one would 
not find value in a work of art which did not contain 
a harmonious relationship of color and line~ nor could 
one approve an industrial practice which did not contain 
20 
a just relationship between the persons involved. But to 
see that certain conditions must be fulfilled~ that certain 
relations must prevail for there to be value in a situation 
is one thing; to equate the relations with the value is 
quite another. "The value ascribed • . • is an added 
predicate over and above these relations."1 
The final definition of value which Sorley rejects 
is the definition which describes value as a quality of an 
object as shape and color are qualities of material 
things.2 Certainly in our language value is predicated 
as quality is predicated. The categorical proposition 
which states that "the apple is red" and the categorical 
proposition which states that "the painting is beautiful" 
seem to be examples of the same kind of assertion or predi-
cation. But~ said Sorley~ the likeness is only apparent. 
Qualities may be predicated not only of existing objects~ 
but also of non-existing ones and even of objects which 
cannot exist, which is quite different, according to Sorley~ 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924)~ p. 74. 
2Ibid.~ pp. 74-75. 
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from the situation in which value is predicated. A predi-
cation of value has a direct bearing upon existence, said 
Sorley, and in that fact itself is to be found the defini-
tion of value: "When we predicate worth or value we assert 
or imply that the object is worth being or ought to be."l 
Value is synonymous with that which ought to be. 2 
Such a definition of value can best be described as 
normative. That is to say, values are not values because 
they are valued by someone; rather, they are values because 
they Ought to be valued by someone, whether or not they 
actually are so valued. If it is true of a work of art 
that it is beautiful, one describes it as beautiful not 
because it simply seems so to him, or because it gives him 
certain aesthetic pleasure, or because it fulfills certain 
desires, but because he discovers its beauty, and in the 
discovery is discovering something that ought to be. How 
does this discovery occur, and how is it validated? It is 
to this question, essentially, that the next two sections 
address themselves. 
Even when all of this is said a certain vagueness 
remains in the notion of value as the term is used by Sorley. 
In his concern to separate the notion of value from the 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 77. 
2Ibid., p. 1. 
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notion of human desire he seems almost to be suggesting 
that desires are always evil, or at least dangerous, and 
that they are to be counteracted by denying them through 
some sort of imposition of Platonic Forms.l But that such 
is not his intent is seen clearly in his description of 
values as meaningless save as they are related to persons.2 
And it is at this point that he does the most to dispel 
any vagueness that beclouds his definition of value. At 
one point, speaking of truth and beauty, he says: "We do 
not seem justified in calling them values apart from their 
realisation in or through conscious life. They are not 
values till realised."3 At another, he says: 
What we call the 'goods' of the world are appraised 
in relation to persons--by ministering to their de-
sires, furthering their ideals, or offering scope for 
their activities. The fruits of the earth are called 
good if they nourish man or satisfy any human wants; 
the forces of nature, the arrangement and order of the 
world, are valued for their effects on the lives of 
persons--for the personal and social qualit4es and 
conditions which they encourage and foster. 
To be sure, he insists that such values are instru-
mental only, in that man uses them as "means for promoting 
(3rd 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 144. 
2Ibid., pp. 45, 117, 123, 498. 
3Ibid., p. 45. 
4 Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
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a human good." 1 They "are not in themselves values but 
only instruments of value, conditions by which intrin-
sic values are realised." 2 Nevertheless, even though this 
be so, the reference to satisfaction of human wants is 
significant, and is a type of reference that Sorley does 
not often make. Also, even though the reference here is 
to instrumental values, these instrumental values are 
integrally related to intrinsic values. Intrinsic values 
belong only to persons and, "it would appear, are found 
only in personal life."3 
In arguing for this relationship between values 
and persons Sorley suggests that one imagine, if he can, 
a world of nature exclusive of consciousness. In that 
kind of non-conscious world could there be such as we refer 
to as value? We who have eyes with which to see and minds 
with which to think pass judgments which predicate beauty 
and ugliness, truth and falsehood, good and evil. 
(3rd 
But if mind were completely extruded would there be 
any ground for attributing greater worth to the one 
order than to the other? If it did not express a 
mind, or any idea such as mind forms and imposes upon 
the world, and if, at the same time, there were no 
observing mind whose admiration might heighten its own 
worth, would there be any beauty, any value, in the 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 118. 
2Ibid • 
............... 
3Ibid. 
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assortment of material particles that is supposed to 
remain? We bring mind upon the scene when we say that 
this particular order would have been worth producing 
or that it would be rightly admired; and, unless this 
can be said, the arrangements of light and shade, of 
colour and form, are not themselves values, but only 
certain of the conditions which contribute to their 
being value.l 
With this insistence that values must belong to 
persons Sorley could have given to his theory sound 
empirical grounding. His theory of value, however, simply 
includes this insistence, but does not grow out of it. It 
will be seen in the next section of this chapter that 
Sorley bases his theory of value on what he thinks of as 
"judgments of what ought to be," rather than upon an ap-
praisal of human desires and human satisfactions and ful-
filments. 
In this exposition of Sorley 1 s use of the term 
value it seems appropriate to say a word about the types 
of value which seemed to him to be significant. Sug-
gesting that the categories of happiness, truth, goodness, 
and beauty are "comprehensive descriptions under which 
many particular experiences of value may be brought,"2 he 
then eliminated the category of happiness because happiness, 
rather than constituting an independent kind of value, 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 119. 
2 Ibid., p. 27 
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attaches itself to the other kinds of value. 1 He does not 
tell the reader exactly what he means by this term, 
happiness, and he makes no clear-cut distinction in his 
use of it between happiness and pleasure. He suggests, 
for example, that happiness may be based on sensual ex-
citement, on material riches, on the appreciation of 
beautiful things, on living a moral life, or in searching 
for truth. But he does not suggest, as he might have, 
that the happiness that comes from sensual excitement and 
material riches is perhaps of a different quality from 
that derived from the appreciation and creation of the 
beautiful, the true, and the good. Indeed, in the differ-
ence is to be found significant evidence of which Sorley 
might well have made more use in his argument for a teleo-
logical conception of the universe. But for Sorley the 
three main types of value remained the historic ones of 
truth, beauty, and goodness. 
Before olosing this discussion of Sorley•s use of 
the term value, it needs to be pointed out that he some-
times used the terms value and moral value as synonyms, 
thus making no clear distinction between the nought to ben 
and the "ought to be done by me." In an article in 1910 
he wrote that "the general theory of value might, perhaps, 
lw. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 30. 
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by stretching the meaning of an old term, be called Ethics; 
or a new term, Axiology, might be used for it."l Again, 
in Moral Values and the Idea of God, he stated that, "in 
the widest sense of the word," "ethics might be used to 
signify the whole realm of values." 2 And even when he is 
talking about what is more narrowly understood as ethical 
theory, he sees the primary ethical proposition as "this 
is good," not "this is right for me to do" or "this is 
good for me to do." This latter proposition, he says, 
"has to do with a special application of moral value--its 
application to the conduct of individual persons."3 And 
conduct can be understood in value terms, for Sorley, only 
when it is seen as the result of basic judgments of value. 
Morality is primarily virtuous character, not simply 
righteous conduct, though Sorley does not fail to appre-
ciate the importance of the latter. Intrinsic moral value 
can best be seen in the person possessing a spirit of good 
will, justice, and truth. 4 It is expected that works will 
follow, but morality consists not primarily of them but of 
the character from which they issue. 
1w. R. Sorley{ "The Philosophical Attitude," 
Ethics, XX (1909-1910), 159. 
2w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 508. 
3rbid., pp. 93-94. 
4 Ibid., p. 145. 
This problem of the relationship between the 
"ought to be" and the "ought to be done by me," between 
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judgments of worth on the one hand and obligation or duty 
on the other, is an intricate one, and will be examined as 
a part of the problem of the data of ethical theory, which 
is the subject of the next section. 
2. The Data of Ethical Theory and 
their Claim to Validity 
Among the earliest of Sorley 1 s published writings, 
as was mentioned above, was an essay, nThe Historical 
Method," which appeared as a chapter in a book edited by 
A. S. Pringle-Pattison and R. B. Haldane, Essays in 
Philosophical Criticism. In this essay Sorley took issue 
with anyone who would seek to limit the data of ethical 
theory to descriptions of the historical origin and devel-
opment of ethical ideals. He did not deny that the histor-
ical method had a function to perform, but he did deny that 
the establishment of valid moral ideals is a part of that 
function. 1 That there has been a development, indeed, an 
evolution of ethical ideals Sorley was quite willing to 
recognize. But he insisted on numerous occasions that 
scientific and historical descriptions leave untouched "the 
1w. R. Sorley, "The Historical Method," Essays in 
Philosophical Criticism, ed. A. S. Pringle-Pattison and 
R. B. Haldane (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1883), 
pp. 124-125. 
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fundamental question which ethics has to face--the question 
of the nature of worth or goodness or duty";l that the 
theory of evolution is historical, whereas ethics is not a 
question of history but of worth or goodness; 2 that the 
worth of a man is not to be determined simply on the basis 
of what he has already accomplished but also on the basis of 
what he is capable of accomplishing;3 and that evolution 
itself can only be interpreted correctly when the process 
of attempting to explain the more-developed in terms of the 
less-developed is abandoned in favor of explaining the 
less-developed in terms of the more-developed. 4 
The data of ethics, according to Sorley, go beyond 
historical or scientific considerations and consist of a 
kind of human experience not reducible to any other kind of 
experience. This ethical experience, or moral experience, 
is described by Sorley as a "consciousness of the differ-
ence between good and evil."5 Wherever men are found, 
1w. R. Sorley, "The Knowledge of Good," The Hibbert 
Journal, III (1904-1905), 545. 
2w. R. Sorley, The Ethics of Naturalism (Edinburgh: 
William Blackwood and Sons, 1904), p. vi. 
3w. R. Sorley, The Moral Life and Moral Worth 
{Cambridge: The University Press, 1911), p. 140. 
4w. R. Sorley, "Evolutionary Ethics," The Quarterly 
Review, CCX (1909), 378. 
5w. R. Sorley, The Moral Life ••• , p. 8. 
29 
there also are found r11oral ideas and moral institutions, 
and this, says Sorley, is a fact of experience that lllust 
be reckoned with. 1 Had there never been a distinction made 
between good and evil, between right and wrong, ethical 
theory would never have developed. But men have always 
had at least some awareness of such a distinction, and on 
the basis of this distinction they have developed their 
theories. This consciousness of a difference between good 
and evil is the "moral consciousness" vvhich was mentioned 
in the previous section. This moral consciousness, accord-
ing to Sorley, is a type of awareness which :nakes possible 
the judgments of approval and disapproval that have always 
been a part of human mental activity. 
The ethical concept is based upon the primary facts 
of the moral consciousness, just as scientific con-
cepts have as their basis the facts of direct experi-
ence. The primary facts of the rnoral consciousness 
are themselves of the nature of ~udgment--they are 
approbations or disapprobations. 
An experience is seen to be a r.toral experience by 
its content. If the object of the prir:1ary judg111ent con-
tains the notion of good or evil, the experience is consti-
tuted as moral, and becomes a datum of rnoral values. 
This moral consciousness is not a unique moral 
faculty that is at once inunediate and infallible. "We 
lw. R. Sorley, "The Knowledge of Good," The Hibbert 
Journal, III (1904-1905), 545. 
2Ibid., p. 556. 
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sometimes approve what is not worthy of approval, or disap-
prove what ought to have been approved." 1 But neither are 
any other of our primary judgments infallible. One may 
say, for example, "the haystack in purple," or "the tower 
in the distance is small," or "this line is longer than 
that line," and then upon examination discover that his 
judgments were incorrect. All primary judgments stand in 
need of criticism and possible revision, whether in the 
realm of values or sense experience. 
The moral consciousness, the consciousness of a 
distinction between good and evil, for Sorley, lies at the 
base of all ethical theory. The moral judgment that is 
here evoked is a perceptive judgment in the sense that it 
is immediate, and not the result of reasoning. It is cog-
nitive in the sense that it provides inforn~tion not deriv-
able from any other source. And because awareness always 
1noves from the particular to the universal, it is a partie-
ular judgment of good or evil passed in a certain concrete 
situation. This judgment can be called a moral intuition 
because it is in~ediate and of the nature of perception, 
but it is never, for Sorley, a general proposition that is 
so intuited, nor does it have an infallible claim to truth. 
Such moral intuitions constitute, for Sorley, the data of 
1w. R. Sorley, nThe Knowledge of Good,n The Hibbert 
Journal, III (1904-1905), 555. 
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ethical theory. 1 
If these moral intuitions--these primary judgments 
of approval and disapproval, of ought-to-be and ought-not-
to-be--are the primary materials out of which an ethical 
theory is to be built, what then is to be said about 
duties? If one makes the claim, "this ought to be," what 
relationship does this have, if any, to that person's 
responsibility for actualizing this particular ought-to-be? 
If the judgment, ought-to-be, issues forth from a mental 
activity described as moral consciousness, whence then comes 
the ought-to-done-by-me? 
Duties, says Sorley, are secondary and derivative, 
and can only follow the basic experience of judging worth. 
Then, says Sorley, when worth has been judged, it makes 
sense to relate one's activity to the judgment, and a per-
son is obligated to bring about this relationship; but his 
obligation is definable only in terms of the good that was 
predicated in the judgment of worth. 
Goodness is the ought-to-be, and is related to 
character--the inner state of the person. Duties are the 
ought-to-be-done-by-me, and find expression in conduct--
the overt manifestation seen in behavior. The former 
is the "good in itself"; the latter is the "good for me 
lw. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), pp. 88-91. 
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now." 1 The former is primary, sui generis, independent of 
historical facts; the latter is secondary in the sense that 
it can only be derived from and defined in terms of, the 
former, and is simply an expression of it. 2 Accordingly, 
says Sorley, 
it would appear that in the concept of virtue we get 
nearer to the essential nature of moral value than we 
do in the concept of the duties of man. Duty--the 
concept of worth which is also an obligation--certain-
ly belongs to the essence of a being who is self-
conscious and free, and to whom both the higher wa¥ 
and the lower are open. But duties (in the plural) 
necessitate the application of this principle to the 
changing details of life. And duty itself is a law 
for the will because of the intrinsic worth which 
makes it appeal to our conscience.3 
Duties, then, for Sorley, constitute no part of the 
basic data which underlie ethical theory. The feeling of 
obligation is dependent upon, and subsequent to, the moral 
judgment. When I decide that a particular act ought to be 
done by me now, it is because of the judgment that I have 
already made in terms of the good which I intend for my 
act to produce. 
At this point it is fitting to suggest that 
"conscience," mentioned at the close of the quotation above, 
seems somehow to be taken for granted, and the basic 
1w. R. Sorley, "The Knowledge of Good," The Hibbert 
Journal, III (1904-1905), 554-555. 
2w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 164. 
3Ibid., p. 145. 
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experience of feeling oughtness is not really explained at 
all. To this point we shall return in the statement of 
evaluation of Sorley's thought in the last section of the 
chapter. 
To return to the matter of the moral consciousness, 
and to the intuitions which constitute the data of ethical 
theory, we find Sorley stating that these intuitions, put 
in the form of judgments, "claim objective validity." By 
this he means that when a person makes a moral judgment 
he does more than just express a subjective attitude of 
mind. 1 The expression of the subjective attitude of mind 
may be included, but that is not the significant aspect of 
the situation. The significant aspect to be noted is the 
fact that when moral value is predicated, the judgment 
formed by that predication includes or implies a reference 
to an objective state of affairs. The person who says 
"this is good," does not mean necessarily that he likes, 
or desires, or enjoys, or finds pleasure in the object 
referred to, though such feelings may be present. The 
statement "this is good" implies an objectivity which, if 
valid, holds for everyone. A moral judgment may be false, 
but it cannot be both true and false at the same time. It 
claims validity; if proved false, the moral judgment which 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 93. 
disclaimed it claims validity. Without such a claim to 
validity moral judgments would be worthless. 
In arguing for this position, Sorley draws an 
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analogy between sense experience on the one hand and value 
experience on the other. In the analogy he is speaking 
primarily of epistemological objectivity, but uses this 
same analogy as part of his later argument for metaphysical 
objectivity. At this point he is suggesting that the 
judgment, "the moon is round,n and the judgment, nthe moon 
is lovely to behold," are alike in that each is attempting 
to describe a state of affairs that is other than simply 
a subjective state of the mind making the judgment. 
Certainly when one says that 'tthe moon is round," there is 
general agreement that reference is made to something 
other than a mental state. Epistemologically, at least, 
there is a one to one ratio here--a duality of subject 
and object neither of which becomes lost in the other. 
It is not otherwise with value experience, says 
Sorley. 1 If someone should argue that there is a differ-
ence, the same argument that reduces the value judgment 
to subjectivity must reduce the judgment based on sense 
experience to subjectivity also. Such subjectivity may 
actually exist, says Sorley, but let us not suppose we can 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 69. 
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have it in one area of experience yet avoid it in another. 
If we seek to save our sense experience from the abyss of 
such extreme subjectivism, then we shall save value 
experience from it by the same logic. 
Sorley distinguishes here between this prima facie 
claim to objective validity, and actual validation through 
the application of adequate criteria. If one states that 
the rod partially submerged in water is bent, the content 
of his judgment may need correction, but his intention is 
still that of attempting to describe an actual state of 
affairs. So also in value judgment, if the claim is that 
"pushpin is better than poetry," here again the content 
may need to be qualified, but here also the intention is 
to make an objective reference. In speaking of this claim 
to validity that belongs to sense experience and moral 
intuitions, Sorley insists upon the need for applying 
adequate criteria, as the next section indicates. But his 
emphasis here is upon the fact that across the ages such 
judgments have been made, and consistently they have sought 
to describe something other than just the mental activity 
that has made the initial perceptions and intuitions 
possible. 
If a man or a race of men have thought that something 
is good, then it is a truth--an eternal truth--that 
they so thought; but it is not therefore an eternal 
truth, or true at all, that the thing they thought 
good was good either Ihen or at any time--only that 
it seemed so to them. 
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The fact that they made judgments of approval and disap-
proval, then, is an eternally true fact. What was ap-
proved or disapproved at any particular time might or 
might not have deserved that approval or disapproval. The 
experience which clai1ns objective validity is a basic kind 
of mental activity referred to as moral awareness or moral 
consciousness, analogous to the basic kind of experience 
referred to as sensing. The content of both kinds of ex-
perience may be in need of correction, and both always stand 
in need of verification, but each always makes a prima facie 
claim to be referring to an objective referent. 
The problem of the validation of these claims 
through the application of adequate criteria is the subject 
matter of the section which follows immediately. 
3. The Criteria of Moral Value 
The initial claim to validity Inade by judgments of 
approval and disapproval, as has just been seen, is a claim 
to objectivity independent of the desires or likings of the 
subject making the judgment. But all moral judgments make 
this claim, and yet they cannot all be valid because they 
are not all consistent with one another. For a moral 
1 W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God (3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 68. 
Italics added. 
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judgment to be valid, says Sorley, it must be coherent with 
all other valid moral judgments. Inconsistency between 
judgments means the presence of error. "Freedom from con-
tradiction, coherence, and thus possible systematization 
are criteria by which the validity of any moral judgment 
may be tested." 1 
Sorley•s theory of moral value, then, begins with 
particular judgments of ought-to-be, or "oughts," which are 
intuitions which constitute the data of ethical experience. 
The general validity of these oughts must be accepted in 
order to make possible the criticism of any portion of this 
experience by the assistance of the remainder. 2 The incon-
sistencies and contradictions within the content of these 
intuitions can then be removed by developing them into a 
harmonious system. The process is no different, he insists, 
from that which, of necessity, goes on in all areas of 
human knowledge. Preliminary judgments, whether dealing 
with ethical knowledge or knowledge of causes and effects, 
always stand in need of criticism and possible revision, 
and even generally accepted propositions and theories need 
sometimes to be discarded. 
Theories which at one time seemed firmly established, 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 96. 
2Ibid., p. 91. 
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such as the ptolemaic theory in astronomy, or the 
atomic theory which lasted from the time of Democritus 
almost to the present day, have given place to other 
theories which include a wider sweep, and a better un-
derstanding of each portion, of experience. The prog-
ress of moral ideas shows no greater transformation.I 
The particular "oughts" with which this theory begins, 
far from being disparate and individually unique, one from 
another, are expressions of moral principles. Every moral 
judgment, while it is a particular judgment applicable in a 
particular situation, always implies a universal. "When I 
say 'this is good,' it is because of some character of the 
'this' that it is called good." 2 The particular is approved 
in virtue of a universal principle present in it. 
The criticism of the moral judgment reveals a universal 
element in its subject; the subject is not a mere 
"this"; it is a "this" of a certain determinate kind; 
and it is owing to its character in this respect, that 
is, to the universal element in it, that it is held to 
be good or evil.3 
What Sorley seems to be saying here is that when one 
makes a value judgment, such as "It is good that John gave 
the books to Bill," the value of the situation is related 
to universal principles implied in the judgment, and that 
these universal principles go far beyond this one particular 
instance. The universal principle in this case could be 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 105~ 
2Ibid., p. 97. 
3Ibid., p. 98. 
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connected with friendship, and it might be maintained as a 
principle that friendship always involves sharing; or per-
haps Bill is the owner of the books, and debts should be 
paid; or Bill might be a student in financial straits, and 
then the principle might have something to do with charita-
ble aid extended to one's fellows, particularly when they 
are deserving. 
Such universal principles are discovered in the 
process of applying the criteria of freedom from contradic-
tion, coherence, and systematization, and the greater the 
degree of universality that is discovered, then the greater 
the degree of validity that can be assigned to the principle. 
Along with this test of universality-is the test of 
system. Individual judgments of ought-to-be that fit into 
the system can ordinarily be classed as true, and those 
that fail to fit can be classed as false; though sometimes 
those that fail to fit the old system are seen to be right 
through a fresh resystematization. This test is the same, 
says Sorley, as that by which the accuracy of sense-per-
ception is established. Illusions are so designated 
because they are not able to fit in harmoniously with the 
system of sense experiences. 
But what if the test needs to decide between two 
systems each of which claims validity? Then, n~intained 
Sorley, the test of comprehensiveness is to be applied. 
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That system which represents the most comprehensive univer-
sality of interests has the prior claim to validity. Often-
times, however, the criterion of comprehensiveness reveals 
principles within both systems which are true and which 
really belong together in the same system. Then a new 
system is developed which is more adequately comprehensive. 
Very often, says Sorley, contradictions between particular 
"oughts" are not contradictions of principle at all, but 
appear to be so because of differences in degree of com-
prehensiveness. By way of illustration he refers to the 
savage's approval of head-hunting and the civilized man's 
disapproval of it as both expressions of a common principle 
concerning community welfare. The savage supposes com-
munity welfare enhanced by his activity; the civilized man 
considers such welfare jeopardized by this kind of activity; 
but both agree that community welfare is good, though the 
civilized man is able to think of community in more compre-
hensive terms. 
After suggesting these criteria of universality, 
system, and comprehensiveness for testing moral values, 
and after insisting vehemently that the facts of history 
and the data of ethical theory belong to different orders 
of experience, Sorley makes an interesting reference to 
the history of the hmnan race and to what, in that history, 
he calls the "salient facts of moral appreciation."1 
These facts, he says, "express a constant preference of 
the spiritual over the material or sensuous values." 2 No 
illustrations are given. Two pages later he reiterates: 
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It is a permanent characteristic of the moral con-
sciousness to find value in certain kinds of experi-
ence rather than in other kinds. At every critical 
turn the moral judgment pronounces for the superiority 
of the spiritual to the material in life, and recog-
nises the importance of social ends when confronted 
by the interests or apparent interests of the self-
seeking individual. The higher life and the wider 
life--the life of spirit and the life for others--
these the moral judgment approves with a constancy 
that is almost uniform. The valuation has indeed been 
rejected by individuals from time to time--as it was 
by Thrasymachus in the Republic, as it is in the 
present day by the followers of Nietzsche. But this 
rejection is not so much a different interpretation 
of the moral consciousness as a revolt against 
morality.3 
Between the criteria of universality, system, and 
comprehensiveness on the one hand, and this appeal to moral 
history on the other~ the correlation is not as simple as 
it might at first appear. The criteria are rationalistic. 
They are applied through the process that is called think-
ing. They begin with intuitions which make a claim to 
objectivity but whose fallibility so far as content is 
concerned is well recognized. But when Sorley talks about 
lw. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 104. 
2Ibid. 
3rbid., p. 106. 
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historical uniformity, either partial or complete, the 
uniformity is not that of the application of these criteria. 
Rather, the appeal here is to an intuitionism, not rational-
ism. It is the moral consciousness that is seen as opera-
ting uniformly, rather than thinking that is using certain 
uniform criteria. Sorley again gives the reader no 
illustrations. Certainly the history of the world's great 
thinkers, East and West, offers an ample supply of examples 
of persons who chose what Sorley calls nthe higher life and 
the wider life." But what reason can be given for their 
choice? Sorley does not seem to be suggesting here that 
it was always based on their use of the criteria which he 
suggests. Rather, he seems to be saying that it was the 
product of their "moral judgment." Here the criteria take 
on a role of confirming the moral judgment, rather than 
seriously criticizing or revising it, and the moral judg-
ment seems to be a special faculty that is designed to 
lead man to the higher life and the wider life if he will 
but listen to its call. 
To this last point we must return in the section 
on evaluation of Sorley's thought, the last section in this 
chapter. 
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4. Values as Relative and as Objective 
R. A. Tsanoff has said that nthe resistance to 
value-relativism engaged the entire philosophical career 
of William Ritchie Sorley."1 That is surely no overstate-
ment of the case. From his first published work to his 
last Sorley was deeply interested in the problem of the 
status of value, and he refuted strongly and consistently 
the notion that values are relative to the subject who 
pronounces the judgment of value. 
But the term relative, Sorley pointed out, may be 
used in two different ways. 2 In the first place it may 
refer to the type of relativity just mentioned by which 
an object is seen as dependent upon the subject observing 
it. A value, involved in such a subjective dependence, 
would be a value for an individual only if, and as long as, 
it was an object of desire for that individual. It would 
cease to be a value when it ceased to be an object of 
desire. 
Sorley wanted it to be remembered, however, that 
if such a form of relativism is true for value judgments, 
it is also true for every other type of judgment.3 If 
lR. A. Tsanoff, The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization 
(New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1942), p. 591. 
2w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 133. 
3rbid., pp. 134-135. 
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values are relative because they are appreciated by per-
sons, then facts of science are relative because they are 
apprehended by persons.l Both judgments of fact and judg-
ments of value are involved in the same sort of epistemo-
logical procedure, and there is no more reason for holding 
that values are subjective because they belong to a knowing 
mind than there is to hold that facts of science are sub-
jective because they belong to a knowing mind. 
The second way in which the term relative may be 
used, though it is often confused with the first, is 
actually quite different from it. This second meaning 
does not imply subjectivity as did the first, a subjec-
tivity in which the object is seen as dependent upon the 
subject; rather it indicates a relation between the par-
ticular object and the other factors of the objective 
whole. 2 Value is thus relative, in this sense, to other 
values, to persons, to circumstances, and to the whole of 
reality. 
In opposition to Plato, Sorley rejected the view 
which maintains that ideas such as the true, the good, and 
the beautiful are all that are truly real, and that the 
manifestation of such ideas in concrete life and action 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 134. 
2 Ibid., p. 138. 
are unimportant for the task of discerning reality. 1 For 
Sorley, value is always related to existence. Value 
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cannot be predicated of abstract universals. It belongs 
only to the concrete, to the existent, to persons, and must 
therefore always be understood as relative to these ele-
ments. This type of relativity always holds; where there 
is not this relationship to existence and to persons there 
is no value. 
Moreover, said Sorley, value is related to the 
physical and social environment within which it finds 
itself. 2 The person, as the bearer of value, never stands 
alone, but must be understood as related to other persons, 
and is dependent upon his environment for the continuation 
of physical life. This is not to argue for a determinism 
based on circumstances, in which the circumstances would 
control the realization of value; but it is to point out 
that value, while objective, stands in a close relation-
ship with the total environment of the person who does the 
valuing.3 
(3rd 
Because of this relationship there is a tremendous 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
ed.; Cambridge: The University-Press, 1924), p. 139. 
2 1£!£., p. 140. 
3rbid., p. 141. 
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diversity in the values which different people realize. 1 
Different talents, temperaments, interests, skills, natural 
and social environments, historical traditions, and econom-
ic and social conditions, all have their part to play in 
the values which persons cherish and realize; and the 
existence of such differences makes it impossible for the 
experience of value to be the same for any two persons. 
"No man can quite take another's place or live another's 
life. "2 
However, said Sorley, though such diversity of 
values indicates relativity of values, this relativity is 
not complete.3 The different circumstances which have 
been mentioned determine details rather than underlying 
principles. The diversity that is found is .. not inconsis-
tent with a unity of principle or of spirit."4 It is a 
diversity within a greater unity. All of the many diverse 
values are interrelated, and form an organic unity or 
organic whole.5 The value of the whole is more than the 
sum of the values which make up the whole, but all of the 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), pp. 141-142. 
2Ibid., p. 142. 
3rbid., pp. 141-143. 
4 ~., p. 142. 
5rbid., p. 153. 
values of individual persons contribute toward the value 
of the whole. 
In insisting upon this type of relativity of 
values, Sorley accordingly points out that in no real 
sense can values be called absolute. 1 The term absolute 
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refers to that which is complete in itself and has no re-
lations to anything beyond itself. Values do have relations, 
as has been seen, to one another, to the persons to whom 
they belong, and to the circumstances in which those persons 
find themselves. There cannot be more than one absolute, 
one of which belongs just to values. 2 By definition there 
can be only one absolute and that is the total organic 
unity of reality. Everything, including values, must find 
its relationship to that whole. 
The absolute after which we strive is always ahead of 
us and never adequately comprehended. For it is 
absolute, not in its simplicity and separateness, but 
in its system and completeness. Our moral knowledge 
is not derived by deduction from a fixed and certain 
principle. It grows in amount and in organisation 
with the growth of our moral experience; and by 
criticism of this experience we gradually form less 
in1perfect conceptions ~f the realm of ends, or world 
of values, as a whole. 
Values, then, for Sorley, are not relative in the 
subjective sense, but are relative in the sense that they 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), pp. 156-157. 
2Ibid., p. 157. 
3Ibid., p. 155. 
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are always intimately related to existence and to persons. 
Because of this fact values can never be thought of as 
absolute, since the absolute is complete in itself and has 
no relations to anything outside of itself. Sorley denies 
the subjectivity of values on the one hand and the abso-
luteness of values on the other, and argues for a view of 
values in which values are seen as objectively and univer-
sally valid for all reality. 
It has already been seen that, for Sorley, values 
claim the same kind of epistemological objectivity as that 
claimed by objects of sense experience. In neither case 
is such objectivity absolutely provable, but the argument 
in each case stands or falls by the same logic. But what 
Sorley means by objectivity here goes far beyond simply 
the avoidance of solipsism, and values are seen at last as 
a sort of third order of reality., along with 11 existents11 
as the first order, "among which we distinguish persons 
from what may be called simply things"; and relations., 
such as the laws of nature, as the second order. 1 
Indeed, says Sorley., 2 we gain insight into the true 
meaning of the objectivity of values when we contemplate 
1w. R. Sorley., Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924)., p. 191. 
2w. R. Sorley, "Value and Reality," Contemporary 
British Philosophy, ed. J. H. Muirhead (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1925), p. 257. 
the nature of natural laws. Such principles as the axiom 
of the conservation of energy or the law of gravitation 
are not entities with a separate existence of their own, 
and yet they are not cast aside as subjective fancies. 
They describe for us a certain orderliness in our experi-
ence, and because of this we call them "valid." "To be 
valid is not the same thing as to exist, but it is to be 
valid of reality, so that this validity is included in 
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the nature of reality."1 So it is with the principle of 
good will, the chief moral value for Sorley. The validity 
of good will does not depend upon its presence in any par-
ticular mind. Good will Ought to be present in minds be-
cause of its validity, but it is first of all valid, and 
secondly present in minds. 
The steps in the process by which we ascertain 
this validity, according to Sorley, would seem to be as 
follows: (1) The moral consciousness of an individual 
enables him to make a judgment of approval upon good will 
and disapproval upon ill will. He is able to "see" or 
"recognize" or "discover" good will for what it is, and 
thus approve it. This is the basic kind of intuitional 
experience upon which all value-judging is founded, for 
Sorley. The individual could, of course, in this first 
lw. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 188. 
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step, approve ill will, but his error would be demonstrated 
when the test of coherence is applied. (2) In the second 
step the initial judgment undergoes critical examination. 
Does the principle of good will lend itself to universal 
application? Is it consistent within itself, and coherent 
with all that is known about reality? Does it fit into 
a system of principles which together constitute an organic 
whole? Affirmative answers to these questions confirm the 
objectivity claimed in step one. 
Ethical principles which are thus seen to be valid 
are further confirmed when they become efficient factors in 
the world's history, for what men have thought ought to be 
has shaped their activity in producing the actua1. 1 This 
is not to say, however, that it is possible to begin with 
the actual and work backwards. An examination of a cross-
section of the actual state of affairs cannot yield com-
plete information in the realm of values. Such a cross-
section can never be taken as representative of the whole. 
Persons are the only possible bearers of value, and "persons 
cannot be understood by what they have achieved at any 
given moment." 2 It is their nature "to be realisers of 
value" and this is a continuous dynamic process which 
lw. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 187. 
2 ~., p. 232. 
cannot be captured by a cross-section. What they are 
capable of becoming in the future must also be taken into 
account. 1 
"Why," asks Sorley, does each person "approve the 
goodness of others or blame his own deficiencies? It is 
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because his consciousness, his nature, is in sympathy with 
the value which he sees, even when he fails to reach it 
himself. It is the anima naturaliter moralis that speaks." 2 
Within himself, somehow, within his cognition, he comes to 
grips with ideals not of his own making, ideals that 
attract him and challenge him. "He has affinity with the 
ideals which he approves even when he fails to follow 
them."3 
Values characterise personal life as completed and 
perfected; they are factors in the fulfilment of 
purpose, and purpose is an essential trait of per-
sonality. It is possible that they may never obtain 
complete realisation in time. But, even so, they 
will express the limit towards which the nature of 
persons points and presses. In this way they belong 
to the sum total of reality as an existing system. 
And this connexion resembles that of law to fact in 
the causal systen~ with this difference: that the 
latter relation is exhibited at each instant of time, 
whereas the realised system of values is the limit 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
{3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 232. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
towards1which personal life tends in its temporal course. 
Thus, for Sorley, there is a moral order in which human 
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living at its fullest finds direction. When the individual 
brings value into existence he "is conscious of a standard 
or ideal which has validity as a guide for his personal 
endeavor, or of an obligation that rests upon him.n 2 
Without such awareness of an ideal, there could be no ex-
perience of value. But experiences of value we know, so 
"we are compelled to form the conception of an ideal good 
or of a moral order, which, as the condition of actualised 
goodness, must also be regarded as in some sense having 
objective reality."3 
This objective moral order is the base upon which 
Sorley grounds his argwnent for God. Since such a moral 
order is seen to exist, it needs a residence, and the only 
adequate residence would be a Cosmic Mind. 
Thus the values of truth, goodness, and beauty 
represent, for Sorley, objectively valid and universally 
applicable principles, the reality of which is independent 
of man, yet only in the fulfilment of which can man find 
self-realization. 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), p. 238. 
2 Ibid., p. 499. 
3Ibid., pp. 499-500. 
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5. Evaluation of Sorley's Thought 
In evaluating Sorley's thought, it is well to be-
gin with the merits of his system. One of these merits is 
to be seen, sur~ly, in his consistent atteQpt to have his 
system firmly grounded in experience, with the terrr, experi-
ence used in a broad and inclusive manner. Whatever be-
longs to experience, to hwnan consciousness, Sorley 
thought, should be considered as data in the task of 
philosophical explanation. Whoever is guilty of excluding 
certain types of experience from such consideration will 
inevitably develop a philosophical explanation that is 
inadequate for accounting for all experience. This, he 
thought, was the shortcorning of the naturalists. In his 
opinion the naturalists had centered their attention upon 
the world of sense experience and had ignored the whole 
realm of experience of approvals and disapprovals, of 
moral experience, and thus had cut themselves off from 
the possibility of developing an adequate philosophical 
system. 
Only when all experience is taken into account--
moral, aesthetic, religious, intellectual, as well as 
sensory--can there be any real hope of developing an 
adequate philosophical explanation of this universe and 
its experients. Any adequate theory of philosophical ex-
planation must include all items of experience as data. 
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If a whole area of experience is excluded, the r-esulting 
theory will, to that extent, be incomplete and inadequate. 
Such exclusion may simplify the task of explanation, but 
the adequacy of an explanation is certainly far uore sig-
nificant than its simplicity. Occam's razor calls for 
the greatest simplicity possible, but never at the expense 
of adequacy. 
For a theory of value this empirical emphasis 
means, in the first place, that whatever else is to be 
said of values, they must always be understood as related 
to experience and to existence. They are not to be 
thought of as floating loose in the air, but are always 
ndown to earth" where experience is taking place. And, 
in the second place, it means that experiences of value, 
whether of the true, the good, the beautiful, or the holy, 
are just as surely facts of experience, and worthy of 
consideration and investigation, as experiences of color, 
sound, taste, odor, or touch. 
A second merit belonging to Sorley's thought, and 
closely related to the first, is the significant place 
given to persons in his system. Surely there can be no 
experience without experients, for the former is dependent 
upon the latter. Any system that dares to call itself 
"empirical" needs to give careful attention to the sub-
ject to whom "experiencen belongs. It is Sorley's point 
• 
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that for there to be an experience of value there must be a 
personal mind that is the home and the occasion of that 
experience. More than this, values themselves are mean-
ingless save as they are related to persons, they must 
be interpreted in terms of their relationship to persons, 
and without this relationship to persons they cannot be 
said to exist. 
A third merit that needs to be mentioned is Sor-
ley's use of the coherence criterion as the test by which 
values are to be judged. If value judgments are to be 
organized, then it would seem that one is on the right 
track when he looks for a universal system of values, 
and when he suspects that something is wrong when he dis-
covers contradictions between judgments of value. Whether 
or not Sorley's analysis of moral experience is acceptable 
is a probleut still to be handled, but his use of coherence 
is certainly an asset to his system. 
A fourth merit of Sorley's thought is to be found 
in his insistence that what he terms moral experience, the 
whole realm of the "ought to be," must not be allowed to 
be explained away or reduced to non-moral terms in the 
process of analysis or explanation. The real1:1 of ought-
ness is as real in our experience as is the realm of 
existence. To be sure, Sorley's treatment of this realm 
of oughtness has created some problems which must still be 
handled before this chapter can be concluded; nevertheless, 
his recognition of it, and his inclusion of it, as one of 
the significant aspects of his system constitute a genuine 
contribution. Moral experience is a unique kind of experi-
ence, not reducible to that which is essentially non-moral. 
And a fifth merit of Sorley's thought is to be 
seen in his suggestion that man lives under a set of moral 
laws that are as real and operative as the laws of the 
physical universe. rvien have their differences one from 
another, yet man everywhere is basically the same. It is 
only reasonable to suppose that, as man everywhere needs 
such things as vitamins, proteins, and minerals to nurture 
his physical body, so he seems to need love, especially 
his own expression of it to others but also their expres-
sion of it to him, for the nurture of his spirit. Whether 
or not it is justifiable to think of the realm of :noral law 
as a realm independent of man is a problem still to be 
examined. But that man lives in a universe in which he 
is not free to do anything that he wants to do and then 
have any set of consequences he may choose, seerns quite 
apparent. The law of the harvest, of reaping what one 
sows, seems inescapable. Without it, indeed, moral char-
acter could not be developed. The concept of moral law 
suggests an order of universal values which are valid for 
all men because they are men. 
Turning from merits to difficulties, we find it 
necessary to raise some rather basic questions concerning 
Sorley's system. One of these questions has to do with 
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the relationship that exists between values and desires. 
Sorley is less anxious to describe a relationship here than 
he is to draw a sharp distinction between the two. For 
Sorley, values are values and desires are desires, and he 
is fearful of any suggestion that values are somehow to be 
explained in terms of desires. 
Sorley 1 s insistence that desire and appraisal of 
desire must not be confused one with the other is surely 
well taken. If desires are to be evaluated, then there 
must be introduced into the process a standard of judging 
which is itself something other than desire. But granting 
this, could it not still be true that current notions 
about the wrongness and rightness of the satisfaction of 
certain desires are the end product of a lengthy history 
of experience and experimentation in which the satisfaction 
of certain desires proved "desirable11 while others proved 
nundesirable 11 ? Sorley hiruself, at one point, hints at 
such a possibility, as was pointed out above, 1 when he 
suggests that all things which are thought of as possessing 
value are so thought of because they are instrumental to 
1w. R. Sorley, Moral Values and the Idea of God 
(3rd ed.; Cambridge: The University Press, 1924), 
pp. 117-118. Quoted above, p. 22. 
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some person's wants, desires, needs, or aspirations. This 
never becomes a part of his theory of value, however, 
which is based not on desires and their subsequent evalua-
tion, but rather on cognitive judgments of worth and 
approval. And these judgn1ents, apparently, are less con-
nected with this life of experienced desire than with an 
independent value realm the truths of which we grasp intui-
tively. What constitutes them as values, for Sorley, is 
not that they :-nay have first arisen in the experience of 
satisfaction of desire, and then managed to pass the test 
of careful criticism. Rather, they are intuited as be-
longing to an order of reality which is independent of man 
yet somehow relevant for man. But if such a realm is 
really independent of man, does it make any sense to in-
sist that the values of such a realm have any relevancy 
for man? Wherein would the connection lie? And if values 
of such a realm could be shown to be valid for man, would 
not this be sufficient to disprove its independence? 
Sorley could have avoided the problems connected with such 
a position by developing his suggestion about the relation-
ship between values and personal desires. This he did not 
choose to do. 
Another question to be raised, along with this one 
about the relationship between values and desires, concerns 
Sorley's use of the notion of obligation. Sorley defines 
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value as 11 that which ought to be." But from whence comes 
this "oughtness, 11 this obligation? Who is obligated to 
whom, and in what way? We have already discussed Sorley's 
distinction between the "ought to be" and the 11 ought to be 
done by ~11e." For him, the virtues of the 11 ought to ben 
are the basis for determining the duties of the 11 ought to 
be done by me." Nowhere, however, does he analyze the 
nature of ought as experienced. At one point he speaks of 
conscience, but passes by with no indication that the 
word ;night present some difficulties as to its proper 
interpretation. He is quite clear, certainly, in his 
insistence that a feeling of obligation can arise only as 
a result of a prior judgment of approval or disapproval. 
But can obligation as felt be fully explained in terms 
of such judgments of approval which are essentially cogni-
tive in nature? 
For Sorley, an experience is seen to be a moral 
experience by its cognitive content. If the predicate of 
the prLaary judgment contains the notion of good or evil, 
then the experience is constituted as :rnoral, and becomes 
a datum of moral values. But such a description of moral 
experience seems far removed fron1 the arena in which actual 
moral struggling goes on. What seems actually to take 
place is lllOre vital, more dynamic than such a view sug-
gests. In moral experience the individual finds himself 
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called upon to 1nake a choice, and he feels obligated to 
choose one alternative in preference to others. What 
mal{es the experience a moral experience vmuld seel•l to be 
not just the cognitive content but the feeling of obliga-
tion that is present as well. 
A final question to be raised here concerns Sor-
ley's appeal to intuition at crucial points in the devel-
opment of his syster:1. His basic analysis of i>Joral experi-
ence includes "moral intuitions 11 as the very foundation 
stones of that experience. Granted, these intuitions are 
not to be accepted as infallible, but must undergo test-
ing. And yet intuitions refer to iwmediate perceptions, 
and the suggestion that Sorley is :naking here is that 
:noral experience is basically a cognitive experience. 
Once again, this fails to include the notion of the ex-
perience of obligation as felt. 
Another particular instance of this appeal to in-
tuition was mentioned above in relation to Sor1ey's dis-
cussion of "the higher life and the wider life--che life 
of spirit and the life for others." 11 These," he says, 
11 the moral judg;n.ent approves vlith a constancy that is al-
most uniform. 11 
But why should this be so? Is it because there 
is a cognitive 11 moral given" which cor:tes to the individual 
as a discovery of an order of reality independent of man 
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yet valid for him? This surely is the impression that is 
left with the reader. The "moral judgment" is given 
credit for 11 recognizingn wherein true value lies. But is 
it necessary to adopt so mysterious an explanation? 
Perhaps it might be suggested as an alternative 
theory that, through a long process of trial and error, 
through examination of consequences, through many experi-
ences judged "desirable" and "undesirable, 11 and after 
much critical appraisal, men who approved the "higher life 
and the wider life11 did so because they discovered what 
seemed to them to be the basic desirability of such a way 
of life. Rather than belonging to a realm independent 
of man, this higher, wider life may well have been forged 
on the anvil of human experience. The life of spirit and 
the life for others may have been discovered to be more 
self-fulfilling, broadly conceived, than the life of 
sense experience and the life for self. 
CHAPTER III 
WILLIAM DAVID ROSS 
A significant figure in contemporary British 
thought is William David Ross (1877- ), twenty-two 
years Sorley•s junior. Ross was formerly of Oriel 
College, Oxford University, having served there, at 
various times, as Fellow and Tutor, Professor of Noral 
Philosophy, and Provost. A fellow and one time president 
of the British Academy, a member and one time president 
of the Aristotelian Society, an Aristotelian scholar of 
distinction and wide renown, the editor of the Oxford 
edition of Aristotle which included his own translation 
of several of the works, an honorary fellow of Merton 
College, and Gifford Lecturer in Aberdeen in 1935-1936, 
Ross has served in many capacities which have meant both 
great honor and great responsibility. 
In the realm of ethical theory and ethical value, 
Ross recognizes a substantial intellectual obligation to 
H. A. Prichard and C. D. Broad. The primary characteristic 
of the deontological point of view which each of these 
thinkers represents is to be seen in the sharp distinction 
which is made between right and duty, on the one hand, and 
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goodness on the other. According to P. H. Nowell-Smith1 
and A. C. Garnett, 2 deontological ethics is duty ethics 
(the term coming from the Greek deon, deontos, meaning 
obligation), as opposed to teleological ethics which is 
value ethics or goods ethics (coming from the Greek telos, 
teleos, meaning end or goal). What the deontologists 
insist upon, more than anything else, is the affirmation 
that the rightness of an act is not reducible to whatever 
good may be found in it or realized from it. The rightness 
of an act is itself unique, irreducible, sui generis, 
non-inferential. Prichard argued3 that moral philosophy 
has been laboring under the presupposition that when a 
person ought, there is a reason why he ought. This pre-
supposition, both false and misleading according to 
Prichard, has been responsible for much faulty thinking in 
the realm of ethical theory. What needs to be recognized, 
says Prichard, is that one ought, simply because he ought. 
He can desire for reasons, but he cannot ought for reasons. 
Oughting is a function which he simply has. 
While Ross agrees that the rightness of an act is 
1P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (Harmondsworth, Middle-
sex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1954), p. 13. 
2A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 25. 
3H. A. Prichard, "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a 
fJiistake?", Mind, XXI (1912), 21-37. 
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not reducible to the goodness or it nor the consequences 
which it will bring about, he does recognize that a study 
of the concept "good" belongs as much to ethics as does a 
study or the concept "right," and he sees them as closely 
related under certain conditions. The extreme deontologi-
cal position can be seen as one or the factors which had a 
part in shaping Ross's thought, but the milder form of the 
theory as set forth by C. D. Broad--milder in the sense 
that it contains certain concessions to the utilitarian 
point of view--seems closer to Ross's own position. 
In The Right and the Good, published in 1930, Ross 
attempted a detailed analysis or what he considered to be 
the three most important concepts of moral philosophy, 
namely, the right, the good, and the rnorally good. Slightly 
less than a decade later in his Gifford Lectures, Founda-
tions or Ethics, he examined these concepts again, reaf-
firming much that he had already said, modifying some of 
his conclusions, and adding some new material. Ross has 
chosen not to prepare articles for publication in the philo-
sophical journals, though he did read a paper concerning the 
matters discussed in his books at the Sixth International 
Congress or Philosophy, and another at the Ninth Interna-
tional Congress of Philosophy, both of which papers were 
subsequently published. The material in these papers, 
however, is amply covered in his two books named above, 
and principally in Foundations of Ethics. 
C. D. Broad refers to The Right and the Good as 
nthe most important contribution to ethical theory made in 
England for a generation"; 1 and he speaks of Foundations 
of Ethics as a book "in which good sense and acuteness and 
clarity, commonly lavished on trivial straw-chopping, are 
devoted to elucidating questions of perennial significance."2 
R. B. Brandt speaks of Ross as having developed "the most 
convincing of twentieth century formalist theories."3 Cer-
tainly Ross has set forth the most complete and systematic 
treatment of the deontological point of view. 
1. The Meaning and Ground of Right 
Using the same sort of empirical approach as was 
seen to be characteristic of Sorley, Ross proposes to take 
as his starting-point the existence of what he calls the 
moral consciousness. 4 This moral consciousness, for Ross 
as for Sorley, consists of that great host of opinions, 
convictions, and beliefs which people hold concerning what 
kinds of acts ought, or ought not, to be done, and what 
1c. D. Broad, Review of Foundations of Ethics, by 
W. D. Ross, Mind, XLIX (1940), 228. 
2Ibid., p. 239. 
3R. B. Brandt, Ethical Theory (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1959), p. 392. 
4w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 1. 
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kinds of things ought, or ought not, to be brought into 
existence. Science must discount such opinions, and proceed 
instead upon the basis of sense observations, says Ross, 
but ethics has no place to turn other than to these opinions 
for the raw material with which it must work. 1 Many of 
these convictions and beliefs will be discovered false, 
many will seem uncertain at best, but some will be able to 
be accepted as fitting into a harmonious pattern of ethical 
truths. 2 
In this moral consciousness, says Ross, two main 
strands of experience are distinguishable. One strand 
consists of the closely connected notions of right, duty, 
and ought, and the ideal of human life is expressed in 
terms of obedience to laws. This is the Hebraic ideal. 
The other strand consists of the notion of goods, or ends 
to be aimed at, and here the ideal of human life is ex-
pressed in terms of the progressive satisfaction of desire 
and attainment. This is the Greek ideal.3 Both of these 
strands belong to the 1noral consciousness, and neither can 
be ignored in any examination of that consciousness. 4 For 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 3. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
4 Ibid., p. 5. 
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Ross, each strand is irreducible, and only in its own 
tenns can each strand be understood. 
Of these two strands, though neither is reducible 
to the other, Ross thinks of the forrner, consisting of 
right, duty, and ought, as the more significant. It is to 
a consideration of this concept uright 11 that we now turn. 
What is ro.eant when an act is called the right act'? 
Ivloral goodness is not meant, says Ross, for moral goodness 
is always related to motives, and the right act is right 
regardless of the motives which prompted it. 1 Right is a 
characteristic of acts, whereas morally good is a 
characteristic of motives. Along this same line, Ross 
draws a distinction between an act and an action. The act 
is that which one does, that is, the change which he 
originates; the action is the doing, that is, the origina-
ting of this change. Acts are described as right or \'lrong, 
whereas actions are described as morally good or morally 
bad. The doing of a right act may be a morally bad action, 
as when a man leaves money to charity to annoy his family; 
and the doing of a wrong act may be a morally good action, 
as in conscientious mistakes. Whatever right way mean, 
surely, says Ross, it rnust not be confused with moral good-
ness. 
1w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 3-5. 
rJioreover, Ross insists, right does not mean "com-
paratively evolved," as the evolutionary theories would 
have it. 
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Even if it be true that there is a perfect correspond-
ence between the characteristic of being right and 
that of being more evolved, such that neither is ever 
found without the other, there is really no resem-
blance between the characteristic which we have in 
mind when we say "right" or nobligatory" and that 
which we have in mind when we say "more evolved."l 
And in response to the assertion that right means nthe pro-
duction of maximum good," Ross says: 
Is it not clear that when a plain man says nit is 
right to fulfill promises" that he is not necessarily 
thinking of the total consequences of such an act, 
still less thinking that the total consequences are 
always the best possible or are even likely to be so? 
And if some one says "it is right to do that which 
will produce the best consequences,n he does not 
think that he is elucidating the meaning of the word 
"right," but that he is stating the characteristic, 
the possession of which by an ac~ entails its having 
the characteristic of rightness. 
For Ross, right is an irreducible notion,3 self-
evident to the mature mind, 4 which is used to refer to a 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 13. 
2rbid., p. 42. 
3w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 12. 
4
rbid. The only help that Ross gives the reader in 
determining what "the mature mind" involves is to be found 
in the following statement: "For minds to reach the neces-
sary degree of maturity the development that takes place 
from generation to generation is as much needed as that 
which takes place from infancy to adult life." The Right 
and the Good, p. 12. 
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certain fitness or suitability to a situation. 1 Degrees 
of suitability vary, and rightness is to be identified only 
"with the greatest amount of suitability possible in the 
circumstances." 2 The right key or the right road possess 
their rightness by virtue of their suitableness in opening 
a door or arriving at a destination. Ross is anxious at 
this point, however, lest such a utilitarian consideration 
be seen as the essence of moral right. This he denies, 
and asserts that an examination shows that while both 
utilitarian suitability and moral suitability are relations 
which elicit a favorable reaction, the likeness is in the 
reactions and not in the types of suitability.3 
The closest one can come to describing this moral 
suitability, says Ross, is to show its kinship with 
aesthetic suitability. In neither case is there any 
question about "subserving an extraneous purpose; there is 
a direct harmony between the parts of the composition, as 
there is between a moral situation and the act which com-
pletes it.n4 Moral suitability, as rightness, is as fully 
irreducible as rightness itself. An act is not morally 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 51-52. 
2Ibid., p. 53. 
3rbid., p. 54. 
4Ibid. 
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suitable because of certain ends it makes possible. It 
simply is morally suitable, and that is all there is to 
it. 
The more we think of the term nright," the more con-
vinced we are likely to be that it is an indefinable 
term, and that when one attempts to define it one 
will either name something plainly different1from it, or use a term which is a mere synonym of it. 
But Ross is willing to go further than this when he 
moves from the problem of what right means to the problem 
of what makes right acts right, or the ground of right. 
Here again Ross speaks in terms of suitability, but in-
eludes also the notion of utility. He quotes Broad ap-
provingly when Broad asserts that nthe rightness or wrong-
ness of an action in a given initial situation is a func-
tion of its fittingness in that situation and its utility 
in that situation. 112 Ross limits the situation to that 
which is current at the time the act is performed, and 
disagrees with Broad 1 s notion that the fittingness must 
also apply to later phases of development of the situa-
tion. "It seems to me clear," says Ross, " that the 
situation which an act must fit if it is to be right is 
the situation that exists when, or just before, the act is 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 43. 
2c. D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trfibner and Co., Ltd., 1930), p. 220. 
Quoted in W. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. 81. 
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done, not the situation as it will develop if modified by 
the act." 1 
The plain man, says Ross, experiences the sense 
of rightness in terms of duties {in the plural). Certain 
types of acts make claims upon him, and Ross calls these 
claims prima facie duties. 2 Some of these prirna facie 
duties rest on previous acts such as promises made or 
wrongs inflicted, which Ross calls the duties of repara-
tion. Some rest on the previous acts of others, such as 
services rendered, and these are called the duties of 
gratitude. Others are the duties of justice which consist 
of a fair distribution of happiness and n1erit; the duties 
of beneficence, which call upon one to irnprove the lot of 
others in terms of virtue, intelligence, or pleasure; and 
the duties of self-improvement, in terms of adding to one's 
own virtue and intelligence.3 
To this list of prima facie duties set forth in 
The Right and the Good, Ross added, in Foundations of 
Ethics, the prima facie duty to do that which one believes 
to be morally most suitable in the circun1stances as one 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics {Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 81. 
2w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 19. 
3 Ibid., p. 21. 
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understands those circumstances.1 He had attempted to be 
more objective than this in the original list, but recog-
nized that this subjective aspect of obligation needed to 
be mentioned also. 
This is not to say that each of these duties con-
stitutes the right act. There may be conflicts between 
these duties in a given instance. Here Ross distinguishes 
between total obligation and prima facie obligation. 
Prima facie obligation refers to the fact that certain 
kinds of acts tend to be right, though the situation may 
make it necessary for someone to violate the prima facie 
obligation. Total obligation must include all aspects of 
a situation, and is then the most right of all acts that 
are open to the agent. 2 
It is interesting to note Ross's appeal to intui-
tionism in regard to these prima facie duties. 
I should make it plain at this stage that I am as-
suming the correctness of some of our main convic-
tions as to prima facie duties, or, more strictly, am 
claiming that we know them to be true. To me it seems 
self-evident as anything could be, that to make a 
promise, for instance, is to create a moral claim on 
us in someone else. Many readers will perhaps say 
that they do not know this to be true. If so, I cer-
tainly cannot prove it to then1; I can only ask them 
to reflect again, in the hope that they will ulti-
mately agree that they also know it to be true. The 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), pp. 161-163. 
2Ibid., p. 84. 
73 
main moral convictions of the plain man seem to me to 
be, not opinions which it is for philosophy to prove 
or disprove, but knowledge from the start; and in my 
own case I seem to find little difficulty in distin-
guishing these essential convictions from other moral 
convictions which I also have, which are merely falli-
ble opinions based on an imperfect study of the work-
ing for good or evil of certain institutions or types 
of actions.l 
However, while these prima facie duties are intui-
ted, specific duties in specific situations are not. While 
the prima facie obligations are simply there to be grasped, 
total obligation is more difficult to discover. vie "form 
the considered opinion,n says Ross, and he insists that it 
is no more than this, that one of the prima facie duties 
in the particular circumstances of the situation is "more 
incumbent than any other," and this becomes obligatory in 
the situation. 2 "We can never know our duty in this sense, 
but can only reach more or less probable opinion about 
it."3 Nevertheless, says Ross, we have a sufficient degree 
of probability for practical purposes. 4 
To answer, then, the question raised at the be-
ginning of this section as to what is meant when an act 
is called the right act: For Ross, the right act is the act 
1w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 20-21 n. 
2 Ibid., p. 19. 
3w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 190. 
4 Ibid., p. 191. 
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that ought to be done. 1 Some particular right act, however, 
is not necessarily an act that ought to be done by this 
particular man, for this particular man may not be able to 
do it. But if this particular man is able to do it, and 
if, in the situation, among all of the alternative right 
acts which he might perform, this act is the most right 
act, then this is the act that he ought to perform. 
Also, there may be alternative right ways of ful-
filling an obligation, such as some cases of keeping 
promises. If a man has promised to pay someone five 
dollars, equally right would be the alternative acts of 
paying in five one-dollar bills, a five-dollar bill, or 
a check or money order in the amount of five dollars. 
No particular right act in such a case is obligatory, so 
long as the promise is kept. 2 
Concerning this matter of obligation, Ross had 
stated in his earlier work, The Right and the Good, that 
that which ought to be done can be described as a certain 
state of affairs. If a person has promised to return a 
book to its owner, that promise is not kept and the obli-
gation not fulfilled until the book is in the hands of the 
1w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930T, p. 3. 
2w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 56. 
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owner. 1 Later, in Foundations of Ethics, however, he indi-
cated that he had found it necessary to change his mind in 
this regard. When one has exerted himself to produce the 
effect, says Ross in this later book, he has done all that 
can be expected of him. Otherwise, intervening factors, 
such as a careless postal clerk, or a paralyzing disease, 
could not be compensated for in assigning rightness or 
wrongness to the act. 2 
And when he does exert himself because he feels 
that it is his duty to exert himself, his act is not only 
right but it is morally good as well. The notion of good 
in general as well as moral good, in Ross's system, must 
now be examined. 
2. The t/leaning and Nature of Good 
Ross, true to his empirical approach, undertakes an 
analysis of propositions in which the term 11 good 11 is nor-
ma.lly used in order to decide what good ;neans. First of 
all, he points out a distinction between the attributive 
use of the term, on the one hand, as when so1nething is 
referred to as a good-so-and-so; and the predicative use 
of it, on the other hand, as when it is said that 
1w. D. Ross, The Ri~t and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 6-47. 
2w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 160. 
so-and-so is good. 1 If used attributively, Ross notes a 
distinction based on whether the reference is to persons 
or to things. If applied to persons, such as a good singer, 
a good doctor, or a good liar, the term seeus to imply 
efficiency. If applied to things, the term 11 goodn can 
mean "ministering to some particular human interest, 11 
such as 11 a good knife, 11 or 11 a good poe1n11 ; or, closely re-
lated to this, it can mean the successful achievewent of 
purpose, such as "a good afternoon at the library." 2 
But, says Ross, this attributive use of good has 
no significance for ethics.3 It is only when good is 
predicated that we have a proposition significant for 
ethics. "The meanings that are important for ethics are 
that in which we say 'such-and-such a Glan is good, ' 
meaning 'morally good,' and that (or those) in which we 
say (rightly or wrongly) 'virtue is good, 1 'knowledge is 
good, 1 'pleasure is good'." 4 When the term "good11 is 
used in this sense, says Ross, it is a concept Vlhich cannot 
be reduced to terms other than itself, and hence is, in 
that sense, indefinable. 
1w. D. Ross, The Ri~ht and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p.5. 
2Ibid., pp. 65-66. 
3w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 256. 
4Ibid., pp. 256-257. 
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But even though the term ngood" is indefinable, it 
can be paraphrased by saying of those things of which good 
is pred:i.cated that nthey are fine or adlilirable activities 
of the hwnan spirit, and by adding that they are good in 
such a way that any one who has them or does them is to 
that extent being good himself." 1 
As to the nature of these "admirable activities of 
the human spirit, 11 there is no one characteristic that 
applies to all of them. "What unites all our applications 
of the word is not a single connotation of 'good'," but a 
nsingle type of attitude, the favourable attitude." 2 vJhen 
an object is called good, what is expressed is an attitude 
toward the object, but what is meant is a quality or 
characteristic of the object itself and not about the atti-
tude toward the object.3 "When we call an object good we 
are co~nending it, but to commend it is not to say that 
we are commending it, but to say that it has a certain 
character, which we think it would have whether we were 
commending it or not." 4 Thus, while the favorable attitude 
is shared by all applications of good, it is not what good 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 283. 
2Ibid., p. 255. 
3rbid. 
4Ibid. 
means, though it is a characteristic of the nature of 
good. What is referred to is an intrinsic quality that 
is good in itself, or intrinsically good. The favorable 
attitude refers to a subjective situation, whereas the 
"certain character11 of that which is good refers to an 
objective state of affairs. 
Ross recognizes four kinds of things that are 
intrinsically and objectively good: (1) virtue, 
(2) pleasure, (3) the allocation of pleasure to the 
virtuous, and (4) knowledge (and in a less degree, right 
opinion). 
Ross describes virtue as consisting of virtuous 
disposition and action, which is action, or a disposition 
to act from a certain type of motive such, in particular, 
as nthe desire to do one's duty, the desire to bring into 
being something that is good, and the desire to give 
pleasure or save pain to others."1 It is self-evident 
that these have value in themselves, says Ross, quite 
apart from any consequences they might bring about. 
As for pleasure, Ross suggests that pleasure can 
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be thought of as intrinsically good by comparing the situ-
ation here to the case of conditional or prima facie 
1w. D. Ross, The Ri~t and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 4. 
rightness. It is not that every situation in which there 
is pleasure is a good situation, but rather that pleasure 
itself is good unless there is something in the situation 
to negate that good, such as pleasure that is contrary to 
dessert, or pleasure that is the result of a bad disposi-
tion.1 It is this consideration that calls for Ross's 
third independent good, "the apportionment of pleasure 
and pain to the virtuous and the vicious respectively.» 2 
This, he claims, is the foundation of the notion of 
justice as a duty. 
Should anyone doubt that pleasure is an intrinsic 
good, says Ross, let him imagine two states of the uni-
verse in both of which amounts of virtue and knowledge, 
and of any other possible intrinsic goods, are equal, but 
in the first of which there is a balance of pleasure over 
pain, and in the second, a balance of pain over pleasure. 
The self-evident choice between the two, according to 
Ross, is the first, in which there is a greater amount of 
pleasure than pain.3 Or should he doubt the relationship 
between pleasure and merit, let him imagine two states of 
the universe with the amount of virtue and vice, pleasure 
1vi. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 134. 
2 Ibid., p. 138. 
3Ibid., p. 135. 
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and pain in one equal to the amount of these same qualities 
in the other, but in the first of which the vicious are 
happy and the virtuous miserable, and in the second the 
virtuous are happy and the vicious !r-Liserable. Again, 
says Ross, nvery few people would hesitate 11 to choose the 
second in preference to the first. 1 
Of the fourth intrinsic good, knowledge, Ross uses 
the same sort of reasoning involving tvw imaginary states 
of the universe alike in all respects save that of knowl-
edge. And the appeal is once again to the self-evident 
nature of the choice that is made--"can anyone doubt 11 that 
the state of the universe in which there is more knowledge, 
other things being equal, 11 \'lOUld be a better state of the 
universe?n 2 
Ross relates these kinds of good to the three as-
pects of the person, to the cognitive, affective, and 
conative functions of the mind. Knowledge is related to 
cognition as the ideal state of the mind; pleasure is 
related to feeling as its ideal state; virtue is related 
to conation as the ideal state of the will; and the alloca-
tion of pleasure to virtue is the ideal state of the rela-
tion between conation and feeling.3 All other goods, says 
1w. D. Ross, The Ri~t and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. ~8. 
2 Ibid., p. 139. 
3rbid., p. 140. 
Ross, are complex in the sense that they are compounded 
of the three simple elements of virtue, knowledge, and 
pleasure. 1 
So far as a scale of goods is concerned, Ross 
lists virtue as of more worth than knowledge, and both 
virtue and knowledge as of more worth than pleasure. Be-
ginning with pleasure, he asserts that it is one matter 
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to compare pleasure with pleasure; quite another to compare 
pleasure with knowledge or virtue. Even the comparison 
of pleasures offers its difficulties, however, as becomes 
evident when one is asked to compare the pleasure derived 
from reading good literature and derived from a walk 
through the woods. So many other factors enter into the 
situation besides pleasure per ~' that often it is the 
case that two pleasures simply are not corr~ensurable on 
any practical basis. But there are certainly instances, 
says Ross, when pleasures are commensurable in terms of 
intensity and duration. 2 
Instances of knowledge are also cor11mensurable 
one with another, their conunensurability being in terms 
of degrees of certainty on the one hand, including the 
degree of adequate basis for that certainty; and, on the 
1w. D. Ross, The Ri~t and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. ~1. 
2Ibid., pp. 143-145. 
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other hand, the nature of the fact apprehended, generality 
of fact being of greater worth than particularity. 1 
As regards the comrnensurability of various kinds 
of virtuous acts and dispositions, this is the problem of 
moral goodness, which will be discussed in the next sec-
tion. But the most difficult problem related to a scale 
of values is that of comparing pleasure, knowledge, and 
virtue with one another. But certain considerations, says 
Ross, are helpful: (1) human life seems more valuable than 
animal life even in cases where animal life contains a 
greater balance of pleasure over pain than does a particu-
lar human life; (2) the laws of the universe seem to be 
such that pleasure often finds its source in the "practice 
of virtue, the knowledge of truth, and the appreciation 
of beauty,n rather than in the "indulgence of cruelty, 
the light-hearted adoption of ill-grounded opinions, and 
enjoyment of the ugly"; (3) one has a duty to acquire 
virtue for himself, but pleasure, never a duty to acquire 
for oneself, is pe~missible only when it does not inter-
fere with duty; (4) the fact that some pleasures, such as 
the enjo~nent of cruelty, are called bad pleasures, whereas 
there is no such thing as bad virtue. 2 
1w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), pp. 145-149. 
2Ibid., pp. 149-152. 
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Knowledge itself is not so readily seen as superior 
to pleasure, save when knowledge is the result of a desire 
for knowledge, for this desire itself is of moral worth, 
hence is better than pleasure. In establishing virtue as of 
more worth than knowledge, Ross says, "\fuen I ask myself 
whether any increase of knowledge however great, is worth 
having at the cost of a wilful failure to do my duty or of 
a deterioration of character, I can only answer in the 
negative." 1 
So great is the distinction that must be made, 
Ross thinks, between virtue and pleasure, that he rejects 
the view that they can both belong to one scale of value, 
the one higher and the other lower. This view he had set 
forth in The Right and the Good2 but in Foundations of 
Ethics he insisted that they cannot even be on the same 
scale, lest it be thought that, given enough quantity and 
intensity, pleasure might conceivably loom higher on the 
scale than a low order of virtue, which is always a possi-
bility if both are on the same scale.3 "Pleasures, if 
ever good, must be good in a different sense from that in 
1w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 152. 
2Ibid., p. 150. 
3w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 275. 
84 
which good activities are so." 1 
In these views which Ross holds concerning the 
idea of good, he can best be classified as an objectivist. 
Sorley, as seen in the previous chapter, r•tade much of the 
point that when one says that a certain value ought to be, 
the claim intends to mean not simply that the person 
making it has a feeling that that value ought to be, or 
that he desires it, or that he has an interest in it. 
All of these aspects of the situation ~nay v!ell exist. 
But the real intention of such a claim, according to 
Sorley, is to say something about an objectively valid 
state of affairs. Thus, when it is claimed that some value 
ought to be, the oughtness is not reducible to subjective 
feeling, desire, or interest, but is a unique predication 
not reducible to anything else. The value ought to be, 
and has objective validity quite apart frorJ subjective 
desire. Ross is saying much the same thing when he states 
that "when we call an object good, we are commending it, 
but to commend it is not to say that we are commending it, 
but to say that it has a certain character, which \'le think 
it would have \'lhether we were commending it or not. " 2 
When Ross attempts to describe that which is worthy 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 275. 
2 Ibid., p. 255. 
of commendation, he is engaged in the sa:11e enterprise as 
Sorley when Sorley is attempting to describe that which 
ought to be. Sorley describes the ought-to-be in terms 
of truth, beauty, and goodness; Ross describes that which 
is worthy of commendation in terms of virtue, pleasure, 
and knowledge. There is a correlation recognizable here 
between truth and knowledge, between beauty and pleasure, 
and between goodness and virtue. Sorley, however, is 
moving toward a 1netaphysical description of the status 
of value, finding in oughtness the clue to an understand-
ing of ultimate reality. Sorley then grounds the objec-
tivity of the ought-to-be, or the objectivity of values, 
by arguing that they find their residence in a cosmic 
rilind. Ross, apparently, feels no need for such metaphys-
ical grounding, or at least does not provide it. Neverthe-
less, Ross is no less ardent than Sorley in denouncing 
naturalistic relativism and in supporting value objectiv-
ism. Both Ross 1 s goods and Sorley' s values are al\"lays 
related to persons, but Ross seems content to rest his 
case when he has dealt with the person, the self, as expe-
rienced. Sorley, on the other hand, is not willing to 
stop at this point, but wishes to go on to develop a meta-
physical theory of the.person, both finite and infinite, 
to provide a ground for the self as experienced. Both 
Ross and Sorley are objectivists in their insistence that 
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the claims made concerning good, for Ross, and value, for 
Sorley, are not claims about subjective desires but refer 
rather to an objectively valid state of affairs. 
3. Moral Goodness 
Having dealt with the problem of eood in general, 
Ross turns to the task of distinguishing moral goodness. 
Ross's analysis of the nature of goodness led him to sug-
gest that virtue, pleasure, and knowledge are the basic 
elements to be found in man's predication of good. But 
not all instances of these elements of goodness can be 
classified as moral goodness. Certainly there are kinds 
of knowledge, such as the knowledge of geo1netric theorems, 
which are good in themselves yet which do not necessarily 
constitute moral goodness. And surely there are many 
instances of one's own pleasure, which, though quite inno-
cent and harmless in themselves, such as rest after hard 
work, have no moral quality. What, then, constitutes moral 
goodness? 
Ross suggests that perhaps the most effective way 
to explain what he means by "morally good" is to say that 
it means "good either by being a certain sort of character 
or by being related in one of certain definite ways to a 
certain sort of character." 1 Here, as has been his method 
1w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 155. 
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previously when dealing with right and good, Ross asks how 
this term is used in common speech, and notes that it is 
sometimes said that a certain man is morally good, or that 
a certain action or certain sort of feeling, such as s~n­
pathy with misfortune, is morally good. "But it seems 
clear that a man is morally good by virtue of having a 
character of a certain kind, and that an action or a feel-
ing is morally good by virtue of proceeding from a charac-
ter of a certain kind." 1 
In attempting to describe this certain kind of 
character upon which moral goodness is based, Ross speaks 
of motives, and states that "it see:as quite clear that it 
is in virtue of the motives that they proceed from that 
actions are morally good." 2 Here he dra\'lS a sharp dis-
tinction, as he has done before, between moral goodness 
and rightness, pointing out that rightness belongs to acts 
"not in virtue of the motives they proceed from, but in 
virtue of the nature of what is done,"3 whereas moral good-
ness is related to motives. The certain kind of character, 
then, upon which moral goodness is based, is that character 
that is moved by a certain type of motivation. "The moral 
1
vl. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 155. 
2Ibid., p. 156. 
3~. 
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goodness both of actions and of feelings arises from their 
proceeding from a certain kind of desire." 1 The desires 
which, for Ross, belong to the morally good character are 
the desire to do one's duty, the desire to bring into being 
something good, and the desire to produce some pleasure, or 
prevent some pain, for another being. 
The desire to do one's duty issues forth in what 
Ross calls conscientious action, and is the most signifi-
cant kind of desire related to moral goodness. Conscien-
tious action is synonymous vvith virtuous action, and both 
mean the same as morally good, for Ross. Thus it can be 
said that actions resulting from any one of these three 
desires (the desire to do one's duty, the desire to bring 
into being something good, and the desire to produce some 
pleasure, or prevent some pain, for another being), can be 
called conscientious, virtuous, or morally good. 
Ross attempts to deal with desire on a critical 
basis, and suggests that it is only when one has "already 
assumed (on quite insufficient grounds) that pleasure is the 
only object of desire," that he finds it ndifficult to sup-
pose that the thought of an act as right can arouse a desire 
to do it. 112 Ross points out that people often speak of 
1w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 156. 
2Ibid., p. 158. 
11 wanting to do their duty." It is for them a desire. This 
is the feeling of moral obligation--this desiring to do 
one's duty, whatever that duty may be. It is a felt want, 
none the worse for being a desire, but morally good because 
of the nature of the desire. "What is properly meant by 
the sense of duty is the thought that one ought to act in 
a certain way, not that one has been brought up to or is 
expected to act in a certain way." 1 
I~>loral goodness, then, is a quality of actions 
which proceed from that kind of character which is motiva-
ted by a desire to do one's duty, the desire to bring into 
being something good, and the desire to produce some 
pleasure, or prevent some pain, for another being. 
In Foundations of Ethics Ross softens somewhat the 
sharp distinction he made in The Right and the Good be-
tween rightness and moral goodness, though still insisting 
that a distinction must be drawn. In The Rigpt and the 
Good the distinction was rigid, with Ross insisting that 
an ethical theory of the morally good and an ethical theory 
of the right were simply talking about different things. 2 
In Foundations of Ethics, on the other hand, after probing 
more deeply into the complexities of hun-~an ;activation and 
1w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 164. 
2Ibid., p. 156. 
allowing such utilitarian concerns as a consideration of 
consequences, he states that nif the agent is responsive 
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to all the morally relevant considerations in their right 
proportions, he will in fact do the right act.nl And he 
goes on to state that "no action will have the utmost moral 
excellence which an action in the circumstances can have, 
unless it is also the right action. 112 
Ross is far from ready to yield completely at this 
point, however, and says that while the completely morally 
good action must be the right act, a right act need not be 
a good action, and a partially good action may not be a 
right act. If one man owes another man a sum of money, 
the right act is the repayment of the debt. If the credi-
tor is poor and deserving, moral goodness could also be 
involved if there is the desire to relieve suffering. But 
if the desire is to encourage a spendthrift to sorne ex-
travagance he cannot afford, the payment of the debt would 
be a right act, but a morally bad action. 
While Ross insists on maintaining this distinction 
between the right and the good, he recognizes that in the 
life of a mind they are related. 
Yet, as might be expected, goodness of character is 
the only condition that with even the slightest degree 
1H. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 309. 
2Ibid. 
of probability tends to make for the doing of right 
acts. If a man is not morally good, it is only the 
merest accident that he ever does what he ought. 
The act to which he is attracted by one feature of 
it, itself morally indifferent or bad, may be the 
act towards which a good n~n would be attracted by 
its whole system of morally significant features, 
but if it is so, the coincidence is accidental. 
Thus a theory which insists on the difference and 
mutual independence of rightness and goodness is 
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by no means precluded from recognizing those connec-
tions ~etween the two which are well known to cornmon 
sense. 
In definition, the right and the morally good are dis-
tinct; psychologically, the interplay that goes on between 
them in a personal mind must not be overlooked. 
4. Evaluation of Ross's Thought 
In turning to an evaluation of Ross's thought, 
one has no difficulty in recognizing merits in his system. 
Not the least of these merits is his willingness to work 
painstakingly at the task of making accurate and critical 
distinctions in the realm of terminology and meaning. The 
rignt, the good, and the morally good, are each analyzed 
with detailed thoroughness, and Ross does not conclude his 
analysis of any of these terms until he feels assured that 
he has exhausted the essential and unique meanings that 
are involved. Unwilling to reduce the cowplexities of 
moral experience to a simple system when such reduction 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 310. 
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does not seem justified, Ross finds rightness distinct in 
meaning from goodness and each of them irreducible to 
simpler tenns. His concern throughout his work is with 
accuracy of analysis rather than simplicity of conclu-
sions. In his careful study Ross has demonstrated the 
need for distinguishing with care among the variety of 
moral concepts that are needed to describe human experi-
ence. 
Another, and related, merit is to be found in his 
empirical approach. In examining the right and the good, 
his method of procedure is to ask how these terlils are 
actually used in experience. He begins, as did Sorley, 
with an examination of moral consciousness, this being for 
both Ross and Sorley the whole complex of opinions, con-
victions, and beliefs held by people about obligations, 
values, and standards, expressed in their approvals and 
disapprovals. It is possible that Ross exaggerates the 
in1portance of what it is the ncommon mann intends to say 
when he uses such terms as "rightn and 11 good," and yet if 
we are to have a common language which will enable us to 
conununicate with one another, it is not amiss at least to 
begin with a consideration of current terminological usage. 
Ross's system does not appear to be a 11 back-to-corrunon-sense" 
sununons. His treatment is much more sophisticated than it 
is naive, and his questions about common usage are 
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primarily aimed at finding out what is going on within 
human experience when certain tenas are used, rather than 
an attempt to receive tutoring at the hands of the untu-
tored. He is interested in the right as experienced, and 
in the good as experienced, and to discover what is unique 
in either of these, one must make as broad a study as 
possible of the actual experiences of persons. 
Going beyond Ross's analytical thoroughness and his 
empirical approach to a consideration of the content of his 
system, a third merit to be mentioned is the contribution 
that he makes in insisting that a distinction must be made 
between rightness and goodness. It will be necessary to 
point out subsequently that one of the difficulties with 
Ross's system is to be seen in his failure adequately to 
relate the right and the good in a unified manner. Never-
theless, even if they are related in a unified system, the 
good is not equivalent to the right, and a predication of 
rightness is not in the same sense or with the same inten-
tion a predication of goodness, nor is it always possible 
to predicate rightness and goodness of the same objects. 
For example, there is meaning in the statement, "He is a 
good man," but not in the statement, "He is a right 
man.n If Ross has done nothing more than to present this 
distinction with a greater force and clarity than that with 
which it has been presented previously, his contribution 
toward an adequate understanding of moral experience has 
not been slight. 
Still another merit is to be seen in the manner 
in which Ross handles the experience of desire. Desire 
itself is seen to be a normal human experience. vlhether 
it is worthy or not depends upon what it is that is de-
sired, and any moral judgments to be made must be made 
not on the basis of the fact that desire was present but 
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on the basis, first of all, of what is desired, and second-
ly, of what is then done by way of satisfying or denying 
the desire. 
A fifth merit worthy of mention is the prominent 
place in his system that Ross gives to the matter of 
justice and the duties of special obligations. Among 
those things that Ross holds to be intrinsically and ob-
jectively good is to be found the allocation of pleasure 
to the virtuous. A fair distribution of good is no less 
in~ortant, for Ross, than the achievement of good. 
Justice belongs to a moral order. Also, quite apart from 
the future consequences which may follow it, any action 
is done within a pattern of presently existing relations 
arising from promises made, debts incurred, or injuries 
inflicted, each of which constitutes a special situation 
calling for suitable or fitting action relevant to that 
situation. Special obligations have always been essential 
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parts of genuine morality, and the pursuit of maximum 
good affords no justification for ignoring them. Any 
society which neglects them does so to its peril, and any 
moral theory which does not insist upon their tremendous 
significance falls short of being an adequate interpreta-
tion of moral experience. 
A sixth merit of Ross's thought, and the last one 
to be mentioned in this evaluation, is found in his insis-
tence that the intention of any judgment in which nrightn 
or "good 11 is predicated is to say sornething about an 
objective state of affairs independent of the subjective 
mind which formulates the judgment. Granted that this is 
no proof of objective status so far as particular judgments 
are concerned, it does seem to be an accurate portrayal of 
what is intended when such a judgment is ;;mde. And the 
significance of recognizing this intention lies in the 
fact that to deny it is to eliminate the point of refer-
ence that makes the life of mind intelligible and communica-
tion between minds meaningful. To accept this is not to 
solve the problem of deciding which judgments have an 
objectively valid referent and which do not. It was to 
solve this problem that the various criteria of truth were 
developed. But to accept it is to make possible the em-
ployment of a criterion and the carrying on of a conversa-
tion which can deal with the problem with some degree of 
intelligibility. To reject it is to remove the ground of 
this intelligible conversation and make meaningless the 
task of problem solving. 
Ross•s objectivism goes further than this, certain-
ly, but this is the essential ground on which it is based. 
It is significant for moral theory in that while men do 
not agree in their particular approvals and disapprovals, 
they do agree that some things are worthy of approval and 
some are not. They do not agree as to which acts are 
right and which actions are good, but they agree that some 
acts are right and some wrong, some actions good and some 
bad. Ross goes further to suggest that when human experi-
ence is studied, one discovers the basic principles in-
volved in right acts and good actions--he 11 sees, 11 or in-
tuits these principles--and, as set forth in the preceding 
sections, Ross enumerates the principles which seem to hi;n 
to result from this examination. The principles which Ross 
names are more readily acceptable, perhaps, than the in-
tuitionistic method by which he claims to have discovered 
them, but his intuitionism will be discussed shortly. It 
is enough to say here that the basic ground of his objectiv-
ism, not unlike that in Sorley•s system, would be exceeding-
ly difficult to refute. 
Turning from the merits in Ross•s system to the 
matter of difficulties or weaknesses, it would seem that 
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one such weakness is to be found in Ross's omission of 
any significant emphasis upon the nature of persons and 
the role of persons in his system. Sorley, as was seen 
in the last chapter, emphasized the person, and went into 
great detail to insist that all values are related to 
persons, that values must be interpreted in terms of their 
relationship to persons, and without this relationship 
to persons they do not exist. Sorley clain~d to have 
founded his system on the experience of value, and for 
there to be an experience of value there LlUst be a per-
sonal mind that is the home and the occasion of that ex-
perience. 
Ross would not be likely to disagree with this. 
Indeed, he says something that sounds closely connected 
with this when he says, ncontemplate any imaginary uni-
verse from which you suppose mind entirely absent, and 
you will fail to find anything in it that you can call 
good in itself. 111 But the point he is making in the pas-
sage of which this sentence is a part is not intended to 
say something about mind so much as it is intended to say 
that material objects have only instrumental value. Of 
course, they have such instrumental value only for persons. 
But Ross was so careful in his attempt to develop a full 
1w. D. Ross, The Ri~t and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. ~o. 
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and complete analysis of moral experience that it is dis-
appointing to find him, for the most part, simply presup-
posing the experient or agent \vithout whom there could be 
no experience. 
A second aspect of Ross 1 s thought about which some 
questions need to be raised involves his use of the tenn 
suitability. Actually, the tenn would seem to be a very 
good one for the task of defining rightness. To describe 
the right act as the act that is morally suitable in a 
given instance would be a helpful beginning, at least, 
and does suggest something of what rightness implies. 
But the problem can scarcely be dropped at this point, and 
one wants to know at least two things: one, what is the 
criterion for judging what is suitable in a given instance? 
and two, what is the characteristic of moral suitability 
that distinguishes it from other kinds of suitability? In 
answer to the first question Ross appeals ultimately to 
intuition, which is the subject matter of the next criti-
cism. In answer to the second question, Ross not only 
appeals to intuition but confuses the issue still further 
by suggesting that the nearest that he can come to defining 
moral suitability is to liken it to aesthetic suitability. 1 
Rather than make the crucial distinction which :nust be 
1w. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 54. Referred to above, p. 8. 
made if moral suitability is to be understood as moral, 
Ross glosses over the distinction with this analogy, and 
leaves the reader in no better position than he would be 
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in if the appeal had been to intuition alone. The notion 
of suitability itself really has rather fruitful possibil-
ities in the matter of describing what is meant by right-
ness, but anyone who so uses it needs to show \'lith greater 
clarity and precision than Ross has done just what he means 
by it, how he intends to make judgments concerning and 
in what sense r:1oral suitability is constituted uoral. 
A third aspect of Ross's thought in need of fur-
ther inquiry is the role that he gives to intuition. For 
Ross, in ethics as in mathematics there are certain 
"crystal-clear intuitions11 which form the foundation of 
all knowledge in each of these two fields, respectiv~ly. 1 
11 The main moral convictions of the plain mann are intui-
tions which constitute knowledge. 2 nThe existence of an 
obligation arising from the rr.a.king of a promise is so 
axiomatic that no moral universe can be imagined in which 
it would not exist.u3 To avoid subjectivism Ross does not 
1r,J. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 144. 
2vL D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 2ln. 
3\'J. D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics, p. T7. 
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refer sir.1ply to his o\'m intuitions in this ,,1atter, but 
rather speaks of nthe plain ;:,1an, nl "thoughtful and well-
educated people, n 2 11 the best people, n3 11 the i:,ature il<ind, 11 l.~ 
and the intuitive judgments which issue forth from such 
sources as these. 
Ross recognizes the difficult position he would 
be in if he claimed infallibility for such intuitions, and 
yet he offers no other criterion by which conflicting 
clai;ns might be resolved. The ultimate appeal always is 
to intuition. It is not particular judgl;tents, however, 
that are to be intuited. Speaking of intuitionism, he 
says that "the general principles ·which it regards as in-
tuitively seen to be true are very few in number and very 
general in character. 11 5 But these form the basis for his 
total ethical system, and thus his systen1 as a whole rests 
upon intuitionistl. And no alternative criterion is offered 
by which particular judgments are to be for,·.mlated or 
tested. 
As we asked in the case of Sorley's appeal to 
1w. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 2ln. 
2Ibid., p. 41. 
3Ibid. 
4rbid., p. 12. 
5~:J. D. Hoss, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 190. 
intuition, so we can ask again here, is it necessary to 
suggest so mysterious a solution to the 1:1oral proble;~t? 
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To suggest such a solution certainly places upon Ross an 
additional obligation to analyze carefully the nature of 
the person who is able to have such intuitions, an analysis 
which he never r,lakes. 
A final problem in Ross's thought to be discussed 
here is concerned v.rith the relationship which pertains be-
tween the right and the good. Earlier in this evaluation 
Ross was c01runended for the careful work he has done in 
analyzing these tenas, and for distinguishing between the 
meanings involved. Certainly a distinction needs to be 
dra\m between thein. But any system of ethics needs to 
show not only how they are distinct--it needs also to show 
how they are related. 
This has been a difficult point for the deontolo-
gists to handle. They are called deontologists largely 
by virtue of the fact that they have r.1ade this distinction, 
and they have usually been so interested in right and duty 
that they have given little consideration to the good. 
Ross, however, insists upon the i~portance of the good in 
ethical theory, and does show certain relationships between 
the right and the good. Among prima facie duties he lists 
the duty of producing good, and the :--ilorally good character 
is the character from whom he expects right acts to come. 
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As has been suggested, Ross 1 s thinlcing on this point seer:1s 
to have undergone change as he has 1:1oved toviard a position 
which includes a more complete relationship bet'.'leen the 
right and the good. But his position on this Llatter is 
never clearly nor fully stated. 
CHAPTER IV 
ALFRED CYRIL EWING 
Alfred Cyril Ewing, twenty years younger than Ross, 
is another distinguished figure in contemporary British 
philosophical thought. Born in 1899 in Leicester, England, 
he was graduated in 1920 from University College, Oxford, 
with first-class honors in Classics, Ancient History, and 
Philosophy. He was awarded his doctorate in 1923, and 
won the Green Prize for Moral Philosophy in 1926. Cam-
bridge University has honored him with a Litt. D. Degree. 
He is a Fellow of the British Academy, and currently 
Lecturer in Moral Science in the University of Cambridge. 
Ewing has been a diligent student of Irmnanuel Kant, 
of metaphysical idealism, and of ethical theory, and has 
written extensively on all these subjects. Two of his 
books, Kant's Treatment of Causality and A Short Commentary 
on Kant's ncritique of Pure Reasonn, are noteworthy products 
of his studies of Kant. Two more of his books, Idealism: A 
Critical Survey and The Idealist Tradition from Berkeley 
to Blanshard, the latter consisting largely of selections 
from the idealists themselves, are products of his studies 
in idealism. Ewing does not call himself an idealist, 
though he is certainly sympathetic to the idealist point of 
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view, and can be said to be oriented, in much of his think-
ing, toward an idealistic outlook and attitude. 
In the field of ethics Ewing has written The 
Definition of Good, published in 1947, and Ethics, pub-
lished in 1953. Along with these two books on theoretical 
ethics, Ewing published two other books on what might be 
called practical ethics, entitled The IJiorality of Punish-
ment and The Individual, the State, and World Government. 
These four works on ethics all complement one another, and 
the various facets of Ewing's thinking on the subject of 
ethics are in close agreement with one another. 
Along with these books Ewing has prepared a large 
number of papers, essays, and book reviews which have been 
published in philosophical journals. lVIore than half of 
these have been on subjects within the field of ethics. 
Not himself a deontologist, Ewing was nonetheless 
influenced by Prichard, and was in agreement with Prichard 
concerning the lack of meaning in the question, "Why should 
we do our duty?" 11 Either the fact that it is my duty,n 
says Ewing, "is a sufficient reason why I ought to do some-
thing, or there can be no reason why I ought to do it at 
all. 111 But a greater influence upon his thought was made 
by C. D. Broad and W. D. Ross. Prichard was so interested 
1A. C. Ewing, "Rightness and Consequences," The 
Hibbert Journal, XXIX (1931), 327. 
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in the notion of the right that he neglected the notion of 
the good. Both Broad and Ross, going beyond Prichard, 
recognized that the notion of the good is highly signifi-
cant in ethical theory, but while suggesting that there is 
a relation between rightness and good consequences, main-
tained that both the right and the good are separate and 
unique concepts, neither of which is reducible to the 
other nor definable in terms of the other. 
Ewing wished to develop a more thoroughly integrated 
system than had been achieved by Broad or Ross, a system 
which would more adequately relate the notions of the right 
and the good. He agreed with them, as will be seen subse-
quently, that any attempt to define rightness in terms of 
goodness would prove to be inadequate to explain the full 
meaning of rightness. But perhaps the good is definable 
in terms of the right, or in terms of that which is closely 
related to the right, namely, oughtness. 
Beginning with an analysis of cormnonsense ethical 
propositions, 1 Ewing rejects all types of ethical subjec-
tivism and ethical naturalism because such interpretations 
fail to account adequately for what people actually mean 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), pp. 50-51, 13-14, 37, 39, and 45. 
Also, A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The Iviacmillan Company, 
1953), pp. 1-15. As a matter of procedure, Ewing does not 
begin with such an analysis in The Definition of Good, but 
this analysis does constitute a logical base, as is indi-
cated in the citations listed. 
106 
when they assert ethical propositions. He then proceeds to 
analyze basic ethical terms, holding fast to the conviction 
that at least one ethical term must be irreducible to 
non-ethical concepts and that the concept of "oughtness" 
is more basic in ethics than the concept of ngoodness." 
His resultant view can be termed intuitionistic, non-natu-
ralistic, objectivistic, and realistic. 
1. The Role of Intuition in Ewing 1 s Thought 
Ewing contends that since in all reasoning at 
least some intuition is necessarily presupposed, it is 
only natural that ethical reasoning should include intui-
tion also. 1 In order to illustrate the presupposition of 
intuition in all reasoning, Ewing suggests the argument: 
A, therefore B, therefore C. For this argument to be valid 
it must be known that B really does follow fron1 A. But how 
can this be proved? Perhaps, says Ewing, an intermediate 
proposition D can be placed between A and B, which proposi-
tion follows from A and from which B follows, nbut this 
only puts the problem further back." 2 Now it must be known 
1A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The Macmillan Co., 
1953), pp. 136-137. Also, Ewing, The Fundamental Questions 
of Philosophy {New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), p. 48; 
Ewing, Idealis1n: A Critical Survey (New York: Humanities 
Press, 1933), p. 260; Ewing, Intuitionism and Utilitarianism,n 
Revue Internationale de Philosophie, I {1939), 664. 
2A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The l\1acmillan Co., 
1953), pp. 136-137. Also, Ewing, The Fundamental Questions 
of Philosophy (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951), p. 48. 
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that D follows from A, and while a new intermediate propo-
sition might be placed between A and D, either the process 
is never to be completed or else some link of inference 
between A and the next proposition must be inunediately ap-
prehended without the aid of further argument or additional 
interpolations of intermediate propositions. Knowledge by 
inference, then, or even reasonable probability by infer-
ence, involves the occurrence of knowledge by intuition. 
The inferential process itself presupposes intuition of 
the connections from one level of the inference to another. 
Ethical intuitions for Ewing are not the same as intuitions 
of logical connections, but what he hopes to have shown 
by his line of reasoning is that, if inference is ever to 
be used, "the possibility of intuition cannot be rejected 
on principle." 1 Once weaken the prejudice against intui-
tion in general, and perhaps its place in an ethical theory 
will not be so readily discounted. Says Ewing, in con-
cluding this aspect of his argument, "The term intuition 
is apt to be suspect, but to say somebody knows something 
intuitively is only to say that he knows it otherwise than 
by simple observation or reasoning." 2 
Having said this about intuition in reference to 
1A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1953), p. 137. 
2Ibid. 
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any type or inference, Ewing proceeds to deal with ethical 
intuition in particular. In ethical experience certain 
truths present themselves as presuppositions on which that 
experience is based, yet which themselves must be known 
either intuitively or not at all. As illustration, Ewing 
refers to the act of a man inflicting unnecessary pain on 
others. If such action is objected to, it might be said 
simply that the man desired to act in this manner. If so, 
on what ground can it be said that he ought not to do that 
which he desires to do? In answer, Ewing says: 
Our objections that he ought not to do so presuppose 
that pain is evil, and that we ought not unnecessari-
ly to inflict evil on other men. I do not see how 
these truths can be proved: they are kno~~ intuitively, 
if at all. And in general it is very hard to see how 
we can know anything to be intrinsically good or ba~ 
except by intuition. What argument could prove it? 
In keeping with this, Ewing speaks of "seeingn the rightness 
or wrongness of acts. 2 Such rightness or wrongness, accord-
ing to him, can never be proved; it can only be grasped in-
tuitively. 
Ewing does not contend, however, that such intuitions 
are understandable apart from the rational processes of the 
human mind. Intuition cannot be isolated from the rest of 
human mental activity, but is both helped and influenced by 
1A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1953), p. 138. 
2Ibid., pp. 138-139. 
inference though it nsees" beyond what is provable by 
inference. 1 Nor are intuitions infallible. Ewing calls 
intuition a "developing capacity," and so "capable of 
error. 112 And in some instances at least, intuition must 
be tested by a coherent pattern of reasoning, which, 
while it does not prove the truth of the intuition by 
means of logical argument, does offer confirmatory evi-
dence. 
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In speaking of the relationship between intuition 
and reason, Ewing calls intuition a "rational judgment," 
though making a distinction here between a rational 
judgment based on argument, which is not intuitive, and 
a rational judgment which can be confirmed by argument 
but which is based on intuition.3 Insisting that intuition 
is not to be identified with some kind of emotional feeling, 
Ewing asserts that nthe best and most reliable intuition 
comes after reasoning and not before.n 4 He states that 
intuition "certainly must be subject to the test of rea-
soning."5 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (The Ivlacmillan 
Company, 1947), p. 30. 
2A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1953), p. 139. 
3Ibid., pp. 140-141. 
4Ibid., p. 141. 
5Ibid. 
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Intuition should not be regarded as a quasi-miraculous 
flash of insight standing by itself and not essentially 
linked with any other thought process at all. It pre-
supposes at least a rational selection between differ-
ent aspects of the situation, whether this is done 
instantaneously or gradually, and it is certainly af-
fected deeply by our previous experience, thought and 
action. • . The more reasoned and reasonable my 
thought, the more likely is rny intuition to be reli-
able.l 
It is a mistake, according to Ewing, to put emphasis 
upon intuition alone or upon coherence alone. Both are 
needed, he believes, if an adequate ethics is to be devel-
oped. Intuition provides the basic raw material with 
which reason must work. 
The coherence test plays an essential part in con-
firming, amending, clarifying and extending what 
first presents itself as a more or less confused in-
tuition. Thus it is by the use of the coherence test 
that humanity passes--alas how slowly!--from moral 
principles almost confined to dealings with other 
members of the agent's small tribal group to a really 
universal application of these principles, since men 
gradually come to recognize that the limits imposed 
by themselves on the classes of those towards whom 
they have duties of benevolence are arbitrary and 
inconsistent. On the other hand without ethical in-
tuition there would be no mate~ial to which the co-
herence test could be applied. 
There can be no doubting the fact that in thus 
viewing reason and intuition as "not enemies but indispen-
sable allies,"3 Ewing has managed to save his position 
1A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The IVIacmillan 
Company, 1953), pp. 141-142. 
2A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
r<Iacmillan Company, 1947), p. 211. 
3A. C. Ewing, Ethics, p. 143. 
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from much of the criticisu which confronts the narrower, 
more traditional type of intuitionism. vlhether or not in-
tuition still holds enough status in his system for that 
system to be called intuitionism is a problem that will 
have to be examined carefully in the evaluation of Ewing's 
thought. 
2. The Definition of 11 Good 11 
Ewing, in giving to his most significant work on 
ethics the title The Definition of Good, vias intending, 
by that title, to answer the question, 11 vfuat is the defini-
tion of goodness?" In the preface to that book he points 
out that this question must be carefully distinguished 
from the question, nwhat things are good? 11 While the lat-
ter question seems more practical, Ewing insists that the 
forHler is far more fundamental since 11 it raises the issue 
whether ethics is explicable wholly in ter;.1s of something 
else, for example, human psychology." 1 And it is only 
when one knows what characteristics are to be seen as 
making one action right and another wrong, that the search 
for these characteristics can then be undertaken. 
In attempting to define the terra 11 good,n Ewing 
first seeks to determine how the term is commonly used, 
1A. c. Ewing, The Definition of Good (:New York: 
The Hac111illan Company, 1947), p. i. 
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and demonstrates the ambiguity of the term by distinguish-
ing at least ten senses in which it is used1 : (1) It is 
often used as a synonym for pleasant or liked--nthis roast 
beef is good. 11 (2) It is used to mean what will satisfy 
desire--na good lunch, u not simply as a lunch v.,rhich tasted 
pleasant but one which satisfied the desire of hunger. 
(3) It is used to refer to the capability of fulfilling 
function efficiently, whether the function itself be good, 
bad, or indifferent-- 11 a good knife,n even if used only by 
a nMrderer upon his victi~s. (4) It is used to mean instru-
mentally good--" a good appendector,ly, a instrumental to physi-
cal health. (5) It is sometimes used to mean something is 
efficiently produced--na good bookr' when this refers to 
the book as well written. 
(6) Presupposed in the foregoing, and particularly 
in 4 and 5, is the meaning of good as intrinsically good, 
or good-in-i tself, as opposed to instrtlJi1entally good or 
good-as-a-:tteans. 11 That is," says Ewing, 11 I uean that the 
thing called good really has the characteristic goodness 
in its primary sense, and is not :;terely called good because 
it produces something else which has the quality in ques-
tion.112 As illustration--nthe experience of being kind to 
1A. c. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
I-1acmillan Company, 1947), pp. 112-116. 
2Ibid., p. 114. 
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others is a good experience." 
(7) It has been used to mean ultimately good--
G. E. IVToore has made a distinction between intrinsi-
cally good and ultimately good, but since Moore defines 
ultimate good in terms of intrinsic good, Ewing does not 
believe that such a distinction is necessary. (8) It 
can be used to apply to characteristics which are ngood-
making." 
When "goodn is applied to a characteristic of some-
thing, it signifies not that the characteristic is 
intrinsically good itself, but that things which 
have the characteristic are in so far intrinsically 
good. For example, the statement that pleasure is 
good means that the quality of pleasantness makes 
what has it good.l 
(9) It is often used to mean morally good, and 
this in relation both to actions and to persons. Since, 
says Ewing, it can hardly be applied to both actions 
and persons in the same sense, this ninth sense will re-
fer just to actions--"a good deed." (10) It is used to 
mean morally good in relation to persons--"a good man." 
Good as applied to persons may also mean simply effi-
cient, as in the third sense, such as a good typist, 
but surely it sometimes signifies a more specifically moral 
quality. 
Of special significance in this list is the 
1 A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
t-'1acmillan Company, 1947), p. 116. 
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distinction which Ewing makes between intrinsic good and 
instrumental good. 1 He employs the usual definitions of 
instrumental and intrinsic, as has just been seen, refer-
ring respectively to "good as a means" and "good as an 
end.n He denies the possibility of instrumental goods 
existing independently of intrinsic goods, for means pos-
sess meaning only in reference to some end. Deny the 
existence of the end, and it is then purposeless to talk 
about means that vmuld be capable of achieving that non-
existent end. This is not to say that intrinsic goods 
cannot also serve as instrumental goods, but it is to say 
that intrinsic goods are basic. "Unless soue things were 
good-in-themselves and not only as means, nothing would be 
of any use at a11." 2 
So in the distinctions drawn bet\,Ieen the ten 
various senses in which "goodn is used, sense 6, which re-
fers to that which is intrinsically good, is the Glost 
basic and is the one to which all of the other nine senses 
nmst be seen as integrally related. Thus, whether one is 
speaking of a umorally good" person or act (senses 10 and 
9), the "goodness" of vanilla ice cream (sense 1 or 2), a 
1A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The Hacmillan 
Company, 1953), pp. 5-o. 
2Ibid., p. G. Also, Ewing, The Definition of Good 
(New York:--Tlle l·1acmillan Company, 1947), p. 146. 
ngood hit 11 in baseball (sense 5), a ttgood gas chamber11 
(sense 3), or any other of the senses in which the terr,, 
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"good" can be used, these expressions take on meaning only 
as they are seen as related to some intrinsic good. 
It is worth noting that Ewing, on ;,1ore than one 
occasion, insists upon a characterization of intrinsic 
good that is oriented toward idealisr.l. In Ethics he states 
that 11 what is good in itself must be an experience, state 
of nind or life, it cannot be anything without conscious-
ness at all. 111 In The Definition of Good he says that 
11 what is intrinsically good is not a physical thing or a 
physical act, but the experience or state of mind associ-
ated with it." 2 And again, in Ethics he says that it is 
nthe experience or state of mind connected with11 physical 
things or acts that constitute intrinsic good.3 
But what, after all, is "intrinsic good 11 '? Ethj_cal 
theorists have suggested a variety of anm~Ters, but ;nost 
of them, E"~:ling believes, complicate the proble:n rather 
than solve it. The root of the difficulty, according to 
Ewing, is the ;nistaken presupposition that 11 good:' is the 
;;1ost basic, most priuary, term in ethical theory. Evling 
1A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New Yorl<.:: The l'-'lacmillan 
Company, 1953), p. 7. 
0 
c:.A. C. h'wing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Ivlacmillan Cornpany, 194'7), p. 20. 
3A. C. Ewing, Ethics, p. 129. 
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does not believe that a definition of 11 goodlf can be given 
in non-ethical terms that \"lill do justice to v<That is meant 
when something is called an intrinsic good. He does be-
lieve, however, that a definition in ethical and psychologi-
cal terms can do justice to what is r~1eant, allow for the 
unique ethical character of the experience, and avoid the 
natural ambiguity that surrounds the terr:t n good" by 
recognizing nought 11 as a more fundamental term than 11 good. 11 
Thus ugoodn must be defined in terms of 11 ought." 
Before seeing hm'i this is accoi1lplished, however, 
it is necessary to examine Ewing's definition of 11 ought. 11 
3. The Definition of "Ought" 
Just as the term "goodu can be used in a variety 
of ways, so the term nought" is also ambiguous, though 
to a lesser extent. 1 Ewing distinguishes three usages of 
uoughtn in ethical theory. 2 
( l) nThe action one ought to perforrnn may mean 
that action which is really preferable, all things con-
sidered. But all things could be considered only by an 
all-knowing and all-wise being. H~tBn beings are not 
equipped for such a full sweep of knowledge and understand-
ing, and hence are not equipped to understand what is 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (Ne\·l York: The 
Nacmillan Company, 1947), p. 118. -----
2Ibid., pp. 118-122. 
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really preferable. Ne\'lly developed drugs have been pre-
scribed for the treatment of certain human ills, only to 
be the occasion of more serious ills than those they were 
intended to alleviate. Only the ability to foresee such 
undesired consequences would have made it possible to avoid 
ther.1. 
Nevertheless, says Ewing, there is a sense in 
\vhich this first usage of 11 oughtu is not involved in such 
complications. There are situations in which c01:1plications 
about consequences do not arise. Referring to what Ross 
had called nprima facie duties,n Ewing says that one ought 
to be faithful to promises made, that one ought to value 
justice more than r.1oney, that one ought to dislike cruelty, 
that one ought to love good parents, and the like. Such 
judgments depend not upon knowing all the facts, but upon 
having experienced \'lhat it is to be a human being. Indeed, 
says Ewing, "we are rightly so confident of the truth of 
E1any such judgments that we use the term 'knm'l' rather 
than 'believe'.nl And he goes on to say, "I am convinced 
that I ought to dislike the unnecessary infliction of pain, 
and not only that relatively to the available evidence I 
ought to do so. 112 
1A. C. E\·iing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 120. 
2Ibid. 
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(2) The second v;ay in which "ought" is used is the 
sense in which not to do what one ought, or to do what one 
ought not to do, is always morally blameworthy. It is this 
usage of 11 oughtn which comes the closest to expressing what 
is intended when the term is used in a 1noral sense. The 
first usage would have more meaning if human beings pos-
sessed onmiscience, but lacking that quality, indeed, 
making the great majority of choices in the realm of prob-
ability rather than certainty, it is often misleading to 
speak of an action which is "really preferable." And yet 
some distinction needs to be made between a situation in 
which a surgeon decides that he ought to perfor::n surgery 
because this seems to be the path of reasonable, intelli-
gent, informed probability, and a situation in which an 
uninformed or misguided individual believes he ought to 
keep certain members of society in an inferior status be-
cause of external characteristics which they happen to 
possess. In each of these cases the moral force of "ought" 
is felt in its full power, and in each case not to fulfill 
the action called for would be morally blameworthy. And 
yet to suppose that one situation is on the same moral 
plane as the other when all factors are considered would 
be to destroy what is intended by the term "moral." Such 
confusion can be avoided by the distinction between the 
first and second senses of "ought." 
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But problems still remain, for the surgeon ought 
to do (the moral imperative of sense 2) \'lhat ought to be 
done (the preferable of sense 1); whereas the misguided 
individual ought to do (the moral imperative of sense 2) 
what ought not to be done, for what he feels obligated to 
do cannot be said to be really preferable. Hence, another 
sense is needed. 
(3) The third sense in which "ought" is used makes 
allowances for the limitations of human ability to under-
stand situations and foresee consequences which may arise 
as the result of choices. Here, instead of speaking of 
that which is really preferable, one speaks rather of 
that which is preferable in the light of the available 
evidence. This usage makes room for human error, human 
weakness, human prejudice, and human inability to forecast 
the future. If the surgeon performs surgery and the patient 
dies from some unforeseeable and completely unlikely com-
plication, the surgeon is not seen as morally blameworthy. 
He is morally blameworthy (sense 2) only \vhen he fails to 
do that which, according to sense l or sense 3, is really 
preferable or at least preferable in the light of the 
available evidence. 
Thus, while the second usage of 11 ought" is more 
distinctively moral than either the first or third usage, 
for here "ought" is used in a sense nin which not to do 
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what one ought, or to do what one ought not to do, is al-
ways morally blameworthy," this second usage is necessari-
ly related to the other two usages. 1 11 We ought always to 
do what we believe we ought, 112 (sense 2), but there is also 
need to examine the content of that belief against what 
would reasonably seem to be really preferable (sense 1), 
or preferable to choose given the circumstances (sense 3), 
or both. 
Before pressing further into these three senses of 
"ought" to see how "preferable" of sense 1 and sense 3 is 
to be defined, and to see more fully what is meant by the 
moral obligation of sense 2, it is necessary to note how 
Ewing explains the relationship between noughtn and the 
closely related terms of "duty" and "right.n3 All three 
of these terms are intimately connected, according to 
Ewing, and as there are three different senses in which 
nought" is used, there are, corresponding to these, three 
different senses in which each of these other terms is 
used. Also, there are times when these terms are used al-
most synonymously. To speak of nthe right action" is to 
speak of "the action which ought to be done.n However, 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
fvlacmillan Company, 1947), p. 120. 
2Ibid. 
3rbid., pp. 123-125. 
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when nright" is used without the definite article it has 
a broader significance. There may be a variety of ways 
in which one is able to do his duty, any one of which 
would be right but none of which would necessarily be "the 
right way." A debt in the araount of five dollars may be 
paid by means of a five-dollar bill, five one-dollar bills, 
a bank check, or by any one of a variety of combinations 
of change. Unless some stipulation has been made, any one 
of these methods would be right. Here "rightn is being 
used as the equivalent of "not wrong." 1 
Ewing differs from Ross in this, for Ross, while 
noting this distinction, departed from this normal usage 
and chose to use "right" as the adjective to correspond to 
nsomething that ought to be done." 2 
By "duty11 is usually meant any action or class of 
actions which ought to be done. It would not ordinarily 
be applied to a situation in which an action is desired 
because it would bring the agent personal pleasure, nor is 
it usually applied to acts of slight importance. It is 
usually used to emphasize the moral aspect of an act, 
though Ewing is not willing to limit it exclusively to the 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 124. 
2w. D. Ross, The Ri t and the Good (Oxford: The 
Clarendon Press, 1930 , pp. 3- • Ewing refers to this in 
The Definition of Good, p. 124. 
second sense of "ought" since it is possible to make a 
mistake about one's duty. 1 
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But for a complete analysis of all of these tenns 
something more still needs to be added. An action which 
is a duty or which is the right action is the action which 
ought to be done. And the action which ought to be done is 
the action that is preferable in the particular circum-
stances under consideration, and the person who understands 
an action as preferable has a certain obligation in rela-
tion to it. But what does it mean to say that something 
is preferable, or that someone is morally obligated in re-
lation to it? 
In answer to such a question Ewing points out that 
nought" really covers two different concepts, the concept 
of fittingness and the concept of moral obligation. 2 If 
it can be said that someone ought to do something, then 
there must be "a certain relation between the action and 
its environment such that the action is fitting, appropri-
ate, suitable, and its omission unfitting, inappropriate, 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
f'v1acmillan Company, 1947), p. 125. Ewing accepts Ross's 
theory of prima facie duties as a part of his own theory. 
See Ewing, "Intuitionism and Uti1itarianisJ>1, 11 Revue Inter-
nationale de Philosophie, I (1939), 659; The Definition of 
Good, pp. 119-120, 187, 201-204; Ethics (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1953), p. 182. 
0 
cA. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 132. 
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unsuitable." 1 The 11 oughtn of sense 1 or sense 3, referring 
to the preferable, is oughtness in this sense of fitting-
ness. That which is preferable stands in a certain rela-
tion within a total situation in such a way that it can be 
said to be fitting, or suitable, or appropriate. 
But this is only a portion of the meaning of 
nought.n Along with this is the concept of strictly moral 
obligation. Fittingness and moral obligation, though re-
lated, are not the same. In the case of moral obligation, 
nwe feel that we are under binding laws which we cannot 
break without being ourselves evil in a r:1ore serious and 
quite different way fro in that in which pain is evil. " 2 
It is only when one deems an act fitting that he feels a 
moral obligation to perform it, and moral obligation can 
itself be called a fitting response to a certain type of 
situation, yet the distinction betHeen the two terms :~1ust 
not be overlooked. n'Fittingness' stands for a relation 
between an action and its environment, moral obligation is 
something analogous to an imperative on the agent. 11 3 
While it is possible thus to analyze the term 
nought, 11 it is not possible to define it in the sense 
1 A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Nac::lillan Company, 1947), p. 132. 
2Ibid., p. 133. 
3Ibid. 
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explaining it in terms of something other than oughtness. 
The concept of 11 oughtness 11 is, for Ewing, the basic ethical 
terrn. Oughtness as fittingness must be intuited, experi-
enced, 11 seen." Reasoning has its place, but if oughtness 
itself had to be established and der.tonstrated by an infer-
ential argument it ·would lose its essential nature. Fit-
tingness is subject to the examinations which reason :nakes 
possible, but is not reducible to other tern~, either 
within or outside the field of ethics. And concerning 
oughtness as iiloral obligation, EHing says that nit is 
certainly a part of rnoral consciousness, if anything is, 
that we are under binding obligations. • . We are 
directly and certainly conscious of moral obligation."1 
The implications of these notions, and their rela-
tion to the idea of the good, must now be examined. 
4. 11 Good" and "Ought" in Ethical Judgment 
Any satisfactory solution to the problem of seeing 
how !t good" and '1 ought n are related to one another and re-
lated to ethical judgment, according to Ewing, ~nust be 
based upon a careful examination of vJhat happens in the 
mind when ethical judgments are made. 2 Such an examination 
1A. C. Evling, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
J:·tiacmillan Company, 1947), p. 134. 
2A. C. E\'ling, Ethics (New York: The Kacmillan 
Company, 1953), p. 121. 
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reveals, says Ewing, that ethical judg:nent is fundamentally 
other than simply an attitude of admiring, welcoming, ap-
proving, or their opposites, even if it is insisted that 
such an attitude is generalized into the notion that it 
includes the feeling that everyone ought to share this 
same attitude. That ethical judgment includes such an 
emotional aspect cannot be seriously doubted, says Ewing, 
but it has also a cognitive aspect on the basis of which 
ethical assertions can be classified as objectively true 
1 
or false. And this cognitive aspect, in the form of a 
"conviction that something is really objectively good or 
bad, right or wrong, 11 is, in the normal ethical experience, 
prior to the emotional attitude. 2 Furtherlllore, without 
this cognitive aspect, this nconviction, 11 the emotional 
attitude would not be really ethical at all "but simply a 
taste or unethical preference."3 
But what is the nature of this cognitive aspect? 
Is it best expressed, in reference to an act of murder, by 
saying "one ought not to corrunit murder,n or by saying 
"murder is not good 11 ? Or are the two forms of expression 
simply alternative methods of saying the same thing? 
1A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The I•Iacrnillan 
Company, 1953), p. 121. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
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According to Ewing there is a difference here between 
noughtn and 11 good 11 which must not be overlooked, even 
though there is a connection between them which cannot be 
denied. 
The most simple distinction to be made between 
"good" and noughtu has to do with the fact that ugood" is 
ordinarily used to describe ends and 11 ought 11 is ordinarily 
used in relation to actions. 1 But this is but a bare be-
ginning. In analyzing the term 11 good, 11 Ewing shows that 
if what is being spoken of as good is a certain experi-
ence, then the best definition of this sort of good would 
be an experience "worth having for its own sake.n 2 But 
the verb 11 to have,n in this sense, can be used to apply 
only to experiences. What, then, ~night it mean to employ 
the predicate "good" in propositions concerning, for exam-
ple, beautiful objects? If, says Ewing, we want a defini-
tion of "good" that will include not only its application 
in regard to experiences, but as it is used in other types 
of propositions as well, some broader definition than 
"worth having for its own sakeu must be used. To supply 
this need, Ewing suggests that "good11 be defined as 11 what 
1A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The Macmillan 
Company, 1953), p. 8. 
2A. c. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
rvracmillan Company, 1947), p. 147. 
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ought to be the object of a pro attitude.n 1 A pro attitude 
is simply a favorable attitude. It might mean choosing, 
desiring, liking, pursuing, approving, admiring, or any 
combination of these. 2 
So we have obtained a definition of "intrinsically 
good 11 in terms of "ought. u • • • vlhen something is 
intrinsically good, it is (other things being equal) 
something that on its own account we ought to welcome, 
rejoice in if it exists, seek to produce if it does 
not exist. vie ought to approve its attaimi1ent, count 
its loss a deprivation, hope for and not dread its 
coming if this i~ likely, avoid what hinders its 
production, etc.~ 
But how is one to determine whether or not he 
should have a pro attitude toward a certain object? If the 
answer is in ter;ns of 11 good," and the goodness of the object 
is said to determine favorableness of the attitude, then 
the definition has become circular, and so worthless. But 
if it is in terms of 11 ought," then the previous distinction 
bet\veen nought" as fittingness and "ought't as moral obli-
gation needs to be considered. To say that something is 
worth pursuing is certainly to say that it is fitting that 
it be pursued; it is not to say, necessarily, that some 
particular individual has the moral obligation to pursue 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Hac1nillan Company, 1947), pp. 148-149. 
2Ibid., p. 149. 
3Ibid. See also, A. c. Ewing, Ethics (New York: 
The Ilfacmillan Company, 1953), p. 104. 
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it, for such may well be outside the realm of possibility. 
On this basis, then, Ewing defines ngoodn as 11 fitting object 
of a pro attitude." 1 
Ewing believes that such a definition of "good" in 
terms of fittingness helps to explain \thy there are so 
many senses in which the term 11 good" can be used. For the 
particular pro attitude the fittingness of which is being 
asserted will determine the sense in which ngood 11 is being 
used. 2 And fittingness carries moral obligation with it 
for a person when and where it is possible for that person 
to do what is fitting, or to bring about ·v.rhat is fitting, 3 
so "good 11 becomes an object of moral obligation whenever 
one is free to choose that toward which it is fitting to 
have a pro attitude. 
But if ngood11 cannot be accepted as the fundamental 
concept of ethics, why not use moral obligation to assume 
that role? Would it not be possible to analyze "the fitting-
ness of doing A in terms of the moral obligation to do A if 
we could? 114 
Hy reasons for not adopting this course were as follows: 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New Yorl{: The 
Ivlacmillan Company, 1947), p. 152. 
2Ibid., p. 166. 
3rbid., p. 173. 
4Ibid., p. 185. 
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(a) It is clear that for me to be under a moral obli-
gation to do A I must first believe that it is fitting 
for me to do A. Therefore the concept of moral obli-
gation presupposes the concept of fittingness and not 
vice versa. (b) There is no verbal contradiction in 
saying both that my own pleasure is a good and that I 
am never under a moral obligation to pursue it as such, 
or in saying that I am under no moral obligation to 
sacrifice somebody else's lesser good for the sake of 
my own greater good. Therefore we cannot use nought" 
in the moral obligation sense when defining "good." 
(c) As we have seen, ngood" does not alv;ays mean only 
what ought to be chosen; it sometimes means what ought 
to be admired, or be the object of other pro attitudes 
such as desire or liking, and we cannot say that we 
are under a 111oral obligation to admire, desire, or like 
something, but we can say that we ought, in the fit-
tingness sense, to have these feelings toward it.l 
The task of ethics, then, is to determine which 
objects are fitting objects of a pro attitude ("good"), 
and of these, which are also fitting objects of :rioral obli-
gation ("right"). "Good," 11 fittingness, 11 and "moral obli-
gation 11 are the three most ultimate concepts in ethical 
theory, for Ewing, none of them reducible to non-ethical 
terms, and 11 fittingness" the concept on which both "good 11 
and "moral obligation11 depend. "Fittingnessn itself must 
simply be 11 seen," though in some specific instance it does 
need coherent ratification. 
5. Non-naturalistic Realism 
As Sorley and Ross before hLt, Ewing has waged re-
lentless warfare on naturalism and naturalistic ethics. 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
f-ilacmillan Company, 1947), p. 105. 
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According to naturalism all explanation must be verified 
by the scientific process of the laboratory. The natural-
ist, at least the type opposed by Ewing, defines ethical 
concepts in the non-ethical terms of s01.1e form of science. 
The science usually chosen is psychology, often in relation 
to biology, and ethical terms are defined in ter:,ls of de-
sire, feelings of approval, and the like. Ewing agrees 
that such terms must be taken into consideration in any 
attempt to explain what is meant by "good 11 and "ought 11 but 
he does not agree that the full story can be told by using 
these non-ethical terms alone. 
One of the factors contributing to naturalistic 
interpretations of ethical experience, according to Ewing, 
has been the mistaken notion that the basic concept of 
ethics is some indefinable quality called "goodness" which 
"belongs" to objects or which objects "have." Hhen this 
quality failed to be discovered in the process of scien-
tific analysis, a serious doubt was ra~sed as to its exist-
ence. The difficulty, says Ewing, resides in the fact that 
what was being looked for--the indefinable base of ethical 
value--\·.ras being looked for where 1 t could not be found. 
"We are not clearly aware of an indefinable non-natural good-
ness, but we are of fittingness and obligation." 1 The 
1A. C. EHing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Maclidllan Company, 1947), p. 178. 
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principal weakness of a naturalistic definition of "good," 
says Ewing, is not that 11 good" is indefinable but that if 
it is defined naturalistically such a definition carries 
with it no moral obligation to pursue the good, and pur-
suing the good would be no more fitting than failing to 
pursue it or than pursuing the bad. 1 
Ewing admits that the naturalists have rendered 
a service in describing ethical value in terms of such pro 
attitudes as desiring, liking, and approving. What they 
have done, however, according to Ewing, is give attention 
to the "concrete, n~re distinctly perceptible element in 
goodnessn while omitting the relational element. 2 There 
is a connection between emotional attitudes and judgments 
about goodness and badness, but while naturalism is one 
attempt to explain this connection, Ewing offers what he 
claims to be a more adequate alternative explanation. 
yfuat the naturalist fails to explain adequately, says 
Ewing, are the relations which occur in consciousness. 
In analyzing ethical experience the primary relation in 
ethical judgment is fittingness. Assuredly, the naturalist 
will deny that such a relation as 11 fittingness" is given 
in sensation, but then he must face up to the presence 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 178. 
2rbid. 
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of relational terms in his own propositions when he speaks 
of "approving of" or 11 feeling emotions tov·Jard. 11 11 0f11 and 
"towardr' in this sense are certainly not given in sensation, 
and yet they are employed by the naturalistic theorist. 1 
Ewing believes that the naturalist needs to overcome his 
blindness to the importance of relations, particularly the 
relation of fittingness. 
Also of worth in this theory which recognizes 
fittingness rather than "good" as the irreducible ethical 
term, says Ewing, is the fact that it allows for the 
existence of the relationship between "goodn and the con-
scious mind that is cognizant of "good 11 without surrender-
ing to subjectivism. There is no such thing as "good" 
apart from the conscious mind which recognizes it as good, 
since ngood't is defined in terms of a pro attitude which 
can only belong to a mind. From this it is possible, 
and possibly unavoidable, to move into a subjectivistic 
position if "good" is simply "good." But if the pro 
attitude is to be based on an objective fittingness, says 
Ewing, then not only can it be seen as related to mind, 
but related also to an objective realm which mind must 
recognize and to which it must, in a sense, conform. 2 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 179. 
2Ibid., pp. 180-181. 
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Ethical value is not analyzable simply as any ob-
ject of any kind of pro attitude, so far as Ewing is con-
cerned. If it were, ethical values would simply consti-
tute descriptions of psychological states and so would 
lose the norwative status that rightfully belongs to 
ethics. This is where naturalistic interpretations break 
down, for ngood" means "fitting object of a pro attitude, 11 
and it is the t'fittingness," not simply the attitude of 
admiring, or choosing, or approving, that gives to the 
situation its distinctively ethical tone. 1 
Ewing's realism is best seen not in regard to 
goodness, since goodness is definable in terms of fit-
tingness, but in regard to fittingness itself. Fitting-
ness is recognizable in an intuitive grasp, and no more 
than this can be said about the matter. 
Certain characteristics are such that the fitting re-
sponse to what possesses them is a pro attitude, and 
that is all there is to it. . . We see directly that 
pleasant experiences as such, natural beauty, unself-
ish love, are fitting objects of pro attitudes. That 
they are follows necessarily from their specific 
nature. 2 · 
Recognizing, however, that such a bald statement of real-
istic intuitionism is an oversimplification of the basic 
issues of ethical theory, yet without denying that 
1A. c. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), pp. 189-190. 
2Ibid., p. 172. 
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intuitionism is true, Ewing speaks of there being a co-
herent system of ethical truths so logically related one 
to another that you cannot alter one of these truths 
without contradicting others. 1 Unwilling to go all the 
way in affirming an absolute system of such truths, Ewing 
holds that they form at least such a harmony of interde-
pendence that the intuition of some ethical truths can 
serve to confirm the intuition of others, 11 so that we are 
not wholly dependent on intuition, but have also this 
'coherence' test.tr 2 But whether intuitions are accepted 
as truth with or without the confirmation of coherence, 
what are being dealt with, according to Ewing, are not 
simply the vagaries of the human consciousness but actual 
responses of consciousness to a real order of things 
which apparently exists independently of human conscious-
ness. 
6. Evaluation of Ewing's Thought 
In evaluating Ewing's thought, it is well to begin 
with the merits which his view possesses. One of these 
merits consists of Ewing's attempt throughout all of his 
work to be empirically inclusive. Never does he seem to 
be spinning a tale unrelated to experience. Rather, his 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 203. 
2Ibid., p. 204. 
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primary and enduring question is, What is included in 
ethical experience, and what, precisely, is its nature'? 
And the answers which he suggests are based on that experi-
ence and integrally related to it. He chides naturalists 
and subjectivists for being less empirical than he, for 
they usually pride themselves on their use of direct ob-
servation of experience, yet they abandon such direct 
observation when the experience to be examined is ethical 
experience. 1 Whether or not Ewing's system is adequate 
to account for ethical experience, that his attempt is to 
handle that experience as inclusively and competently as 
he can there can be no doubt. And this, to say the least, 
seems meritorious. 
Another of these merits is to be seen in Ewing's 
refusal to reduce any term to something other than itself 
where such reduction does not seem warranted. It has 
already been noted that he criticized naturalism for in-
eluding just such a reduction of ethical terms to non-
ethical terms. So far as simplicity of explanation is 
concerned, the more reduction the better. But adequacy 
calls for something other than just sin~licity, and Occam's 
Razor can be applied only in cases of equal adequacy. 
When one says, "Murder is wrong, therefore you ought not 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
f"lacmillan Company, 1947), p. 50. 
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to commit murder,n it is possible to reduce the expression 
into terms such as an attitude of disapproval, or glandu-
lar or neural activity, or emotional reaction leading to a 
command, but the supposition that any or all of these 
terms have fully expressed the original assertion is some-
thing less than proved. The element of oughtness, at 
least in Ewing's sense of fittingness if not of moral 
obligation, is present in the expression but not present 
in the reductions. It escaped in the process of reduction 
and must be recaptured before the analysis can be consid-
ered adequate. 
Still another merit to be noted is Ewing's will-
ingness to go beyond sheer intuition to at least some sort 
of coherence test. That he leaves some question as to the 
precise relationship between intuition and coherence will 
be pointed out in the discussion of what seera to be weak-
nesses in his system. But whether or not he gives to 
coherence a sufficiently significant status, he is cer-
tainly to be credited with strengthening his system by his 
use of coherence. Intuitionism always has faced an in-
soluble problem when asked to arbitrate between conflict-
ing intuitions, and the problem will remain insoluble as 
long as conflicting claims to intuition exist. If there 
is no more ultimate criterion of truth than intuition, 
one intuition has as good a claim to truth as any other. 
The problem becomes solvable on.J..y by the disappearance 
of conflicts (and then you would have the harmony which 
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is coherence), or by employing some more ultimate criteri-
on by which conflicts can be resolved. Ewing has recog-
nized this difficulty with sheer intuitionism, and has 
sought to overcor:-te it by seeing ethical truths as forming 
a system against which new intuitions need to be checked. 
This is certainly a step in the direction of making 
. ethical theory a subject that is capable of being dis-
cussed from various points of view with some hope of mu-
tual understanding. 
A fourth merit of Ewing's system, and the last 
to be noted here, consists of his description of the im-
plications of the notion of fittingness. Perhaps fitting-
ness is not quite so ultimate and final a term as Ewing 
believes, but it surely constitutes a fertile suggestion 
which stimulates the mind in the attempt to analyze and 
understand exactly what is involved in ethical experience, 
and fittingness itself is at least a characteristic of 
any situation recognized as a value situation. This 
surely is one of the aspects of any experience of worth 
or predication of worth. This is true even of economic 
worth, for when the sales person says, 11 This item is worth 
twenty dollars," if he really means what he says he is not 
simply asserting that the selling price of the item is 
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twenty dollars, but that twenty dollars is a fitting price 
for that item at that time. If fittingness can actually 
be intuited, or if a system of fittingness can be determined 
by a proper combination of intuition and coherence, then 
the task of making the transition from theoretical to prac-
tical ethics vlill be considerable eased. But unfortunately 
it is in the very notion of fittingness that is to be 
found what is perhaps the greatest weakness in Ewing's 
system. 
Turning, then, to weaknesses in Ewing's thought, 
they can be sununarized, for the most part, under two re-
lated headings, the first centering around his notion of 
intuition and the second centering around his idea of 
fittingness. 
The place of intuition in Ewing's thought was 
discussed in a previous section and it was seen there 
that Ewing qualifies his intuitionism to the point of 
saying that intuitions are neither infallible, nor iso-
lated from other rational processes. And he adds, as 
was noted, that intuitions must certainly be subject to 
the test of reasoning. In the light of this, it needs 
to be asked if a system that gives such a prominent place 
to reason can still be called intuitionistic. In Ewing's 
case, the answer is in the affirmative, not so much on the 
basis of his remarks when he is specifically discussing 
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the relationship between intuition and coherence, 1 but his 
ardent affirrn.a.tion from time to time of the intuitive grasp 
which simply occurs and for which there is no accounting. 2 
There is no basic contradiction between intuition and co-
herence if intuition is seen as a possible source of 
truth-claims and not as the final test of truth, but there 
are times when Ewing seems to be suggesting that at least 
some intuitions constitute their own test. His general 
use of coherence is commendable. His failure to specify 
in greater detail than he does precisely what the rela-
tionship between intuition and coherence is, constitutes a 
weal-cness. 
But is moral intuition, as immediate perception, 
ever of final cognitive worth? Ewing seens to assume that 
it is, and accepts it as such. No final answer to the 
problem can be given here. Of particular interest here is 
its relationship to the notion of fittingness. But this 
much can be said--that there is a givenness of some sort 
in all experience not even a solipsist can deny. The 
human mind, to be in touch with its environment, whether 
1Best seen in A. c. Ewing, The Definition of Good 
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), pp. 93, 203, 211; 
and in A. C. Ewing, Ethics (New York: The fvlacmillan Company, 
1953), pp. 141-143. 
2Best seen in A. C. Ewing, The D,;finition of Good, 
pp. 30, 172; and in A. C. Ewing, Ethics, pp. 135-140. 
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that environment be understood as internal or external or 
both, receives immediate data from that environment. But 
human knowledge consists of something more than immediate 
experience. It is a real question whether even a quality 
like yellowness can be "known" without the mediating 
function of mind which classifies it and relates it to 
other qualities. An even greater question is whether 
fittingness can be "known11 \".rithout such rational mediation. 
Ewing's answer seems to be that fittingness can be "known" 
without this mediation, and that any attempt to discover 
it through an inferential process is bound to result in 
failure. 
But even if one were to grant this much, is the 
analysis of ethical experience best expressed by saying 
that the basic factor in such experience consists of a 
cognitive given? !•'light it not be truer to the actual 
situation to say that that which is given, which can be 
called intuitional, is to be found on a more primitive 
plane than the cognitive, and that ethical judgments, as 
cognitive, are best seen as the product of mediating 
rational processes? 
This problem is directly connected with the prob-
lem of Ewing's notion of fittingness, for it is primarily 
a consideration of his treatment of fittingness that leads 
one to classify him as an intuitionist. Fittingness 
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itself, for Ewing, simply is. But when ethical truth, 
or valuational truth in general, or truth in any other 
realm is thus defined in terms of fittingness, the ques-
tion that comes to mind is, Fitting for what? And the 
reply is, Just fitting. But such an answer is scarcely 
adequate. This sounds almost like a type of pragmatism 
which suggests that truth is to be defined in terms of 
what is practical or satisfactory. Then the pertinent 
question to ask is, Satisfactory to whom, and for what 
ends'? So with fittingness. What is fitting for a sincere 
and industrious workman would seem to be quite unfitting 
for a bank robber or horse thief. And if it is said then 
that the ends of the honest workman are more fitting than 
the ends for which the bank robber or the horse thief 
is working, can no stronger case be built for such a 
conclusion than that it is r:1ore fitting to 11 see" it this 
way? 
There can be no question about the worth of the 
term nfittingness" as a unique means of expressing rela-
tions of goodness or oughtness. But is fittingness as 
ultimate as Ewing suggests, or must it not be seen as 
based on the ;nore ultimate consideration of ends in terms 
of which fittingness and unfittingness can be determined? 
In defining good, Ewing insisted that intrinsic good must 
al1vays be thought of as an experience or a state of mind. 
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His entire system might well be strengthened if he r~de 
this same insistence concerning fittingness. Then if we 
must have intuitions, let them consist of the ends of 
fittingness, rather than bare fittingness itself. But 
these ends 1night be best arrived at by a careful analysis 
of all experience in order to determine the nature of the 
self, and then fittingness coul~ be expressed in terms of 
self-realization. 
CHAPTER V 
ARTHUR CAMPBELL GARNETT 
The first three thinkers whose work we have 
examined were all born in Great Britain, received their 
fo~nal education there, and have done their teaching and 
their writing there. This fourth, and last, person whose 
work we shall examine, Arthur Campbell Garnett, vias born 
in South Australia in 1894. 1 He studied at the College 
of the Bible in Melbourne and at the University of Mel-
bourne. From the College of the Bible he received the 
diploma in preparation for ordination for the ministry in 
the Disciples of Christ Church. From the University of 
Melbourne he was graduated with first-class honors in the 
School of Philosophy. 
After two years in the active ministry, he returned 
to the University of tJielbourne, where he v1as awarded the 
M.A. Degree in 1922 and the Litt.D. Degree in 1925. His 
doctoral thesis was entitled "The Problem of Personality 
in the Light of Recent Psychology." Later, from time to 
time, he has had periods of special study at the University 
of London, the University of Edinburgh, the University of 
1Biographical information was received from Prof. 
Garnett in personal correspondence. 
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Berlin, and Yale University. 
He has held teaching posts at the University of 
Adelaide in South Australia, at Butler University in 
Indiana, at the College of the Bible in Kentucky, and, for 
the last twenty-three years, at the University of Wisconsin 
where he is currently serving as Professor of Philosophy. 
Garnett has been a diligent and dedicated student 
of the problem of human nature. He has been particularly 
anxious that the full nature of man be understood and 
appreciated, and this, for Garnett, means especially that 
man's moral and religious experience be seen in its full 
significance. This concern is expressed over and over 
again in his published writings. Not one of his books 
omits a discussion of it, and most of his books are ad-
dressed either to the problem as a whole or to sorr1e par-
ticular facet of it. And the key to the solution of the 
problem, for Garnett, is to be found in what he calls the 
altruistic will. This altruistic will is always at the 
heart of mature reflective morality. To stifle it is to 
stunt personal developrnent; to nurture it is to find 
fulfillment of the true self. It is the basis of both 
morality and religion. It is God at work in the human 
person. 
Garnett's first book, Instinct and Personality, is 
a psychological study in which he insists that any attempt 
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to explain the person merely in biological terms is inade-
quate to account for all that the person is and does. I1Ian 
has needs beyond the instinctive biological needs; for 
example: 
the term "right" expresses something that answers to 
a need. The man raust be not merely a barbarian, he 
must be utterly depraved, who does not feel some im-
pulsion to do the thing which he has decided to be 
right. There is something within him that goes lack-
ing, some element of his nature that is starved, if 
he declines to do right.l 
Again, "the altruistic motive satisfies something in our 
nature which the instinctive impulses cannot account for--
some urge which is above them or more fundamental than 
they." 2 Life at the level of personality can include, but 
always transcends, life at the level of biological in-
stincts. 
Garnett's next book, The Mind in Action, is another 
psychological study, in which he insists that the mind is 
always active in experience. He expanded some of the 
arguments of his first book and went on to develop, in 
embryonic form, a general theory of value. 
This interest in a general theory of value found 
full expression in his third book, Reality and Value. In 
this book he sets forth also his metaphysical position, 
1A. C. Garnett, Instinct and Personality (London: 
G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1928), p. 103. 
2 Ibid., p. 109. 
identifying himself with the school of critical realism, 
at least in epistemology. 
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The epistemology developed is a type of Critical Real-
ism akin to the vie\'lS of Kemp Smith, Stout, and White-
head. But by showing that this epistemology applies 
equally to subject and object we are lead directly to 
an ontology akin to the systems of the great Idealists. 1 
In this system, values are seen as belonging to an objective 
order along with space and sensa. "Space, sense, and value 
are the three qualities which the time process differen-
tiates for us into their various kinds of forrns." 2 
Values are objective. They are differentiated by our 
conative activity from an objective value continuUln. 
Our volitional activity discovers values that are 
there; it does not create them. The activity of the 
subject can do no more than disclose th~ potentiali-
ties definitely resident in the object.5 
Garnett 1 s next t\vo books both deal with the phi-
losophy of religion. The first of these, A Realistic Phi-
losophy of Religion, was developed as a text for use with 
college students. The second, God In Us, was designed more 
for the average reader interested in religion but without 
sufficient background in philosophy to understand or derive 
benefit from the exposition and criticism of a great variety 
of alternative theories. A later book, Religion and the 
Moral Life, is a further development of Garnett's thought in 
1A. c. Garnett, Reality and Value (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1937), p. 10. 
2Ibid., p. 175. 
3rbid., p. 180. 
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the philosophy of religion. All three of these books show 
a vital concern for religion as experienced, and hence 
the approach can be called empirical. They all demonstrate 
a basic trust in man's ability to reason, and a basic trust 
in hwnan nature as a whole. The basic appeal throughout 
is an appeal to be reasonable, to be inclusive in accumu-
lating data, and to be synoptic in overall perspective. 
And along with the appeal to be reasonable is a sensitivity, 
on Garnett's part, to mystical experience and prophetic in-
sight. Religion finds its origin in moral experience, par-
ticularly in the promptings of the altruistic will. Moral 
theory can be developed independently of religion, but re-
ligious devotion is needed if one is to have the courage 
and strength to live up to his moral theory. 
Finally, Garnett has written two books specifically 
in the field of ethics, The f.loral Nature of Iv'fan and Ethics: 
A Critical Introduction. The basic theory developed in 
these books is a type of self-realizationism. This theory, 
while rejecting the adopting of self-realization as the 
moral end-in-view, since this would constitute self-defeat-
ing egoism, uses the concept of the fully developed self as 
a criterion for distinguishing right and wrong. The possi-
bility of intuitive insight into questions of right and 
wrong is accepted, though the fallibility of such insight is 
emphasized. It is a theory which is based on a notion of 
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woral laws, or norms. These moral laws state nthe natural 
conditions which have to be fulfilled if a certain result is 
to be brought about. The conditions for bringing about the 
result are determined by the natural order.nl And here again, 
as in all of Garnett's writings, and central in his ethical 
theory, there is the insistence that a vital aspect of the 
nature of man, within the natural order, is the altruistic 
will, the concern for others, the agape of the New Testament. 
The most important work for this study is Garnett's 
latest book, Ethics: A Critical Introduction. Although 
this is a textbook, it is also more than a textbook--it is 
a carefully developed polemic for Garnett's own point of 
view. The system as worked out in his earlier bool(s, par-
ticularly The r·1oral Nature of r'~an, will not be overlooked, 
but this latest and most carefully systernatized stater11ent 
will necessarily be accepted as the most significant source. 
Along with these books, Garnett has prepared a 
significant nur11ber of essays for publication in philosophi-
cal journals. The great majority of these essays have been 
in the field of ethics, but, as with his books, there have 
been some in the field of religion and some in the field of 
111etaphysics. Further reference will be :nade to these in 
the exposition of Garnett's thought. 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 380. 
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1. Data, l'-1ethod, and Criterion 
Garnett 1 s basic approach to the problems of ethics, 
while having certain distinguishing features of its own, is 
not essentially different from that adopted by the other 
three men of this study. Garnett begins, as they did, with 
the moral judgments of mankind, the judgments of approval 
and disapproval, of oughts and ought nots, of right and 
wrong, of good and evil. These judgments constitute the 
data of ethics •1 nThe subject matter vJith which all ethi-
cal studies must begin is the actual body of moral judg-
ments made by human beings, unsystematic and frequently 
inconsistent as they are." 2 
In seeking out these moral judgments of mankind, 
the interested person should gather them from every possi-
ble source. He needs to be a student of the history of 
ideas. He needs to study the moral judgments of human 
beings at every stage of their development.3 
We cannot neglect the moral ideas of the primitive. 
Still less can we neglect those of the saints and 
sages. We have to go to the great literature of 
every people, the literature in which their spiritual 
life is expressed, and particularly that of their 
religions, in order to understand their moral 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 21. 
2A. C. Garnett, Religion and the Moral Life (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), p. 20. 
3A. c. Garnett, Ethics •.. , p. 14. 
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experience and evaluate their systems of values. Then 
we must go to the moral philosophers who have under-
taken the criticism and systematization of t~e ethical 
ideals and moral experience of their people. 
And, says Garnett, we find such judgments wherever 
we find men. To be sure, different societies have widely 
differing views as to what is right and wrong, but in 
every society the attitude toward what is thought right and 
wrong appears to be much the sarne. 2 In every society, man 
nfeels guilt and shame and he expresses moral approval. He 
has a sense of honor and a consciencej and he hides his 
guilt and acts the hypocrite."3 Though different societies 
have "different conceptions of the rights and duties of 
individuals, 11 no society "is without conceptions of right 
and duty." 4 
This, however, is only a part of the story. While 
such judgments constitute the materials with which ethical 
criticism must begin, a deeper level of data is to be 
found in the human experiences which give rise to moral 
judgments. Not only must these moral judgments be exam-
ined, criticized, and systematized, but "always the court 
of last resort is ethical experience--the experience of 
1A. c. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 14. 
2A. c. Garnett, The Mowal Nature of Man (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 17. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
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value and obligation.nl This experience is prior to the 
moral judgments, gives rise to those judgments, and consti-
tutes the data which such judgments seek to express or 
formulate. 
Intuitive insight, also, plays a part in providing 
the data with which ethical theory must deal. 
If by nintuitionn we simply mean insights into speciflc 
relations between certain complexly involved psycho-
logical processes in ourselves then we must recognize 
that moral insight or intuitlon does occur, and these 
insights or intuitions are the ultimate basis of the 
formation of ethical concepts, the understanding of 
ethical terms, and of our basic moral judgments, the 
judgments which underlie all independent and critical 
thinking. Without some such expressions of insight at 
its basis we could have no genuinely moral tradition, 
no genuine moral conscience, nothing more than habits 
and customs which ar2 liked or disliked and judged 
useful or otherwise. 
Garnett is careful to insist, however, that intuition must 
never be thought of as self-validating. It can be a source 
of ethical truth, but it can never serve as the criterion 
of ethical truth. "Criticism must be applied to every 
ethical assertion.n3 
Once the data are in hand, the task of moral phi-
losophy is ready to proceed. The method of procedure is 
what Garnett calls the method of philosophical criticism 
1A. C. Garnett, Religion and the Moral Life (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), p. 20. 
2A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 367. 
3rbid. 
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which consists of dialectic, analysis, and synthesis. 1 
Dialectic refers to the "persistent asking of every possible 
question and the consideration of every possible answer." 2 
Analysis refers both to a method of observation and to a 
method of stating the results of observation in the form of 
a definition.3 Analysis is the central feature of philo-
sophie criticism, for, in essence, it is the "elimination 
of confusion by the making of distinctions." 4 "The aim of 
analysis as a method of observation is to make a distinc-
tion in our thought wherever there is a difference in 
experience or activity."5 
The results of analysis are then tested by syn-
thesis. If the descriptions, the distinctions, and the 
definitions which were formulated in analysis are accurate, 
then they ought all to fit harmoniously together, without 
contradiction or inconsistency, into an adequate descrip-
tion of experience. 
Garnett's method can thus be called synoptic. 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 9. 
2 Ibid., p. 11. 
3 Ibid., p. 12. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
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nTruth is one," he says. 1 Also, he claims that "we can 
never see the world with complete clarity until we see it 
whole." 2 The critical work of analysis is absolutely 
necessary, but the analytical examination becomes the 
foundation of a synoptic philosophy.3 "The results of 
critical analysis call for definition, definition calls 
for comparison, and comparison for a fitting together of 
the resultant concepts into the kind of whole that most 
naturally or reasonably describes the experience from 
which they are derived." 4 
Garnett's criterion of truth, then, is coherence, 
or the reasonable fitting together of the facts of experi-
ence with the ideas that seek to describe, explain, and 
relate those facts, together with all other ideas that 
belong to the life of mind. One looks not for certainty 
but for reasonable probability. But one always avoids the 
irrational, the inconsistent, and the contradictory, even 
when these are supported by the claims of revelation. 
Claims of faith must be nnot only 'not unreasonable' but 
1A. C. Garnett, The Moral Nature of Nan (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 47. 
2A. C. Garnett, Reality and Value (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1937), p. 14. 
3A. C. Garnett, A Realistic Philosophy of Religion 
Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1942), p. 2. 
4Ibid. 
positively reasonable.nl Indeed, says Garnett, 11 to say, 
as does Kierkegaard, that the essential significance of 
religious faith lies in the belief in the absurd, is not 
merely nonsense; it is unethical. Man has no right to 
surrender his reason." 2 
Garnett recognizes that such a criterion calls 
for a venture into speculative philosophy, for evidence 
remains incomplete; and if gaps in the system are to be 
filled in, they must be filled in on the basis of 
reasonable probability, not on the basis of scientific 
accuracy. But the criterion of scientific accuracy is 
unable, at the present time at least, to deal adequately 
with man's moral and religious experience. Hence, if 
this moral and religious experience is to be dealt with, 
it can best be dealt with by means of such coherent 
systematizing. 
2. The Meaning of "Ought 11 
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For Garnett, the key concept in ethical theory is 
the idea of obligation.3 However, obligation must be de-
fined in terms of oughtness, so an analysis of the meaning 
1A. C. Garnett, The Moral Nature of Man (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 257. 
2A. c. Garnett, Religion and the Moral Life (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), p. 124. 
3 A. C. Garnett, The Moral Nature ..• , p. 108. 
155 
of "ought" must precede an analysis of the meaning of 
obligation. "'Duty• and 'obligation,' in the broad usage 
of these terms, may be defined as 'what one ought (in the 
ethical sense) to do.' 'Wrong' may be defined as •ought 
not to be done, 1 and 'right' may be defined as equivalent 
to •not wrong.•" 1 
Following the study made by H. L. Hollingworth, 2 
Garnett distinguishes at least ten different meanings of 
"ought," though recognizing that all of these different 
usages share a common core of meaning. Each of these 
meanings of "ought" attempts to refer to some kind of re-
quirement--to what is required (1) for a correct logical 
or mathematical solution, (2) for completion of a pattern 
or organized whole, (3) for social welfare, (4) for utility, 
(5) for beauty, (6) for fulfillment of duty, (7) for safety, 
(8) for accord with custom or convention, (9) for justice, 
and (10) for accord with the law.3 
In each of these different meanings of "ought," two 
features stand out. In the first place, in each of these 
1A. c. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 345. 
2H. L. Hollingworth, Psychology and Ethics (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1949). 
3A. c. Garnett, Ethics ••. , p. 345. 
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uses of the term, 11 ought" has a certain prescriptive or 
directive function. In each case the purpose of the 
"ought" seems to be neither to give information only nor 
to express feelings only, but to direct conduct along a 
particular path. In the second place, while it serves a 
prescriptive or directive function, it does not operate 
as a command, but rather it n~kes an appeal to reason. 
In each of the meanings of "ought," not only is a particu-
lar course of action being prescribed, but there is the 
claim that there are reasons for this course of action in 
preference to other courses of action. The implication is 
that the line of conduct being prescribed is necessary if 
certain conditions are to be maintained or realized. 1 
Not all of these "oughts" are ethical, however. 
Not all of them can be thought of as constituting duty or 
obligation. The reasons or requirements cited may be 
ethical, but they may also be prudential, aesthetic, legal, 
conventional, logical, or connected with some other usage 
of "ought." To say to a person, nYou ought to try 
'cherry-nut ice cream•," is not to use "oughtn in the 
sense of "ethical ought.n It is informative and it is 
prescriptive, and it is perhaps also expressive. It im-
plies a reason--a utilitarian consideration which might be 
A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 345. 
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expressed as, "'Cherry-nut ice cream' tastes delicious." 
But it scarcely seems to be a requirement of duty, some-
thing which a person ought morally to do. 
The clue, says Garnett, to determining whether or 
not "ought" is being used in a moral sense is not to be 
found in a further analysis of nought," but is to be found 
in the context within which the "oughtn appears. The 
question, nWhat steps ought I to take in the purchase of a 
piece of property?" suggests the legal use of "ought." 
The question, "How much vanilla ought I to put into this 
cake dough?n suggests the use of "ought'' referring to that 
which is required for the completion o ·~ an organized 
whole. But the statement, "You ought morally to pay your 
bills,n is clearly within the province of the moral use of 
nought. 11 The requirement here is a moral requirement. At 
this point, says Garnett, we are forced 11 to realize that 
our problem as to the meaning of ethical 'ought' sentences 
has to do not so much with the meaning of 'ought' as with 
the meaning of 1 moral' or 'ethical' . nl 
Garnett does not wish to malce any distinction in 
meaning between the words "moral" and "ethical." He recog-
nizes that often a distinction is 1nade, with "ethics" re-
ferring to theory and "morals" referring to practice. But 
1A. c. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 346. 
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because such a distinction tends to be confusing, Garnett 
chooses to ignore it, and uses 11moral 11 and "ethical" as 
synonyms. 1 
In distinguishing moral "ought" from other types 
of "ought,n Garnett says that a moral requirement "is 
identical with the requirements of duty in the broad 
sense (for 'duty' in the broad sense is synonymous with 
'moral requirement') and it includes the requirements of 
justice and duty in the narrow sense.n 2 Such a require-
ment is distinct from utility and security, for duty 
sometimes calls for the denial of such prudential consider-
ations as utility and security. Looking after the re-
quirements of one's own security is surely prudent, but if 
this is done to the neglect or hurt of others then such 
action surely cannot be called a moral requirement. It is 
sometimes possible for a moral requirement to include the 
notion of prudence, but it must never be identified with 
it, and prudence must be ready to be overridden by the 
moral requirement. And this relationship which holds true 
between the requirements of prudence and the moral re-
quirement, holds true also between all the other 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), pp. 346-347. 
,..., 
c:Ibid., p. 347. 
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requirements we have considered and the moral requirement. 1 
Garnett qualifies further this notion of a moral 
requirement by pointing out that it is applicable only in 
situations in which there is voluntary control of conduct. 
Not all aspects of life are subject to voluntary control, 
hence not all aspects of life are aspects of moral re-
quiredness. Impulses arise within the human organism 
which condition behavior. Such impulses are involuntary. 
The behavior which issues forth from these impulses is 
involuntary to the extent that it is not challenged, en-
dorsed, or modified by "foresight and choice of more dis-
tant goals." 2 Voluntary behavior is behavior that is 
challenged, endorsed, or modified by foresight and choice 
of more distant goals. 
In brief, involuntary behavior is behavior that oc-
curs without reflection on alternatives; voluntary 
conduct is influenced by reflection on alternatives. 
The line, however, is not a sharp one, for the immedi-
ate occasion may give no time for reflection and yet 
the reaction may be determined by habits and decisions 
made after much reflection on similar situations. All 
we can say is that behavior is voluntary so far as it 
is determined or endorsed by foresight and reflective 
choice.j 
Garnett concludes, then, that a moral requirement 
is "a requirement that voluntary conduct should be of a 
1A. c. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), pp. 347-348. 
2Ibid., pp. 348-349. 
3Ibid., p. 349. 
160 
1 
certain kind." To say nyou ought, ethically, to do xn 
is the same as to say "It is morally required that you do 
X"; and this is the same as saying "It is necessary for 
you to do X if you are to maintain a morally correct 
pattern or standard of voluntary conduct." Whenever some-
one uses the moral "ought" or speaks of a nmoral require-
ment," what he has in mind is some ideal standard or pat-
tern of voluntary conduct. nHe is saying that a certain 
line of conduct is necessary for maintenance of this 
standard or pattern; and in the use of •ought' he is 
urging conformity to this pattern or standard." 2 
But now, with this much said, the problem becomes 
one of determining whether or not there is any common or 
universal element in the pattern or standard which people 
have in mind when they speak of a moral requirement; and, 
if so, how the pattern is formed and what constitutes its 
nature. This question, for Garnett, can only be answered 
after an examination of the meaning of the term ngood. 11 
Before turning to that examination, however, there 
is one more aspect of Garnett 1 s treatment of 11 oughtn to 
which reference needs to be made; namely, his distinction 
between nought to be" and "ought to do. 11 Sorley, as has 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 349. 
2Ibid. 
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been seen, defined value as that which nought to be." Such 
a definition troubles Garnett, for he sees it as a misuse 
of the term "ought.n The true meaning of ought, he insists, 
is "ought to do," and to speak of "ought to be" without any 
reference to the agent who is responsible for bringing 
about the state of affairs thus described is to use nought" 
in a way that does violence to its basic meaning. 
What we mean by saying that something ought to exist 
is that it is the sort of thing that someone, or 
people in general, ought to bring into existence, or 
keep in existence, when they can. The thing that 
nought to exist,n and perhaps does not exist, cannot 
be said to have an obligation. What we are saying is 
that some person or persons have an obligation in 
regard to it, to bring it into existence, or keep it 
in existence, if they can. The "ought" has been 
transferred, by the figure of speech known as metonymy, 
from the persons who ought to do the thing which we 
say ought to be.l -
Thus when Garnett speaks of ltought" in the moral 
sense of that term, he is meaning nought to do.n And 
this, for him, is the primary ethical concept. It is 
equivalent to nunder obligation to do" or nhave a duty to 
do. 112 "The notion of duty, obligation, ought-to-do, can 
be taken as the sole and central distinctively ethical 
term, and all other ethical terms can be defined by using 
it together with terms having natural psychological or 
1A. C. Garnett, The fv1oral Nature of !>1an (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), pp. 56-57. See also, 
A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1960), pp. 265-267. 
2A. C. Garnett, The r.-loral Nature . . • , p. 111. 
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physical referents." 1 
Just what our duties and obligations are, in 
Garnett's system, will be discussed after an examination 
of his definition of "good." 
3. The fv'Ieaning of "Good 11 
It has been seen in the previous section that the 
primary ethical term, for Garnett, i.s "oughtu in the sense 
of "ought to do,n "duty,n or "obligation.n Such a term 
entails the notion of a nonn, or standard, and thus can be 
said to be a normative term. But what about "goodn? Is 
it a normative term in the sense that, by definition, it 
entails the notion of a norm or standard? 
Garnett thinks not. In a number of places in his 
writings2 he has argued for a non-normative definition of 
good. This is not to suggest that there is not a relation-
ship between that which is thought good and obligation, 
but it is to suggest that morality is constituted by the 
1A. C. Garnett, The Moral Nature of Man (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 112. 
2The Moral Nature ••. , pp. 118-122; Ethics: A 
Critical Introduction (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 
1960), pp. 350-355; "Distinctions and Definitions in 
Ethics,n Philoso hy and Phenomenolo leal Research, 
XII (1951, 73-77; A Non-Normative Definition of 1 Good 1 ,u 
The Language of Value, ed. Ray Lepley (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1957), pp. 122-130; and "Is 'Good' a 
Normative Concept?, 11 The Philosophical Quarterly, VII (1957), 
260-263. 
very nature of obligation itself rather than by a notion 
of the good thing which one feels obligated to support or 
bring about. 
Ewing has defined "goodu as "a fitting object of a 
pro attitude. 11 To say that something is "goodn is to say 
that it is "fl.tting for persons to assume a favorable 
attitude toward it." 1 Garnett is willing to accept the 
major portion of this definition, but objects to the use 
of the term "fitting.n He suggests that it is too vague 
to be used effectively in such a definition; moreover, the 
term "fitting" has a normative connotation to which Garnett 
objects. To speak of nfittingness" is to suggest a certain 
logical entailment between "good 11 and "ought to do.n 
Garnett finds the relationship between "good" and "ought 
to do" not in any logical entailment, but in the "practical 
relations of the facts" to which each of these terms 
refers. 2 
It seems apparent, says Garnett, that whenever 
someone says that something is good he is using the term 
ngood" as an expression of approval. He may intend to say 
more than this by his use of the te~n, but at least he says 
this much. It also seems apparent, according to Garnett, 
1A. C. Ewing, The Definition of Good (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1947), pp. 148-152. 
2A. C. Garnett, The Moral Nature of Man (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952}, p. 119. 
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that when a person says that something (whether a thing, 
an action, or an event) is good, he means that it possesses 
certain characteristics nwhich make it reasonable for 
himself and others to approve of it.nl If a certain high-
way is called a "good road," the person calling it "good" 
expects others to find it "good" also. He has reasons for 
calling it good, and, in giving those reasons, describes 
the attributes of the road--the smoothness of its surface, 
the width of the pavement, the shortness of the route to 
the desired destination, the density of traffic, the scenic 
landscapes, and the like. And if someone were to deny that 
this particular highway is a ugood road," he would be 
expected to substantiate his denial by criticizing some or 
all of the attributes just listed. And agreement would 
depend upon a reasonable examination of the attributes of 
the highway. 
A definition of ugood," then, needs to include 
this aspect of reasonableness. Thus, says Garnett, to say 
that "X is good, 11 is the same as saying that "X is a rea-
sonable object of a favorable attitude"; or, 11 X is an 
object toward which it is reasonable to adopt a favorable 
attitude11 ; or again, nx is an object toward which 
enlightened understanding tends to develop a favorable 
1A. c. Garnett, The Moral Nature of Man (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 119. 
attitude."1 A favorable attitude is an attitude 11 inclined 
to keep, preserve, or promote the thing, or the kind of 
thing in question." 2 To call something nbadn is to say 
that it is an object toward which it is reasonable to adopt 
an unfavorable attitude, and "evil" is simply a stronger 
synonym for 11 bad.n3 
This is a non-normative definition of "good" in the 
sense that it does not imply "ought." Rather, it seeks 
to emphasize the characteristics of that which is called 
11 good." Nevertheless, persons tend to read a normative 
implication into statements which claim that something is 
good. It seems natural to move from statements predicating 
something as "good" to statements outlining a course of 
action which ought to be undertaken. But analysis reveals 
the insertion of an intermediary step which is usually 
overlooked. The inference can be put in the form of a 
syllogism. 
X is the best (the most reasonably favored) action 
in the circumstances. 
I ought to do the action most reasonably favored in 
the circumstances. 
1A. C. Garnett, The Moral Nature of Man (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 120. 
2 A. C. Garnett, "Distinctions and Definitions in 
Ethics, 11 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XII (1951), 74. 
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Therefore, I ought to do x. 1 
The obligation stated in the minor premise, "I ought to do 
the action most reasonably favored in the circumstances,n 
will be discussed in the next section. It needed to be 
mentioned here to show that it is only when this assumption 
is made that one can move from a statement predicating 
"good," to a statement claiming obligation to act in such a 
way as to bring about or support this ugood.n 2 
In dealing \vith the definition of "good," it is 
necessary to distinguish between moral good and nonmoral 
or natural good. The rnoral realm is the realm of voluntary 
control. Judgments predicating moral good are asserting 
that actions subject to voluntary control, and the agents 
of such actions, are reasonable objects of a favorable 
attitude. Nonmoral or natural good refers to the vast 
realm that is beyond voluntary control and to the objects 
there that are reasonable objects of a favorable attitude. 
The grounds on which moral good is predicated are thus 
quite different from those upon which natural good is 
predicated. For example, an act of heroism would ordinar-
ily be considered morally good, and yet if it were an un-
successful attempt to save life, or an instance in which 
1 A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
{New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 352. 
2Ibid. 
the hero's own life were lost, it would not be considered 
a case of natural good. The hero's action would be a 
reasonable object of a favorable attitude; the loss of life 
1 
would not. 
Thus when we speak of a "morally good 11 man or 
action, we mean one "reasonably favored by reason of 
moral characteristics." As with the "moral requirements" 
referred to by use of the moral "ought," so here the moral 
characteristics referred to by use of the moral "good" 
imply some ideal standard or pattern of voluntary conduct. 
Once again the problem becomes that of determining the 
ground and the nature of this ideal ethical standard. If 
such a standard exists, it should apply to both moral 
"good" and moral "ought. 11 That which is morally good, 
ultimately, should also be morally right, if ethical theory 
is really to constitute a system of coherent truth. 
A clue to the solution of this problem, Garnett 
believes, is to be found in the distinction that can be 
made in the meanings of "good" as "instrumentally good," 
"intrinsically good," and "good of its kind." 2 In each 
case 11 good" means "reasonably favored." Thus "instrumen-
tally goodn means "reasonably favored by reason of its 
1A. C. Garnett, The Moral Nature of Man (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 124. 
2A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 353. 
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instrumental properties." Instrumental properties of a 
voluntary action, however, 
include both the consequences it produces and the 
more or less efficient manner in which it produces 
them. But if these are the features of an action 
with which moral judgment is concerned then a noble 
act of heroism which resulted only in tragedy would 
have to be pronounced morally bad, and an effi-
ciently conducted gang murder which rids society of 
a public enemy would have to be regarded as morally 
good.l 
Obviously the judg:nent of moral good goes beyond a consid-
eration of instrumental properties alone. 
Thus moral good is always intrinsic good. But if 
the notion of intrinsic good is taken by itself, separate 
from that of good of its kind, the intrinsic characteris-
tics to be considered are simply "the foresight and con-
sideration of alternatives and the mental effort by which 
the immediate impulse is inhibited and action directed by 
some other end. 112 Such properties as foresight, consider-
ation of alternatives, and mental effort, however, are as 
much present in a bad voluntary action as in a good one. 
Thus it does not seem that the intrinsic properties, con-
sidered simply as such, offer a sufficient basis for 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 353. 
2 Ibid., p. 354. 
determining whether or not a favorable attitude is to be 
taken toward a particular object. 1 
Nor does Garnett believe that morally good actions 
are simply actions vThich issue forth from a certain type 
of motive. 
The intrinsic properties of the motive are evidently 
relevant to the question of the moral goodness of an 
action, for it is generally recognized that an action 
as a whole should not be called morally good if it is 
done from a bad motive. But the motive alone is not 
sufficient to determine moral goodness, for it is also 
generally recognized that an action cannot be called 
morally good unless it is also morally right at least 
in the sense that it is in accord with what the doer 
of the action himself believes to be morally right. 
Thus it is not self-contradictory to say that an 
action is morally good or bad because, although done 
from a morally good motive, for example, kindness, and 
although the action is objective, right, the doer of 
the action himself believed that such an act of kind-
ness, in the given circ~~stances, was contrary to his 
duty.2 
Thus we are brought to the third sense of ngood,n 
namely, "good of its kind,n to see if, in this sense of 
"good," it is self-contradictory to say that a voluntary 
action is perfectly good but not morally right. Garnett 
believes that this is the case, and that here we are pro-
vided with the key to na common or universal element in 
the pattern or standard people have in mind when they use 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 354. 
2Ibid., pp. 354-355. 
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ethical terms. 111 A consideration of this is the subject 
matter of the next section. 
4. The Criteria of Moral Judgment 
By using the meaning of "good" as "good of its 
kind," Garnett is able to develop a type of self-realiza-
tion theory of ethics and establish his criteria of moral 
judgment. "Moral good of its kind, 11 in this theory, refers 
not simply to those objects within the realm of voluntary 
control toward which it is reasonable to adopt a favorable 
attitude, but the notion of "good of its kind'' introduces 
a norm or standard. "Of its kindtt implies a certain 
determinate order of existence, and the nature of this 
determinate order of existence must be known before it 
can be concluded whether a favorable attitude or an un-
favorable attitude is the more reasonable. To know "good 
of its kind" in reference to a living being, one must know 
the potentialities resident in the make-up of that being, 
and the degree to which these potentialities have been ful-
filled. Thus 11 good of its kind" in reference to voluntary 
conduct means the degree to which potentialities in this 
regard have been fulfilled. 
A good specimen of voluntary action, considered simply 
as a specimen of its kind, will therefore be one in 
which the processes as a whole complete their 
1 A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 355. 
progressive development in such degree and order as 
most completely to realize their potintialities and 
fulfill their function in the whole. 
Voluntary conduct refers to conduct over which 
control is exercised. The process of voluntary control 
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is, essentially, a complex interest process. 2 Involuntary 
impulses are expressions of spontaneous interest in certain 
objects. When possible alternative goals occur to the mind, 
these are other objects of interest. Voluntary control 
calls for the inspection of these alternative claims to 
one's attention and interest, and for the consideration of 
them as reasonable goals. Thus, says Garnett, 
an act in which the potentialities of voluntary control 
are full¥ or perfectly realized (a perfect specimen of 
its kind) will therefore be one in which (1) the 
process of consideration of alternative goals, with 
their means and consequences, is developed as fully as 
possible, (2) the interest in each of these goals is 
developed as fully as is possible when rational con-
sideration of all the facts is uninhibited by partial-
ity or prejudice, (3) the choice is an expression of 
the totality of interests thus devel~ped selecting the 
goal most compatible with the whole. 
What Garnett is attempting to show is that the 
standard of conduct required for an act to be "morally 
rightn is the same standard that would be followed by the 
morally good man. The morally good man must be one whose 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 356. 
2 Ibid., p. 357. 
3Ibid. 
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voluntary conduct is perfectly good in the sense of being 
good of its kind. The morally right act is one which con-
fon·as to a certain ideal standard of conduct. Garnett 
wishes to demonstrate that "what is meant by speaking of 
actions as •morally required' is that our acts should 
accord with the acts that would be produced by a perfect 
expression of voluntary conduct.nl To accomplish this 
he undertakes a further analysis of voluntary conduct. 
As one examines the development of voluntary con-
trol of behavior, says Garnett, he discovers three dis-
tinct levels in that development. 2 Each level continues 
to maintain itself even after the higher levels come into 
being. Each level of development constitutes a fuller 
development of the potentialities resident in the person 
for voluntary control of behavior. The higher the level of 
development, then, the fuller the development of the poten-
tialities of the self. For ethical perfection, or complete-
ness, the lower and more limited levels must be subordinated 
to the higher and fuller.3 
Below these three levels, there is no choice of 
conduct. Behavior is impulsive, following the interests 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 358. 
2Ibid., p. 359. 
3rbid. 
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presented by immediate impulse, and not affected by fore-
sight and choice. Voluntary control enters the picture 
as soon as alternatives are considered. Then a choice rnust 
be made among the alternative interests. 
The first level of the development of voluntary 
conduct--the first principle of choice as one faces the 
alternatives before him--Garnett calls the level--or prin-
ciple--of prudence. 1 One is first of all interested in 
his own satisfactions and dissatisfactions. He wants to 
prolong and renew his satisfactions; he wants to cut 
short and avoid his dissatisfactions. And this, by itself, 
is entirely reasonable. Certainly prudence is to be pre-
ferred to impulsiveness. Prudence is the result of the 
conscious attempt to use foresight and choice, and this, 
as voluntary conduct, is a fuller use of the potential of 
personality. Prudence, then, is one criterion, at least, 
of that which is morally good. 2 
But prudence may sometimes lead to an action that 
is morally wrong. A prudent action is sometimes condemned 
as mean, cowardly, uncharitable, or unjust. \.fhen this 
occurs, it is seen that the occasion for it is one in which 
the prudent person was using foresight and choice in regard 
1A. c. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 360. 
2Ibid. 
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to his own satisfactions and dissatisfactions, but was not 
using foresight and choice in regard to the interests of 
other people.l 
To show the means of development from this first 
level of voluntary control of behavior to the second level, 
Garnett points out what he calls the psychological fact 
"that man is capable of taking an interest in the fulfill-
ment of other people's interests." 2 Any interest fulfill-
ment Garnett calls a "value. n3 The primary hu;.11an values 
are found in the fulfillment "of primary, or spontaneous, 
interests in objects, including the processes of our own 
bodies."4 Satisfactions and dissatisfactions on this 
level ngenerate a psychologically higher level of interests, 
the interests in the fulfillment of our own interests. 
These secondary interest fulfillments we :nay call egoistic 
or prudential values."5 This level of value, in turn, gen-
erates a higher level of value. ~~en one recognizes that 
other selves have interests even as he himself has inter-
ests, he develops a new set of interests--"interests in the 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introductj_on 
{New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), pp. 360-361. 
2Ibid., p. 361. 
3Ibid. 
4Ibid. 
5Ibid. 
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fulfillment of other people's interests, i.e., interests 
in values realizable in the lives of others.nl These in-
terests Garnett calls social interests, and their fulfill-
ments he calls social values, such as love and friendship. 2 
Persons, then, according to Garnett, have interests 
in objects, interests in the fulfillment of their own 
interests, and interests in the fulfillment of the interests 
of other people. The values found in the fulfillment of 
these interests he calls, respectively, primary values, 
egoistic or prudential values, and social values. The 
third level of interests, interests in the fulfillment of 
the interests of other people, constitutes the foundation 
for the development of the second level of reflective con-
trol. "It is the level at which altruistic motives are 
superimposed upon spontaneous impulse and prudence and 
can begin to exercise control over both. 11 3 
This second level of reflective control, while 
altruistic rather than egoistic, is altruistic in a limited 
or particularistic sense. Interest in the fulfillment of 
other people's interests is first of all directed toward 
a limited number of particular persons usually within the 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 361. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid. 
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same kinship, tribal, or ethnic group. If the first level 
of reflective control is the level of prudence, then, says 
Garnett, this second level can be called the level of 
loyalty, "of specific interests in the specific interests 
of specific individuals and groups." 1 It is developed in 
person-to-person contacts, and in the discovery of co1mnon 
interests. It involves the specific obligations that 
deontologists are anxious to have explained--the require-
ments of truthfulness, honesty, the keeping of promises, 
r:1utual aid, returning of favors, reparation for injuries, 
obedience to the law, and the like. It goes beyond pru-
dence, reaching out to a concern for the interests of 
others, and constitutes the second criterion of moral 
judgment. 
The third level of reflective control is developed 
nwhen the interest in the interests of others has general-
ized itself into an interest in human values as such. 112 
This is altruism in its full development, and this is the 
fulfillment of the true potential of human personality. 
It is the ethics of agape, impartial good will, or 
love, as developed in the Hebrew-Christian tradition 
and also, more or less fully and explicitly, in the 
1A. c. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 362. 
2Ibid., p. 363. 
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other great ethical religions and in Humanist philoso-
phies. It comes to be accepted as a higher ethical 
requirement by those who develop the capacity for 
agape because, with the development of this capacity, 
every voluntary act that departs from the type of 
conduct that agape would realize is seen as an imper-
fection of voluntary conduct, a falling short of its 
full potentialities. Once the capacity for agape is 
well developed and clearly recognized, the recognition 
of the higher ethical principle, the principle of 
agape, is inevitable. For, in the ordinary use of 
ethical language, what one (in the ethical sense) 
ought to do is what one is morally required to do, and 
what one is morally required to do is to maintain good 
voluntaE¥ conduct, and this requires that every act 
should accord with that which would be produced by a 
perfect specimen of voluntary conduct, and since a 
perfect specimen of voluntary conduct must be one in 
which the potentialities of voluntary conduct are 
fully realized, this must be an act in accord with the 
motive of agape. Therefore the person capable of 
agape can only logically infer from the ordinary uses 
of ethical terms that what he ought (ethicilly) to do 
is act in accord with the motive of agape. 
Thus, for Garnett, these three levels of voluntary 
control can be seen as three principles of the formation 
of moral judgments and as three criteria of moral judg-
1nents--the principle of prudence, the principle of loyalty, 
and the principle of agape. These stand in an ascending 
order of significance. Prudence is a criterion only when 
the requirements of prudence do not conflict with the 
requirements of loyalty and agape. Loyalty is a criterion 
only when the requireG1ents of loyalty do not conflict with 
the requirements of agape. Agape is always a criterion of 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 363. 
1 
moral judgment; indeed, it is the most significant one. 
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What then is to be said concerning obligation? The 
notion of obligation, for Garnett, is incorporated in the 
notion of self-realization. Obligation is a type of 
"demand or constraint or requirement upon the will, the 
voluntary behavior, of the individual." 2 This is the moral 
sense of nought, n or duty. It does not determine behavior, 
but does exercise a constraint upon an individual as the 
individual determines his behavior. And the constraint 
that is exercised is constraint in the direction of bring-
ing about more complete fulfillment of the potentialities 
resident in the self. It is entirely possible for a 
person to choose some lesser good instead of a greater, 
but it always involves a loss of integrity. When this 
person reflects on what he has done, he "tends to discover 
a peculiar sense of constraint--something different from 
desire, but nevertheless a motivation--toward choice of 
the greater (or greatest possible) good. This is the sense 
of obligation. It is the inner demand of the self for 
maintenance of its own personal integrity.u3 
This drive for self-fulfillment on increasingly 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 364. 
2A. C. Garnett, The Moral Nature of f1an (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 109. 
3Ibid., p. 154. 
higher levels moves one, if he will reflect on it and 
accept the obligation implicit in it, through the levels 
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of value concern--from interests in objects, on to inter-
ests in the fulfillment of his own interests, and on to 
interests in the fulfillment of the interests of other 
people. Also, it will move one, again if he will reflect 
on it and accept the obligation implicit in it, through 
the levels of voluntary control of behavior--from the 
level of prudence alone, to the level of loyalty, and on 
to the level of agape. 
In the previous section, where Garnett was seen 
to be arguing for a non-normative definition of good, the 
passage from a judgment predicating "good" to a judgment 
concerning obligation was said to be possible not because 
"good" logically entails obligation, but because of the 
asswnption of the premise, "I ought to do the action most 
reasonably favored in the circumstances. 111 This assumption 
can now be seen to be grounded in the very nature of the 
self, and in the obligation of the self to develop the 
potentialities of its nature on increasingly higher and 
fuller levels. 
Thus we have a type of self-realization theory, 
based on a conception of natural law which includes the 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 352. 
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conception of moral laws or norms. These moral laws 
describe the conditions which must be fulfilled and the 
requirements which must be met if there is to be whole-
some development of the potentials of personality. These 
laws prescribe the nought" to be fulfilled if action is 
to be right and obligation met. They also prescribe, in 
a general way, which objects, or kinds of objects, may 
be considered reasonable objects of a favorable attitude, 
hence "good. 11 Thus the conception of ngood 11 and the 
conception of nought 11 are both in harmony with the concep-
tion of moral law. The good man meets his obligations by 
fulfilling the potentialities of his nature on increasingly 
higher and fuller levels. 
5. Why "Right" is "Right" 
When persons attempt to give reasons for judging 
that an act is right, they often confuse the process of 
(1) giving reasons why an act should be judged right with 
two other processes: (2) giving reasons for doing some-
thing that is judged right, and (3) giving reasons for 
approving something that is judged right. The question, 
nWhy should I be moral?" does not, in itself, distinguish 
between these processes. According to Garnett, egoistic 
theories of ethics confuse the first and second, and 
approval theories confuse the first and third. 1 
Concerning the first of these--the process of 
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giving reasons why an act, rule, or principle, should be 
judged right--Garnett says that reasons here must show 
that the act, rule, or principle in question nhas the 
characteristics by which it should be so classified." 2 
Thus an act is to be judged right if it does not 
break any moral rules, a rule is to be judged right 
if it conforms to all basTCriioral principles as ap-
plied to the kind of action in question. A basic 
moral principle is shown to be right if it states a 
requirement for perfection of voluntary conduct--as 
we have do~e with the principles of prudence, loyalty, 
and agape. 
This process of giving reasons for a judgment is 
quite different from that of giving reasons for doing 
something or for approving of the doing of so:nething. 
Reasons for actions and attitudes are found in the relation 
of such actions and attitudes to the fulfillment of inter-
ests.4 If, then, a certain act is already judged right, 
what sort of reasons are to be given in support of doing, 
or a:t:proving the doing, of the act that is judged right? 
Garnett suggests that such reasons can be classi-
fied as referring to three types of interest: moral, 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 369. 
2Ibid. 
3Ibid., pp. 369-370. 
4 Ibid., p. 370. 
egoistic, and altruistic. These reasons 11 vary in effec-
tiveness according to the strength of these interests in 
the person addressed." 1 
The moral reason for doing an action, or for ap-
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proving the doing of it, lies simply in the judgment that 
it is right, or in the judgment that not to do it would be 
wrong. For this reason to be effective, the person to 
whom it is offered must already have a positive interest 
in the right. This is the motive of "duty for duty's 
sake." It is usually more strongly developed in persons 
as a motive for approving of right actions, than it is as 
a motive for doing them. "It involves an attitude of ad-
miration, respect, or reverence for the concept of duty or 
the ideal of personal perfection. It is developed to some 
extent in every normal person but requires a high degree of 
personal cultivation and, as a motive for action, is prob-
ably not very strong in many people." 2 
Egoistic reasons for doing and approving of actions 
judged right appeal to the motive of enlightened self-in-
terest. Traditionally they have been referred to as the 
"sanctions" of morality. It usually 11 paysn to do what is 
judged right, and it rarely "pays" not to approve of what 
1A. c. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 370. 
2Ibid. 
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is judged right. Societies have seen to it that 11 the way 
of the transgressor is hard." Social institutions have 
developed means for administering sanctions of praise and 
blame. The conformist has been rewarded and the deviation-
ist punished. 
The third type of reasons for doing and approving 
of actions judged right, altruistic reasons, 11 point to the 
fact that the highest moral principles require actions of 
the kind that would be produced by motives of loyalty and 
agape." 1 As with the moral reasons, so these altruistic 
reasons are effective to the degree in which the motives 
of loyalty and agape are developed in the persons to whom 
these reasons are addressed. But Garnett is not dismayed 
by this, for he says that "some degree of loyalty is 
characteristic of all normal persons, and very strong in 
most persons, and that agape, too, is much more strong and 
general than traditional moralists have commonly supposed." 2 
Indeed, he goes on to say, "these altruistic motives are 
probably the most important factor in developing the atti-
tude of approval of moral conduct in general which is 
characteristic of the great majority in almost every level 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 371. 
2Ibid. 
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of society. 111 
The first step, then, in saying why right acts are 
"right,n is the judgment of principle in terms of prudence, 
loyalty, and agape. Once the judgment is made that an act 
is right, then these further reasons--moral, egoistic, and 
altruistic--can be used to show why the act thus judged 
rj_ght, ought to be done or approved. The raoral reason, 
says Garnett, is the only purely moral motive, 11 but Kant 
was certainly wrong in regarding it as the only intrinsi-
cally good motive." 2 Egoistic reasons have the practical 
value of being "extremely powerful psychological agents in 
the motivation of right conduct a1nong those not sufficient-
ly actuated by higher rnotives.u3 Altruistic reasons point 
to the highest rnoti ves possible, in Garnett 1 s system, and 
-
are always the basic reasons for the actions of the person 
who has achieved a high degree of self-realization. 
6. Morality and Religion 
A statement of Garnett's systera of thought could 
scarcely be considered complete which did not r:1ake at 
least some mention of his religious outlook and ideas. 
Every book that Garnett has written has included at least 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 371. 
2 Ibid., p. 370. 
3Ibid., p. 371. 
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some expression of his concern for religious ideas and 
ideals, and three of his books, A Realistic Philosophy of 
Religion, God In Us, and Religion and the r~1oral Life, have 
had this concern as their central emphasis. 
Garnett believes that ethical theory can be devel-
oped apart from religion. The material with which this 
chapter has dealt thus far--the data, method, and criterion 
of ethics (and all philosophy, for that matter); the mean-
ing of •roughtn and "good"; the criteria of moral judgment; 
and the reasons to be given in answer to the problem of 
why nright" is "right"--all of this material, as consti-
tuting ethical theory, is able to stand independently of 
religion. 
Nevertheless, morality and religion are closely 
related, for Garnett, and it needs to be seen just what 
the relationship is. 
Religion, Garnett points out, may be broadly de-
fined as "an attitude of devotion to something other than 
the self which is regarded as worthy of supreme devotion." 1 
Without this reaching out beyond the self for the sake of 
something beyond the self, there can be no real religion. 
Devotion to self and to self alone is the very antithesis 
1A. C. Garnett, Religion and the lVIoral Life (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), p. 6. 
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of religion. 1 Traditional religions reach not only beyond 
the self but beyond society for their object of devotion; 
religious hwnanism reaches beyond the self but not beyond 
human society. 
There are three aspects of this definition to be 
noted. (1) In describing religion as an attitude of de-
votion, the definition takes account of the volitional and 
evaluative elements in religion as well as the cognitive, 
and recognizes the religious drive as potentially powerful 
and all-absorbing. (2) In pointing beyond the self, the 
definition makes clear the fact that in religion the self 
is directed away from itself to that which is held to be 
above and beyond it, and for the sake of which it will 
gladly lose itself. (3) In speaking of an object that is 
judged worthy of supreme devotion, the definition implies 
that the judgment of worth of the object of devotion pre-
cedes the religious attitude toward it. 
This third aspect of the definition of religion 
involves morality as well as religion. The religious 
object is, by definition, an object held to be supremely 
worthy, hence its adoption involves a moral judgment. 
nwe must have a fairly full and clear idea of what it is 
to be a moral being or to follow a moral principle, 11 says 
1A. C. Garnett, Reli ion and the fv1oral Life (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955 , pp. 5, 9. 
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Garnett, "before we can decide that any particular form of 
moral being or moral principle is supremely worthy of de-
votion."1 
However, though such a moral judgment needs to be 
formulated prior to the adoption of the religious attitude 
toward it, the part which religion plays in supplying the 
discipline needed to act in keeping with the moral judgment, 
Garnett believes, is enormous. 2 
Garnett believes that both religion and morality 
find their origin in the same kind of human experience. 
He refers to psychological studies which, he believes, 
"show clearly that what man believes to be his conscious-
ness of God is rooted in the experience of the moral 
conscience as it constrains him to concern himself with the 
welfare of others besides himself."3 It is not until there 
is an awakening of the moral consciousness that there is 
the awakening of the religious consciousness. 4 
Children first have a dawning of the moral con-
sciousness in regard to actions which can be seen to hurt 
other persons. "The duty of noninjury among friends and 
1 A. C. Garnett, Religion and the Moral Life (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), p. 13. 
2 Ibid., p. 17. 
3A. C. Garnett, The f\1oral Nature of Nan (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 241. 
4Ibid., p. 243. 
188 
companions is the earliest recognized element of the moral 
code, as it is the most obvious and fundamental." 1 Long 
before such a dawning, the child was taught a great number 
of "oughts" and "ought nots," and learned to have many 
demands made of him--he was to 11 behave himself,u he was to 
be a ngood boy," he was to to do vvhat he "ought to do" 
and not do what he 11 ought not to do," or suffer the conse-
quences. 
With the increase of years, however, the child 
begins to develop his critical faculties to the point 
where he can raise questions concerning these de~ands 
which have been made upon him. Prior to this time he was 
able to feel guilt, shame, and emotional well-being, and 
so can be said to have experienced what is called con-
science; but since his standard of morality was an exter-
nal one, consisting of the demands of authority, custom, 
and law, Garnett refers to this simply as ntraditional 
conscience." With the coming to play of critical facul-
ties, the person begins to discover that he is making 
moral demands of himself, sometimes beyond what his society 
expects of him, sometimes in opposition to what his society 
expects of him. This marks the arrival of the critical 
1A. C. Garnett, The Noral Nature of Ivian (New York 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), pp. 243-244. 
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conscience. 1 
At this point in the development of the moral 
consciousness, says Garnett, with :;1orality assun~ing an 
ninwardness, 11 it is not unusual for the person involved to 
interpret the moral awakening as a religious awakening, 
with God thought of as actively at work in the process of 
the awakening, and with the moral notions taken as having 
divine authority. The critical conscience is here thought 
2 
of as the voice of God. 
Actually, says Garnett, both the n:oral conscious-
ness and the religious consciousness find their origin 
in "the experience of a demand which seems like another 
and higher will within us that seeks in and through us 
the good of all."3 Indeed, this becomes the basis of 
Garnett's theistic faith. 
If Elan is to know the self-fulfillment that is 
both the good life and the realization of obligation, "he 
needs a God in his life. He needs to hold to the idea of 
something beyond his individual self that is worthy to be 
supreme among those objects to which he is prepared to 
1A. C. Garnett, The Moral Nature of Han (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), pp. 244, 247-252. 
2Ibid., p. 246. 
3Ibid., p. 249. 
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devote himself." 1 
To keep his spirit whole and draw forth from it its 
best man needs a God to serve, a God whom he can love 
with all his heart and all his life and all his mind, 
a God to whose service he can COlnmit himself with 
self-forgetting zeal and yet know that in such commit-
ment the truest interest of himself and his society 
will be secure.2 
And, along this saii1e line of thought, Garnett has asserted: 
The moral will is the will to do what one believes is 
right and to find, amid perplexities, what is really 
right. Religion brings to that will the conviction 
that it is no were transitory desire, no mere echo of 
human authority, but that God is with it--indeed, that 
God is in it.3 
1. Evaluation of Garnett's Thought 
In evaluating the systems of thought of Sorley, 
Ross, and Ewing, the method of procedure was, first of all, 
to point to merits in each system, and then to examine what 
seemed to be weaknesses, or difficulties, within those 
systems. An examination of Garnett's systen; shows that 
the merits of the systellts previously exainined are charac-
teristic of Garnett's system also. 
For one thing, all three of the previously examined 
systems were commended for being inclusively empirical. In 
each case, the thinkers involved began their study with the 
1A. C. Garnett, Religion and the Noral Life (New 
York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), p. 58. 
2Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
3A. C. Garnett, The Horal Nature of tl!an (New York: 
The Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 269. 
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experiences found in human consciousness, and each thinker 
was anxious to be thoroughly inclusive and critical in his 
examination of these experiences. In dealing with the prob-
lems of ethics, each began vlith the actual experiences of 
approvals and disapprovals, of feelings of obligation, and 
of beliefs about standards of value, all of which are a part 
of human consciousness. And Garnett seeks to be as fully 
en~irical and as fully inclusive as Sorley, Ross, or Ewing. 
Experiences of value and obligation, for Garnett, constitute 
the data for the formulation of :noral judgments, and tnoral 
judgments, in turn, constitute the data for ethical theory. 
Surely such an insistence upon an e1~1pirical ap-
proach is commendable. If the 1aeaning of the terminology 
of ethics is to be grasped and the significance of that 
terminology understood, such terms must be seen as inti-
mately related to the basic human experiences to which 
they intend to refer. An empirical method does not guar-
antee an adequate ethical theory, but at least it is a 
sound beginning toward the formulation of such a theory. 
Another aspect of the three previously examined 
systems which was seen as noteworthy was the refusal in 
each to allow the essential meaning of moral terms to be 
lost in a reduction of those terms to such non-raoral terli1s 
as desire, interest, fear, or biological urge. Sorley, 
Ross, and Ewing all waged relentless warfare upon the 
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naturalists, and one of the main aspects of their criticism 
of the naturalists had to do with just this problem. The 
naturalists, the men of this study claimed, explained moral 
terms by explaining therr1 away. They explained descriptively, 
in the terminology of the natural sciences, often combined 
with psychology and sociology. 
Garnett joins in this insistence of Sorley, Ross, 
and Ewing, that the essential meaning of ethical terms 
nrust not be allowed to be lost in the process of analysis. 
Ethical experience, assuredly, is as valid a type of ex-
perience as sense experience. But it is an experience of 
its ovm kind. To say 11 1 ought," certainly seems to be 
different from saying 11 I desire, 11 or 11 I like, 11 or "I am 
interested." And to experience a sense of obligation cer-
tainly seems to be an experience different in kind from 
that of experiencing biological urges, social pressures, 
wants of whatever type, or interests. l'•loral experience is 
a unique kind of experience, not reducible to that which 
is essentially non-moral. !"loral experience may vlell be 
related to neural and glandular activity, as, indeed, it 
often is. But the meaning of the moral experience, as 
moral, can scarcely be understood in terms of the neural 
and glandular activity alone. 
A third point of agreement to be noted between 
Garnett and the other men of this study, an agreement with 
193 
Ross in particular, but also with Ewing, has to do with 
the matter of a thorough analysis of terms. Ross was 
commended for his attempt at thoroughness of analysis. 
Garnett, too, deserves such co~mendation. All of Garnett's 
works show a concern for this type of thoroughness, and 
his latest book, Ethics: A Critical Introduction, shows it 
most of all. Only through such an analysis can meanings 
be rnade clear and explicit, and an adequate theory be 
built. Such a concern for analysis does not preclude a 
synoptic view, as Garnett's system shows, but rather be-
comes the basis for a synoptic philosophy. 
A fourth point of agreement, an agreement with 
Sorley most of all, but partially with Ewing as well, is 
to be seen in the adoption and use of coherence as the 
most adequate criterion of truth. Sorley endorsed the 
coherence criterion, and used it to develop the notion of 
a universal system of values. Ewing, basically an intui-
tionist, was willing to use coherence, at least in a 
limited way, as a means of ratifying that which has been 
presented in intuition. But it is in Garnett's system, 
of these four, that the coherence criterion comes to its 
fullest use. Throughout all of his writings Ga1·nett in-
sists upon reasonableness, or coherence, as the criterion 
of truth. 
Such a criterion does not provide scientific 
accuracy, but the tools of scientific accuracy are not 
equipped to handle adequately man's moral experience. 
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The tools of scientific accuracy can handle admirably the 
task of describing the space-time order, but moral experi-
ence, while related to the space-time order, seems to have 
meaning which, in itself, is essentially non-spatial. 
Hence a goal must be sought that is different from the 
goal of scientific accuracy; namely, the goal of coherent 
reasonableness. And the criterion to be applied is, thus, 
coherence, which, while yielding no more than reasonable 
probability, yields all that can be expected, and provides 
the framework, or the outside limits, for a reasonable 
faith. 
A fifth point of agreement, once again an agree-
ment primarily with Sorley, concerns the significant place 
given to persons in both Sorley's system and Garnett's 
system. Both Sorley and Garnett make very explicit this 
aspect of their systems. Sorley insisted that values are 
meaningless save as they are related to persons, that they 
must be interpreted in terms of their relationship to 
persons, and that without this relationship to persons 
they do not exist. Garnett wrote an entire book on what 
he referred to as nthe moral nature of man,tt and developed 
an ethical theory of self-realization which necessarily 
has as its point of reference the concept of the nature of 
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the true self, the potentialities of whj_ch are to be real-
ized. 
What is explicit here in the systems of Sorley and 
Garnett is implicit in the systems of Ross and Ewing. 
Neither Ross nor Ewing would be likely to disagree with 
this emphasis on the place of the person. Nevertheless, 
in their published works they do not describe in any de-
tail their views on this matter. 
Such an emphasis on the place of the person gives 
the entire ethical system a point of reference which is 
capable of being the autonomous center of moral activity, 
the agency of voluntary behavior, and the focal point of 
obligation and responsibility. Without such an emphasis, 
it is rather meaningless to speak of obligation, for 
obligation is always personal obligation; it is useless to 
speak of values, for values are always values for persons. 
Garnett is to be conrrnended for giving to the person the 
significant place which it holds in his system. 
And a sixth point of agreer;tent, so far as the 
merits of these systems are concerned, is to be seen in 
the insistence, shared by all four of these men, that the 
intention of any judgment in which right or good is predi-
cated is to say something about an objective state of af-
fairs independent of the subjective mind which forrnulates 
the judgment. Men everywhere are seen to make predications 
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of right and good, and when they do make such predications, 
their intention is to do more than simply reveal their 
subjective feelings or desires. They intend to say some-
thing that is objectively true about right and good. The 
particular thing of which rightness or goodness is claimed 
may, indeed, be neither right nor good, but the claim, 
however ill-founded, intends to reach beyond the subjective 
state of the mind which makes the claim. 
Nor is this the full extent of the moral objectiv-
ism for which these four men stand. Sorley and Garnett 
both develop a system of metaphysical objectivism, both of 
them speaking in terms of a set of moral laws that are as 
real and operative as the laws of the physical universe. 
Both of them feel that the differences between men have 
been over-emphasized, and that more attention needs to be 
given to the many ways in which men are alike. rvran, 
wherever he is found, is ~' with human characteristics, 
hun~n needs, human capacities, human potentialities. The 
concept of moral law suggests an order of universal values 
which are valid for all men because they are men. 
Ross and Ewing do not push this far into the realm 
of metaphysics, but when Ross speaks of 11 suitability" and 
Ewing of "fittingness," they most assuredly are implying 
an objective structure in terms of which nsuitability" or 
"fittingness" find their point of reference and their 
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meaning. 
Man lives in a world in which he calls some things 
"poisons" because of the effect which they have upon his 
physical make-up. Other things he calls 11 nutrients, 11 once 
again because of their effect upon his physical organism. 
Garnett, and these others, are suggesting that man has not 
simply a physical nature, but also a moral nature. As 
there are poisons and nutrients for his physical nature, 
so there seem to be poisons and nutrients for his moral 
nature. fl1an has a make-up--physical, mental, moral--of a 
deterrninate nature. He lives in a universe of a determin-
ate nature. Man seems to have the ability to choose, with-
in limits, how he shall act within this universe. But he 
surely is not free to do anything that he wants to do and 
then have any set of consequences which he might like to 
choose. To a significant degree, he chooses the conse-
quences when he chooses his deeds. 
These six points of agreement have been used to 
show that that which seemed meritorious in the systems of 
Sorley, Ross, and Ewing, are also included in the system 
developed by Garnett. But not only does Garnett's system 
possess these merits. Nore than this, Garnett seems to be 
successful in avoiding or resolving many of the difficul-
ties and weaknesses which beset the systems which have been 
examined here. 
For one thing, one of the major problems for all 
three of the previously examined systems was the role of 
intuition in moral theory. Sorley, Ross, and Ewing were 
all criticized for having, to varying degrees, used 
intuition not simply as a possible source of truth-claims, 
but as a source of truth which carried with it its own 
verification. lt!henever intuition becomes its own verifi-
cation, the hope of resolving conflicts between intuitions 
rationally is lost. Conflicting intuitions can be re-
solved rationally only when a more ultimate criterion is 
used. To the degree in which an ethical theory allows 
for intuition to carry with it its own verification, to 
that degree, at least, that system is rationally weak. To 
the degree that rational means are found to resolve con-
flicting intuitions, particularly through the use of 
empirical coherence, to that degree will the resulting 
ethical theory be rationally more sound. 
Garnett avoids this problem by insisting that the 
criterion of reasonableness, of coherence, must never be 
abandoned. Coherence must be used to test every ethical 
assertion, even when they seem to be of divine origin. In 
this way, man can remain the monitor of his experience, the 
autono:nous agent, the responsible person. 
A second item in this category of problem-solving 
is the difficulty which was seen in the concept of 
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"suitabiliti' for Ross and the concept of "fittingness" 
for Ewing. Actually, they are one and the same concept, 
and the difficulty with this concept is its failure to 
describe the end which is the referent point of that which 
is suitable or fitting. Garnett handles the problem by 
developing a theory of self-realization in which man's 
obligation is to develop his potentialities on increasing-
ly higher and fuller levels. Once such a goal is envisaged, 
then the suitable or fitting act is the act which is di-
rected toward this goal, or which contributes to its reali-
zation. There is the implication of this kind of meaning 
in the terms "suitability" and nfittingness" themselves, 
but it is the kind of implication which needs to be spelled 
out in some detail rather than assumed. 
A third item in this matter of difficulties within 
the previously examined systems is to be found in Sorley's 
definition of value as "that which ought to be.n Garnett 
sees this as an incorrect use of the term "ought, 11 for 
"ought" always implies an agent to bring about that which 
nought to be." Without the agent, the term "ought" can 
have no meaning. It would be better to use the term 
"ought" only in relation to persons who are able to bring 
about that which "ought to be" or do that which "ought to 
be done." 
And a final item in this matter of handling problems 
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of the other syster:1s is to be found in Ross 1 s failure 
ever to work both "right" and "good" into one integrated, 
coherent ethical system. That which is 11 right 11 is simply 
"right,n and no clear way is shown by Ross for relating 
"rightu and ngood." Yet ethical theory seems scarcely to 
have coe1pleted its task at this point of unrelatedness. 
Ross does point out that "right" and "good" must come 
together in the conscious mind of the person who thinks 
about them, and suggests that it is from the good man that 
we expect right acts to issue forth. But such a suggestion 
has no real grounding in his system. Garnett solves this 
problelfl by defining both 11 right 11 and "good 11 in terms of 
his theory of self-realization. The good man is the man 
who persistently works at the task of developing his 
potentialities on increasingly higher and fuller levels; 
the right acts which he performs are those acts which con-
tribute to this process of self-realization; and self-reali-
zation reaches fruition only as the self reaches beyond 
itself in outgoing universal concern for other persons. 
Such a system takes cognizance of the distinction 
between 11 right 11 and "good" which Ross had insisted upon, 
binds up the loose ends which were left in Ross's system, 
shows how 11 good 11 and 11 right" are related, and gives coher-
ent grounding to the system as a whole. 
All of this may seem to indicate that there are no 
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weaknesses or problec1.s in Garnett 1 s system, no questions 
which need to be raised about its adequacy. This is not 
quite the case. Hmvever, it might be well to point out, at 
this point, that the questions to be raised leave the major 
conclusions of Garnett's theory of self-realization un-
touched. 
One question which needs to be raised concerns the 
problem of the nature of the "altruistic will, 11 the concept 
which plays such a prominent part in most of Garnett's 
writings. It is doubtful that the question would arise for 
someone who had read only the most recent of Garnett's 
works, Ethics: A Critical Introduction. But in his earlier 
works the suggestion certainly seems to be made that a con-
cern for others arises spontaneously in the person as the 
result of intuition, and with intuition having done its 
work the person then knows that other people ought to re-
1 
ceive his outgoing good will and care. 
In his most recent book, such a suggestion is 
neither made nor repudiated. It is in this last book that 
he insists so strongly that every ethical assertion must 
1 See especiallf: Reality and Value (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1937), pp. 30b-307; A Realistic Philosophy 
of Religion (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1942), 
p. 56; God In Us (Chicago: Willett, Clark and Company, 1945), 
pp. x, 26-27, 159; The f.iioral Nature of fllan (New York: The 
Ronald Press Company, 1952), p. 249; Religion and the l'v1oral 
Life (New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1955), p. 100. 
be tested coherently. But in all of his vmrks he has 
shown a concern for reasonableness, so he has never seen 
any conflict between intuiting the concern for the good 
of others and reasonableness. 
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But in this last work, the development of the case 
for altruism seems quite different. Here, rather than 
seeing the altruistic will as intuited cognitively, he 
leans heavily upon his total theory of self-realization in 
which altruism is seen as the highest and fullest step in 
the development of the potentialities of the self. And 
the conclusions concerning altruism, rather than intuitive-
ly given, seem rather to be the result of a line of infer-
ential reasoning. 
If this is a development in Garnett's thought, then 
it can be taken as a merit of his system, for it would be 
a step in the direction of coherence. The question concern-
ing the matter has been raised because it is not completely 
clear that such a development has taken place. There needs 
to be a repudiation of his earlier position, if that is 
different from the vie·w which he now holds, along with this 
later statement. 
A second question to be raised is closely related 
to the first. In speaking of the development of the altru-
istic level of voluntary control, Garnett says that this 
level has been reached "when the interest in the interests 
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of others has generalized itself into an interest in hwnan 
values as such.nl And the question is: Just how does this 
"generalizing of itself" take place? 
Perhaps it is unfair to Garnett to single out this 
one sentence, and yet it is a crucial point with which he 
is dealing. Here again, it is doubtful that this would 
attract the attention of someone who had read only this 
most recent book. But combining this with his earlier 
statements about intuiting the altruistic will, one won-
ders if this, also, is some sort of intuitive process. And, 
if so, is this simply a description of what naturally takes 
place? And if it is, in what sense does it constitute an 
aspect of an ethical theory which seeks to do more than 
describe natural processes? 
Possibly this difficulty in interpretation might 
have been avoided if Garnett, instead of using the phrase, 
"has generalized itself," had used the phrase, 11 has been 
generalized." In that sense, then, the altruistic level of 
voluntary control of conduct would be achieved uwhen the 
interest in the interests of others has been generalized 
into an interest in human values as such." Perhaps this 
is what Garnett intended to say. In any case, his phraseol-
ogy makes possible uore than one interpretation. 
1A. C. Garnett, Ethics: A Critical Introduction 
(New York: The Ronald Press Con1pany, 1960), p. 363. 
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A third question to be raised concerns Garnett's 
insistence upon what he calls a "non-normative11 definition 
of "good." This may be nothing more than a problem of 
semantics. But when Garnett defines "good" as na reasonable 
object of a favorable attitude," why does not the inclusion 
of the term 11 reasonable 11 in the definition give it a norma-
tive connotation? Indeed, Garnett's entire system seems to 
suggest that being reasonable constitutes one of man's pri-
mary duties. 
Garnett's intention, here, seems to be that of 
maintaining the purity of his terminology. To speak of a 
norm is to speak of an "ought,n and to speak of an "ought" 
is to speak of an "ought to do,n not an "ought to be." 
The notion of "ought to be11 has already been criticized. 
To speak of a normative definition of "good, 11 then, would 
be something akin to speaking of an 11 ought to be." The 
ought is left dangling, with no agent to bring about what 
"ought to be.n 
Nevertheless, the distinction seems a little 
labored, and the term "reasonable,n in and of itself, does 
seem to suggest a standard, or norm. 
A fourth problem to be noted is one which is relat-
ed to Garnett's treatment of "special obligations.n Ross 
had insisted that such requirements as the keeping of 
promises, the paying of debts, the making of reparation 
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for injuries inflicted, and the fair distribution of that 
which is good, constitute prima facie duties which are self-
evident and unmistakable. Garnett seeks to fit these into 
his own systert1 by placing them within what he calls the 
second level of voluntary control, the level of loyalty. 
But the level of loyalty is the level of relationships 
between persons within the same social groupings, and 
obligations on this level would apply, then, just to the 
members of one's own group. But Ross, surely, had a far 
broader scope in ri1ind than this when he thought of special 
obligations. The requirement involved in each case of 
special obligation, for Ross, is a human requirement, 
unaffected by group membership, and universally applicable 
because of the nature of the hunan person. 
It can be granted that special obligations are 
first felt in relation to persons who belong to one's own 
social groupings, but the principle of special obligation 
reaches far beyond such limitations. Indeed, it reaches 
out to all mankind. 
Garnett, to be sure, would not be likely to disa-
gree with this. Actually, he makes provision for it in 
his notion of altruism. But the matter constitutes a 
problem for his system because he relates these special 
obligations specifically to the level of loyalty, as 
loyalty within "community,n and fails to show their 
206 
relationship to the broader scope of humanity, the entire 
,.human conununi ty." 
And a fifth and final question to be raised here 
is this: \ihat, precisely, is the place of the experience 
of desire in Garnett's system? Garnett has given consid-
erable attention to a careful psychological analysis of 
the self. Since the experience of desire is so frequent 
and familiar an experience for the self, it would seem 
that a psychological analysis of the self would have to 
include an analysis of the experience of desire. However, 
one looks in vain for the use of the term 11 desire11 in the 
positive statement 9f Garnett's description of human 
experience. 
Sorley was criticized as being basically suspicious 
of desire. Desires, for the most part, were items of expe-
rience to be carefully watched and usually curbed. Ross, 
on the other hand, argued that desire can play a useful 
role in the living of the moral life--a person can want to 
do what is right. 
Garnett does not asswne either of these positions, 
but while he may be closer to Ross than to Sorley on this 
point, one would not expect him to speak of "desiring to 
do one's duty." Moreover, the fact that the only times in 
which he uses the term ndesire" are instances in which it 
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refers to desire for pleasure or desire for happiness, 1 
see;,1s to suggest a kinship to Sorley 1 s position. Desires 
emphasize egoism, for Garnett, whereas the ethical de1aand, 
for hi;n, is a demand for altruism. Nevertheless, the 
notion of desire does seem to be smuggled into the positive 
stater,tent of his position. 
In this positive statement he speaks of there 
being three levels of voluntary control of conduct on which 
moral behavior can occur. Below these three levels is the 
realm of impulse--that which, in terms of desire, could be 
called the level of uncriticized desire. Above this realm 
of impulse is the first level of voluntary control, which 
Garnett calls the level of prudence. One's interests on 
this level, according to Garnett, are interests in one's 
own satisfactions and dissatisfactions. But in what is 
the satisfaction or dissatisfaction to be found--in the 
fulfillment, or lack of it, of one's desires'? Garnett does 
not use the ter:n 11 desire, 11 but its ir:1plication certainly 
seems to be present. 
Then, the move from the level of prudence to the 
second level of voluntary control, the level of loyalty, 
is possible because man finds satisfaction not only in his 
own interests and their fulfill~ent, but he finds satis-
faction in the satisfaction of those with whom he is more 
or less closely associated. Once again, in what is the 
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satisfaction to be found--the fulfillment of a higher level 
of desire? 
And when ;;1an makes the move upward from the level 
of loyalty to the third level of voluntary control, the 
level of altruisrn, is it not because he now finds a fuller, 
if not the fullest, degree of satisfaction--satisfaction 
in the fulfillment of a higher, or highest, level of de-
sire'? 
It is unfortunate that Garnett avoided the use of 
the ten;l 11 desire, u or failed to make more explicit his 
position in regard to it. nDesiren is a ter111 which refers 
to a rather significant aspect of human experience. Any 
ethical theory, and especially any psychological analysis 
of the self, needs to approach the problem of desire 
directly. Garnett's failure at this point constitutes a 
weakness in his system. 
CHAPTER VI 
COMPARATIVE SUI~'IIviARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In attempting a sun~ary of the foregoing analyses, 
the most promising method of approach would seem to be one 
in which the principle of organization is based upon the 
crucial issues with which these four systems are concerned, 
rather than one which sets forth a summary statement of 
each individual system, seriatim. Thus, as each issue is 
discussed, comparisons will be drawn, points of agreement 
and disagreement among the four thinkers of this study will 
be described, and evaluations will be offered. 
The sUimnary will be composed of three main sec-
tions. The first section will deal with the procedural 
issues of data, method, and criteria. The second section 
will deal with the basic terms which have been used in 
these systems, such as "value" and 11 good 11 ; "ought,n "obli-
gation,n nduty,n and "right"; "moral"; and ttmoral good-
ness.11 The third section will deal with the case for 
moral objectivism which has been made in these four sys-
tems. And then, following these three sections of swrunary, 
there will be a section which will consist of a statement 
of conclusions. 
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1. Data, Method, and Criteria 
(1.) Data. 
All four of the men of this study claim that the 
basic material with which they begin the task of developing 
an ethical theory consists of moral experience. Were it 
not for the fact that men, throughout history, had already 
made moral distinctions within their experiences, such 
data would not be available. But men have made these 
distinctions, and they serve as the data for ethical the-
ory. 
However, while all four of these thinkers speak 
of beginning with the moral experience of mankind, they 
do not have precisely the same notion in mind so far as 
the content of moral experience is concerned. Sorley 
means by moral experience an awareness of the difference 
between good and evil. This is a cognitive awareness of 
the worth of objects or experiences. This is no feeling 
of obligation--that comes later, for Sorley, only after 
the cognitive awareness of worth has already occurred. 
Feelings of obligation, or duty, are secondary, and do not 
constitute a portion of the data of ethics. 
Sorley confuses the issue, somewhat, by defining 
the value that is cognized as "that which ought to be.lf 
The "ought" suggests obligation, but there is no agent to 
serve as the one who is obligated to bring about that 
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v1hich was approved in the judgment of worth. Hore than 
this, the notion of nought" in the definition of value 
tends to confuse 1noral value with other types of value. 
That which is beautiful, by such a definition, is so:-.1ething 
which ltought to be,n but aesthetic appreciation is not 
necessarily a case of moral obligation. For Sorley, it is 
the subject ;natter of the judgment of value which deter-
mines whether or not it is a moral judgment. 
It will be necessary to return to this problet;1 of 
terminology in Sorley 1 s system in the proper section of 
this chapter. The point to be made here is this: When Sor-
ley talks about the data of ethics as consisting of basic 
moral experience, he is referring to judgments of value, 
not opinions about, nor feelings of, obligation. 
Ross, on the other hand, though using the same term 
as Sorley--rnoral consciousness--means by it not cognitive 
awareness of worth, but the experience of oughts. Whereas 
Sorley looks to the history of mankind for judgments of 
approval and disapproval, Ross looks for opinions, convic-
tions, and beliefs concerning what kinds of acts ought, or 
ought not, to be done, and what kinds of things ought, or 
ought not, to be brought into existence. 
Ross recognizes that two strands of experience are 
to be found within the moral consciousness--the Hebraic 
strand which emphasizes right, duty, and ought, and the 
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Greek strand, which emphasizes goods, or values, or ends to 
be attained. Each strand, for Ross, is irreducible to non-
moral terms, and neither is definable in terrt1s of the 
other. But the Hebraic strand of oughtness Ross believes 
to be the more significant, and he looks to it, primarily, 
for the data of ethics. 
Ewing, not willing to r:1ake ngood 11 and noughtn such 
disparate concepts, finds the data of ethics in experiences 
which belong to each of these strands of the moral con-
sciousness. Ultimately, he defines 11 good" in terms of 
nought,n but, in gathering data, he is interested not only 
in man's ideas of right and wrong, but also in his notions 
of good and bad, and the experiences to which these ideas 
refer. 
Garnett follows Ewing in this i~latter. Rather than, 
consider just cognitive judgments of worth, as was the case 
with Sorley, or primarily beliefs and convictions about 
what ought to be done, as Ross, he combined the t1w. Ex-
periences of value and experiences of obligation are both 
significant experiences in the moral life of r,1an. The 
morally good man cannot be described just in tert;lS of 
11 ought n nor just in terms of "goodn or It value. 11 The de-
scription must include a proper combination of both of 
these concepts. 
Sorley, in liHliting his data to judgraents of worth, 
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and Ross, in placing such strong emphasis upon the notion 
of "ought,n sometimes to the neglect of the notion of 
"good, 11 leave theraselves subject to being criticized for a 
lack of inclusiveness in their systems so far as this mat-
ter of data is concerned. Ewing and Garnett are to be com-
mended for their atte;apt to be thoroughly inclusive. 
(2.) Nethod. 
Each of the men of this study attempt to use a 
method, or methods, which can be characterized as ernpiri-
cal, as analytic, and as synoptic, each to varying degrees 
within the different systems of thought. 
The term nempirical," here, is used to refer to 
the entire area of human experience, or human conscious-
ness. A method in ethical theory can be called "empirical" 
if it is a method that seeks to discover what is occurring 
in consciousness when moral distinctions are rnade, or which 
finds in the experiences of human consciousness the data 
with which it works. 
The term "analytical," in relation to an ethical 
theory, is used to refer to any method Vlhich is based upon 
\ 
a critical examination of all of the possible aspects of 
moral experience. It reduces every experience and every 
term to its basic component parts. It seeks to discover, 
within moral experience, that which is basically irreduci-
ble. 
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The terw 11 synoptic 11 is used to refer to any method 
in which explanation in terms of wholes is seen as more 
basic and more ultimately significant than explanation in 
terms of parts. One who uses a synoptic method explains 
parts in terms of wholes, rather than viholes in terms of 
parts; explains the simpler in terms of the more complex, 
rather than the more complex in terms of the simpler; and 
explains the earlier and less fully developed in terms of 
the later and more fully developed, rather than the later 
and wore fully developed in terms of the earlier and less 
fully developed. 
Beginning with the first characterization of the 
methods used by the men of this study--the empirical aspect 
of those methods--it would surely be difficult to compare 
the varying degrees to which these men succeeded in this 
regard. It was the attempt of all of thern, certainly, to 
relate their work, constantly, to human experience. Each 
of them, apparently, was reasonably successful in relating 
his work at least to what seemed to him to be intimately 
related to human consciousness. 
The second characterization of these methods--their 
analytical aspect--is more easily assessed. Of the four, 
Sorley is the least thorough in this regard, although he can 
be credited with an analytical spirit which sought always 
to subject terms and experiences to critical exar:lination. 
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His failure to analyze iliore carefully the term "value, 11 
his failure to deal more thoroughly with moral obligation 
as felt, and his failure to analyze r.1ore fully the experi-
ence of desire, are illustrations of his lack of thorough-
ness so far as analytical method is concerned. On the 
other hand, his analysis of the relationship between per-
sons and value, and the analysis of what he calls the 
claim to objectivity made by judgments of value, are 
examples of his ability to be analytic. 
Ross and Ewing have worked painstakingly at the 
task of thorough analysis, and have been successful at it. 
11 0ught," 11 good, 11 and other ethical terms, are analyzed 
with the utmost care and patience, and various distinct 
usages of the terms are distinguished one from another. 
And Garnett has been no less successful than Ross and 
Ewing. Garnett has always attempted to be carefully 
analytic in all of his work, and has developed a high 
degree of thoroughness of analysis particularly in his most 
recent book, Ethics: A Critical Introduction. 
And the third characteristic of these methods--
their synoptic aspect--is most markedly seen in the work 
• 
of Sorley and Garnett. For both of these men, truth is one, 
and the method for both is a method which involves a search 
for that one truth. 
Such a synoptic approach is more i1~1plied than 
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explicit in the work of Ross and Ewing. But neither of them 
is so devoted to the analytic method that he supposes he has 
arrived at ultimate explanation when he has arrived at the 
parts to which analysis leads. \ihen Ross speaks of "sui ta-
bilityn and Ewing speaks of "fittingness," that which is 
suitable or fitting is suitable or fitting in relation to 
a total system into which it fits. Neither Ross nor Ewing, 
however, have found occasion, if, indeed, they have sought 
it, to develop such an i;nplication into an explicit aspect 
of their total system of thought. 
The fact that Sorley and Garnett have insisted upon 
being synoptic in their approach has given to their systems 
a degree of completeness which they would not otherwise 
have. 
(3.) Criteria. 
The two criteria of truth which have vied for su-
premacy in the systems here studied are intuition and co-
herence. All four of the men accept intuition at least as 
basic insight into relations between psychological pro-
cesses v-Ihich go on within one 1 s own consciousness, and they 
are all willing to accept it as a source of truth-claims. 
r·1ore than this, however, all of them except Garnett, at 
some point or other, allow intuition to carry with it its 
own verification. Garnett alone remains thoroughly and 
consistently faithful to the demands of coherence. 
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Sorley, to be sure, in dealing with the problem of 
an adequate criterion of truth; endorsed the coherence cri-
terion, or what he called the criteria of universality, sys-
tem, and comprehensiveness. Values, for hi1;1, \'.rere under-
stood as constituting a coherent system of values, and new 
judgments of value were to be tested agalnst that systew. 
Nevertheless, at crucial points in his system, he relies 
not on the reasonable probability which is coherence, but 
upon a type of cognitive given, a nmoral e;iven,n which is 
known as true ·when it is received in consciousness. 
Ross, of these four men, is the c1ost thoroughly 
intuitionistic so far as a criterion of truth is concerned. 
Nor does he, in the final analysis, appeal to anything 
else other than intuition when dealing with the problem 
of basic noughts." One either knows, for exai:lple, that 
he ought not to cause unnecessary pain to others or he 
does not know it; but, says Ross, if he does not know it, 
there is no way to cause him to know it through some sort 
of rational argument. Such a prima facie nought 11 is either 
known intuitively or not at all. And one's only recourse, 
when confronted with someone who does not r•ecognize such a 
prima facie "ought, 11 is to ask hin to look once again at 
the situation. 
Ewing was unwilling to accept so extreme a state-
ment of intuitionism as Ross had advanced, but, though he 
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instituted a type of coherent check upon intuitions, or a 
principle of coherent ratification of them, he remains an 
intuitionist, though to a lesser degree. Ewing strengthens 
his position by pointing out that intuitions are neither 
infallible, nor isolated from other rational processes. 
The best intuitions are those which follow reasoning, not 
those which precede it. Nevertheless, he never shows, with 
precision, the relationship which pertains between intuition 
and coherence. As with Sorley, though Ewing insists upon 
coherent ratification, there are times \'lhen the n intuitive 
graspn is ardently affirmed as, apparently, constituting 
its own verification. 
Garnett, alone among the four, consistently and 
persistently uses the test of reasonableness, or coherence, 
in his examination of all truth-claims. In so doing, he 
makes rational provision for resolving the conflicts which 
so often occur among intuitions, as well as those conflicts 
which occur among all other claims to truth. There are no 
intuitions that are acceptable on their own grounds, but 
all, even those which claim divine origin, must meet the 
test of coherence. Such rational grounding shows more 
promise for arriving at truth than does the claLa to in-
tuitive insight which lacks the rational grounding which 
coherence offers. 
2. Terminology 
(1.) "Value 11 and uGood.u 
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Of the four men of this study, Sorley is the only 
one \vho rnakes extensive use of the term 11 Value. 11 For him, 
a value is a claim to existence, an 11 ought to be." A 
judgment of value is an expression of approval with a 
nor1native connotation. But Sorley failed to draw a sharp 
line of distinction between values in general and rnoral 
values in particular, and the use of the term ttoughttt in 
the definition of value itself, tended to suggest that all 
values are moral values. Indeed, there are times when 
Sorley uses the term nvalue, tt apparently, as synonylliOUS 
with nmoral value." 
Sorley finds, as central and basic in a system of 
values, the tirae-honored values of truth, goodness, and 
beauty. Sorley is careful to point out that these are 
values only as they are related to persons and to exist-
ence. They are not values because they are valued, however, 
but they are values because they ought to be valued, 
whether anyone values them or not. 
Ross and Ewing avoid using the term 11 value" almost 
exclusively. They prefer, rather, to spealc of 11 good. 11 
Garnett seems to have adopted this procedure also, ever 
since his attempt in 1937 to develop a general theory of 
value in his book, Reality and Value. They do not say why 
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this is so, but it could very well be because of the great 
confusion that has developed in the use of the term nvalue." 
For Ross, "good" implies a favorable attitude. But 
it implies more than this. The favorable attitude is the 
subjective aspect of the situation. There is also the ob-
jective aspect, in which ttgoodn is seen as referring to a 
quality or characteristic of the object which is called 
good, a quality or characteristic which the object would 
possess even if the favorable attitude did not exist. 
Ross suggests a system of things that are intrin-
sically and objectively good. In an ascending order of 
worth, they are pleasure, knowledge, and virtue. Pleasure 
is the ideal state of feeling, knowledge is the ideal state 
of cognition, and virtue is the ideal state of the will. 
All other human goods are complexes of these. 
Ewing, after distinguishing ten different usages 
of the terti1 11 good, 11 suggests that the r.1ost basic lileaning 
of the term is to be found in its use as intrinsic good. 
All other usages find their point of reference here. Ewing 
agrees with Ross that the term implies a favorable attitude, 
but, defining ugood 11 in terrns of nought, n he suggests that 
ngood 11 is not applicable to any object of a favorable atti-
tude, but only to an object toward which it is fitting to 
have a favorable attitude. 
Garnett, following Ross and ~ling, also thinks of 
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"good" as referring to a favorable attitude, but he objects 
to the normative connotation that is found particularly in 
Ewing's use of it. He substitutes the term .nreasonablen for 
"fitting," so that "good" is then defined as "a reasonable 
object of a favorable attitude.n 
It is difficult to see exactly v;hat is gained by 
Garnett 1 s insistence that the term rt reasonable 11 carry with 
it no normative connotations. The basic difficulty to be 
found in Ewing's definition is the lack of a rational base 
for determining "fittingness." To speak of a reasonable 
object of a favorable attitude, however, provides the 
rational base that was lacking in Ewing's definition, while 
retaining the concept of fittingness that Ewing was eager 
to have included. Garnett still has the term "value," 
by which he means any interest fulfillment, to carry the 
broader, non-normative implications now borne also by his 
use of the term "good." Value could have the broader 
meaning of the two, with no normative connotation, and 
"good" could be used with a narrower meaning which would 
include a normative connotation. 
(2.) "Ought, n ttobligation, It "Duty, n and ltRight. II 
Although the term "oughtu appears in Sorley's defi-
nition of "value, 11 as that which "ought to be, 11 Sorley's 
system lacks adequate treatr,~ent of the notion of 11 ought, u 
or "obligation.n The use of the term nought" in his 
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definition of nvalue" is misplaced, for only persons can 
nought,n and in the definition no personal referent is pro-
vided. The experience of duty, for Sorley, is not a pri-
mary experience, but is secondary and derivative, possible 
only after a judgment of worth has been :nade. Then duty 
is assumed along the lines suggested in the judgment of 
worth. 
For Ross, Ewing, and Garnett, however, the notion 
of nought" is exceedingly significant; indeed, for each of 
them, either nought, 11 or a term closely related to "ought,n 
is the basic ethical term. 
In Ross's system, the right act is the act which 
ought to be done. The right act is the act which is suita-
ble within a given situation. Prima facie duties--keeping 
promises, paying debts, making reparation for injuries in-
flicted, and the like--are duties because the act required 
in each case is the suitable act, hence right, hence the 
act which ought to be done. One knows suitability through 
intuitive insight. 
Ewing, following the suggestion provided by Ross's 
notion of "suitability," uses this concept as one aspect 
of the meaning of "ought, 11 although he changes the term 
from nsuitability" to 11 fittingness.n The other aspect of 
the meaning of 11 ought 11 he describes in terms of moral obli-
gation. The fitting act is the act that is preferable, or 
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at least the one which seems preferable from the agent's 
point of view. The act that is morally obligatory upon the 
agent is the act which he deems fitting and which is in his 
power to perform. Fittingness is a relation between an 
action and its environment. fvloral obligation is an im-
perative upon the agent. 
Ross had defined "rightn as nthat which one ought 
to do." Ewing uses the term "duty11 to refer to this mean-
ing, and by "rightu he means "not wrong, 11 since often there 
are alternative right acts by means of any one of which a 
person could do that which constitutes his duty; and some-
times a particular right act is not within a person's 
power to perform, hence it could not be said to constitute 
his duty. 
Garnett defines 11 rightn as Ewing had done, oean-
ing nnot wrong, n and meaning by 'twrong, n 11 that which one 
ought not to do. n "Ought," whether in ethics or in so:ne 
other field, has a directive or prescriptive function in 
the form of suggesting a course of action, and it makes an 
appeal to reason. The course of action prescribed is in 
reference to a pattern, or a total system of activities and 
consequences. The appeal to reason is in the form of say-
ing that if one wants a certain pattern fulfilled, then 
there are certain requirements which must be met before the 
fulfillment can be accomplished. 
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Of these analyses of "ought,n Garnett's treatment 
is the most thorough in recognizing, as it does, the v1ide 
breadth of usage of the term "ought, 11 along with the core 
elements--its prescriptive aspect and its appeal to rea-
son--which all usages of the tenn share. For Ross and 
Ewing, "ought 11 is considered primarily as "moral ought," 
with really no attention being given to the frequent non-
moral usages of the term. Garnett recognizes this frequent 
non-1;1oral usage of u ought, n and distinguishes 11 moral ought" 
from other types of "oughtn by means of a careful analysis 
of the tern "moral. 11 
(3.) "Moral Oughtn and ni'1oral Good." 
For Sorley, the realm of the moral is distinguish-
able from the real;n of the non-moral by means of an exami-
nation of the content of the judgments of value which per-
tain to any given situation. If good or evil is being 
predicated, the judgment is a moral judgment, the experi-
ence involved is moral experience, and the problem involved 
is designated as wi chin the realm of the moral. 11 r:Ioral 
ought" is the concept of duty, or obligation, and one has 
a sense of obligation only after the judgment of moral good 
has been made. Of the two terms, 11 moral goodn is more 
basic and prir:1ary; 11 moral ought" is secondary and deriva-
tive, based upon the judgment of moral good. 
In Ross's system, the realm of the noral is 
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primarily the realm of nrightness" or "oughtness.u "Right" 
means "ought to do,n morally speaking. No distinction is 
made between "ought" and "moral ought.n noughtness,n or 
nrightness," is that which characterizes the moral as moral. 
But in Ross's system, "good" is as irreducible a 
term as "ought,n so for there to be 11 moral good," the realm 
of the moral must include not only noughtnessn but some 
kind of goodness as well. This "goodness" that is "moral 
good11 he finds in what he calls virtuous action. rvroral 
goodness is always related to character. An integral 
aspect of moral goodness is the matter of motive. The 
morally good character is that character vThich is motivated 
by a desire to do his duty, to bring into being something 
good, and to produce pleasure or prevent pain for other 
beings. 
Ross is called a deontologist by virtue of the 
fact that he insists upon a sharp distinction between 
nought" and "good." But in his notion of a morally good 
character, the distinction between "moral ought" and "moral 
good" is much less sharp. An action cannot be cor.1pletely 
morally good unless it is also a right act, and it is from 
the morally good character that one expects right acts to 
come. 
Ewing, as Ross before him, makes no distinction 
between nmoral oughtu and "non-moral ought. 11 "Oughtness, 11 
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as the basic ethical term, refers to the ~;1oral realm, and 
distinguishes the moral realm from the non-moral. l\'Toral 
obligation is a particular kind of uought, 11 however--an 
"ought" which it is in the power of the agent to perform. 
And, as 11 good 11 is defined in terms of "ought," so "moral 
good" is related to 11 ought,n in this case the "ought 11 of 
moral obligation. The moral realm is the realm of fitting-
ness, and moral good consists of a favorable attitude 
toward that to which one is morally obligated. 
Garnett, building on these viev.rs but going con-
siderably beyond them, develops a systein of self-realiza-
tion in terms of vv'hich both "moral goodu and 11 moral 
oughtn find their meaning. The realm of the moral is the 
realm of voluntary control of conduct, involving voluntary 
behavior \'ihich is controlled in confor,.tity vJith a pattern 
of self-fulfillment. 'tHoral ought, 11 or 11 obligation, 11 
refers to a constraint upon the will in the direction of 
conforr;1ing to the pattern of self-fulfilbtent. 11 Moral 
good" refers to a reasonable object of a favorable atti-
tude when the nreasonable object 11 is the fulfillment of 
the potentialities of the self on increasingly higher 
levels of voluntary control. The pattern of self-fulfill-
ment itself will be reviewed in the next section. 
3. Moral Objectivism 
(1.) Basic Claim of Ethical Judgments. 
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All four of the men of this study insist that 
ethical judgments, by their very nature, claim objectivity. 
To assert that something is right or good is not to intend 
simply to reveal one's own subjective state, but it is to 
intend to make a statement about something that is be-
lieved to be objectively true. I•1en throughout history 
have made such assertions about what they believe is 
right and what they believe is good, and the claim which 
such assertions carry with them is the clai~ to an ob-
jective status for that which is judged right or good. 
It is possible that such a claim to objective 
status may have no rational basis in fact--subjectivism 
may be true. But if subjectivis;,l is true, then the claim 
to objectivity borne by judgments about sense perceptions, 
and all other claims to lmowledge of objective truth, must, 
by the same logic, fall to the ground. 
(2.) nsuitability11 and "Fittingness." 
In the systems of Ross and Ewing, moral objectivism 
is assumed. It is only in relation to such objectivism 
that their systems have meaning. And yet, both Ross and 
Ewing fail to analyze this basic assumption v.Jhich they have 
made. 
Both of these men have developed their theories 
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upon the basic presupposition that the moral experience of 
man is related to an objective realEl which i,lan must recog-
nize and to which he uust, in a sense, conforu. The 
nature of this objective reah1, and I,ian 1 s o~·m nature, are 
of a certain determinate kind, and rnoral requirer·,1ents are 
requirements for actions that are suitable or fitting 
Hithin this objective realm and related to the determinate 
nature of the self and the world. 
Without this assunption of moral objectivism, the 
notion of 11 suitability11 or ufittingness" would have no 
point of reference. An intuition of "sui tabili ty't or 
"fittingness" is possible only if there is a lltoral order 
to which, then, this intuition refers, and in term.s of 
which it finds its meaning. 
Unfortunately, neither Ross nor Ewing ever ;:1ake ex-
plicit the interesting implication of moral obj ecti visul 
found within the notion of "suitability11 or nfittingness.n 
(3.) Self-Realization. 
While Sorley can be classified as a self-realiza-
tionist, for a man can be fully a man only as he organizes 
his life around the true, the beautiful, and the good, only 
Garnett, of the four men of this study, presents a care-
fully developed theory of self-realization. 
Garnett rejects egoism in any form, and thus does 
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not conceive of self-realization as the moral end-in-vievl. 
But he does describe the good life in terms of the pro-
gressive fulfillment of the potentialities of the self. 
As man controls his behavior by the criteria of prudence, 
loyalty, and altruism, with loyalty superseding prudence, 
and altruism superseding both prudence and loyalty, he ex-
periences fulfillment of selfhood on increasingly higher 
levels of development. And in the altruistic will he 
finds the real basis for true morality and true religion, 
and he experiences the full meaning and joy of being a 
human being. 
Such a theory of self-realization provides a sound 
rational basis for understanding moral experience. To say 
that something is "right 11 or "wrong, 11 11 good 11 or ubad," is 
to say that that something, so described, bears a certain 
kind of relationship to the realization of the potentiali-
ties of the human self. Garnett's theory does justice to 
the claim to objectivity which belongs to .. 1oral judgments, 
it avoids the unempirical aspects of Sorley's view that 
the true, the beautiful, and the good belong to a realm in-
dependent of man, and it provides a fixed point of refer-
ence in relation to which that which is nsuitable 11 for Ross 
or nfittingu for Ewing is understood and interpreted. The 
fitting act, morally speaking, is not known si1:1ply through 
intuitive insight, then, but is determined through a 
critical process of empirical coherence. 
( 4. ) Moral Laws. 
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Sorley and Ewing both speak of universal principles 
of ;norality, and liken these principles to the notion of 
natural laws. For Sorley, the concepts of truth, goodness, 
and beauty represent objectively valid and universally 
applicable principles v.Jhich belong to a moral order. The 
reality of this order is independent of man, yet only in 
aligning his life with this order can uan find self-ful-
fillment. 
Sorley's view is far more rationalistic than 
Garnett's, and less empirical. The objective moral order 
is independent of man, for Sorley, hence really not a 
part of his experience. Garnett, on the other hand, 
stresses the experience of the self, and finds in this ex-
perience a concern for others, an altruistic will, which 
is not reducible to any other kind of human drive, and 
which constitutes a constraint upon the will to act in 
conformity vli th this concern for others. 
The moral order to which the altruistic principle 
belongs, for Garnett, is not a realm independent of man, 
but rather a huuan description of the conditions which 
must be met and the requirements which i.iUst be fulfilled 
if there is to be wholesome development of the potentiali-
ties of personality. Moral laws prescribe the 11 ought 11 to be 
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fulfilled if action is to be right and obligation ;-:1et. 
In accordance with these laws, the good man is prudent when 
this does not conflict with loyalty or al truisrn; he is loyal 
to the fellow members of his various social groupings when 
this does not conflict 11vi th altruism; and he is guided by 
the principle of altruisri1. wherever and whenever such a 
principle is applicable. 
(5.) Theism. 
Both Sorley and Garnett develop a theistic concep-
tion of the universe. Sorley' s argu:,lent for thelsm grows 
out of the need within his system to provide a residence 
for the realm of rnoral laws. This realu of moral laws, 
in Sorley' s view, was understood as independent of ;nan, 
and so the concept of a personal God is postulated in order 
to provide a Cosmic I1 ind as the hOli1e of these r:toral lav.rs. 
Garnett 1 s theis;n is offered as a coherent explana-
tion of the origin of the altruistic will. Han, throughout 
history, has experienced a constraint upon his vvill that 
has led him to have a concern for others. The whole history 
of r.1oral experience, according to Garnett, suggests a Llove-
;nent toward altruism, if not in practice, at least in the-
ory. The comrnon :.nan in general, and religlous prophets in 
particular, have given testimony to this experience of the 
altruistic will. 
Garnett believes that the only coherent account to 
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be given so universal and pervasive an experience is to 
suggest that it has its origin in a Cosrllic Mind which has 
purposed that man experience such a constraint. Indeed, 
the worl<:ings of the altruistic will is none other than God 
at work within the human self. 
4. Conclusions 
(1.) The priit1ary contributions of Sorley' s syster.1 
are to be seen in his use of the coherence criterion of 
truth; in his insistence upon the significance of the per-
son in relation to value; and in his develop~ent of a con-
cept of :noral laws. The primary weaknesses of his syster.1 
are to be seen in his failure to distinguish adequately 
between the notion of value and the notion of obligation; 
and in his appeal to intuition at crucial points in the 
development of his theory. 
(2.) The primary contributions of Ross's system 
are to be seen in his critical analysis of 11oughtn and 
ngoodn; in his careful distinction between 11 oughtn and 
"good"; and in his insistence upon the significance, to 
the moral life, of special obligations. The primary weak-
nesses of his system are to be seen in his failure to de-
velop an analysis of the self; in his dependence upon intui-
tion as ultin~tely self-validating; in his failure to be 
more explicit concerning the objective reahi in terrilS of 
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which 11 suitabilityu finds its meaning; and in his failure 
to develop a relationship between 11 ought 11 and 11 good" which 
would show how both are aspects of a totally integrated 
system. 
(3.) The primary contributions of SHing 1 s systei-.1 
are to be seen in his use of a type of coherence test of 
truth; in his development, beyond Ross, of a rwre thorough-
ly integrated system in v1hich "ought 11 and "good 11 are re-
lated; and in his development, beyond Ross, of a 2ore 
thorough analysis of both nought 11 and 11 good. 11 The primary 
v;eaknesses of his system are to be seen in his frequent 
dependence upon intuition rather than coherence; and in 
his failure to trace out the implications of his notion 
of "fittingness" in a way that would show the objective 
ends in ter<1lS of which the n fi ttingn act can be called 
nfitting.n 
(4.) The primary contributions of Garnett 1 s system 
are to be seen in his thoroughgoing dependence upon coher-
ence; in his development, beyond Ross and E\ving, of a more 
complete analysis of the terms of ethical theory; in his 
psychological analysis of the self; in his carefully de-
veloped theory of self-realization; and in his concept of 
moral laws. The pri;nary weaknesses of his system are to 
be seen in his failure to be more precise both about the 
nature of the 11 altruistic will,n and about the manner in 
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which one comes to know the significance of altruistic 
acts; and in his faj_lure to treat adequately, or at least 
more explicitly, the human experience of desire. 
(5.) A rational case for moral objectivism can best 
be made by means of a dependence upon coherence rather than 
a dependence upon intuition. 
(6.) Since moral terms are always used in relation 
to persons, they should always be defined in te~1s of 
personal experience. r.1oral experience is possible only 
for autonomous personal agents. "Good" means "good for 
persons, 11 and "rightn means "right for persons.u 
(7.) Because all moral terms and all moral_experi-
ence must be understood in relation to personal selves, 
the final point of reference in understanding the ueaning 
of those teTI:1S and in interpreting that experience is to 
be found in the nature of the self, with all of its charac-
teristics and all of its potentialities. 
(8.) A theory of self-realizationisE1, Hith its 
description of the nature of the self, provides a fixed 
point of reference in terms of which all ;;1oral terms can 
be understood and all moral experience interpreted, and 
constitutes a rational ground for a defensible theory of 
moral objectivism. 
(9.) Of the four systems of thought analyzed in 
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this dissertation, Garnett 1 s theory of sc;lf-realizationislrt 
provides the .. :ost defensible case for uor·al obj ecti vis1n. 
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ABSTRACT 
It is the aiJ;l of this dissertation to exawine the 
systems of thought of four recent and contei.tporary obj ec-
tivists in moral theory, W. R. Sorley, \'f. D. Ross, A. c. 
Ewing, and A. C. Garnett, with a view to evaluating the 
case which they make for moral objectivism. 
Sorley, beginning with a study of judg1:1ents of ap-
proval and disapproval, argued that such judgments claim 
objective validity, and, V'lhen analyzed, reveal a pattern of 
basic principles of moral worth. These principles are 
universally valid, and constitute a system of moral laws. 
The primary contributions of Sorley's system are to be seen 
in his use of coherence; in his insistence upon the signif-
icance of the person in relation to value; and in his con-
cept of moral laws. The primary weaknesses are to be seen 
in his failure to distinguish adequately bet·ween value and 
obligation and in his appeal to intuition at crucial 
points in his theory. 
Ross, distinguishing carefully between nright" and 
"good," argued that nrightn is the r:1ore significant term 
for ethical theory. Right acts are acts which are "suita-
ble." Moral objectivism is implicit in his concept of 
11 suitability. 11 The priw.ary contributions of his system 
are to be seen in his critical analysis of 11 oughtn and 
"good" and in his insistence upon the significance, to the 
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moral life, of special obligations. The priuary wealmesses 
are to be seen in his failure to develop an analysis of the 
self; in his dependence upon intuition; in his failure to 
be more explicit concerning the objective realm in terms of 
which "suitabilityn finds its meaning; and in his failure 
to explain n:ore adequately the relationship between nought 11 
and 11 good. 11 
Ewing, influenced by Ross, attempted to overcome 
the difficulties in Ross's systeu. Ewing's moral objectiv-
ism is implicit in his concept of "fittingness.n The pri-
mary contributions of his system are to be seen in his use 
of a type of coherence test of truth; in his developlnent, 
beyond Ross, of a rllore thoroughly integrated system in 
which "oughtn and ngood" are related; and in his develop-
ment, beyond Ross, of a more thorough analysis of t!oughttt 
and 11 good.n The primary weaknesses are to be seen in his 
frequent dependence upon intuition and in his failure to 
trace out the objective implications of his notion of 
"fittingness. 11 
Garnett developed a theory of moral objectivism in 
ter:11s of a universally valid system of moral laws. These 
laws describe the requirements which must be met if the 
potentialities of the self are to be realized. The primary 
contributions of his system are to be seen in his thorough-
going dependence upon coherence; in his development, beyond 
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Ross and Ewing, of a more complete analysis of ethical 
terms; in his psychological analysis of the self; in his 
theory of self-realization; and in his concept of moral 
lav1s. The primary weaknesses are to be seen in his failure 
to be more precise about the nature of the 11 altruistic 
will" and about the manner in which one comes to know the 
significance of altruistic acts, and in his failure to 
treat more explicitly the experience of desire. 
With reference to the thought of these four men, 
the following general conclusions can be dravm: (1.) A 
rational case for moral objectivism can better be made by 
means of a dependence upon coherence rather than upon 
intuition. (2.) A theory of self-realization, with its 
description of the nature of the self, provides a fixed 
point of reference in terms of which moral tenns can be 
understood and moral experience interpreted. (3.) Of the 
four systems of thought analyzed in this dissertation, 
Garnett's theory provides the most defensible case for 
moral objectivism. 
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